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Abstract 
 
The main focus of this thesis is to show the nature of the relationship between the South 
African Defence Force and the local media from 1975-83. The thesis will analyse issues 
specifically relating to the nature of the relationship and show how and why they are relevant 
to understanding the authoritarianism of the apartheid state. The nature of the relationship 
will be conceptualised by way of the analogy of a marriage. The thesis will show that for the 
SADF the relationship was “a marriage of convenience” whereas for the media it was a 
“marriage of necessity”. This relationship operated within the context of a highly militarised 
society that has been termed a “Garrison State”. The apartheid government introduced 
legislation governing reporting of defence matters and the media (namely the South African 
Defence Act 1957 including amendments made up until 1980) that imposed legal constraints 
within which defence correspondents had to operate. Moreover, the MID’s secret monitoring 
of the local media reveals the extent to which the military distrusted the media. A sampling of 
the coverage of defence matters in a selection of newspapers will reveal how their editorial 
staffs and reporters operated in a situation where the flow of information was controlled by 
the military. This will also show that certain defence correspondents cultivated close relations 
with SADF personnel to ensure that they were kept informed. The thesis will also show how 
the SADF reacted to the international media exposure of Operation Savannah and Operation 
Reindeer and how the SADF sought to limit the damage to its reputation by clamping down 
on the local media. The creation of two media commissions both headed by Justice MT 
Steyn, set out to investigate the manner in which local media reported on security issues in an 
environment in which the media and the public were confronted by the “Total Strategy” 
discourse of the apartheid government. The working relationship between the SADF and the 
media encapsulated in the thesis can be described as highly complex and the use of the 
“marriage” analogy assists in understanding this relationship.   
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Introduction  
 
It is the purpose of this thesis to analyse the relationship between the South African Defence 
Force and the media between 1975 and 1983. The thesis will commence with an account of 
South African media commissions since the Second World War and legislation governing the 
reporting of defence matters and the media with specific reference to the South African 
Defence Act of 1957 (including amendments made up until 1980). Mechanisms for 
controlling reporting on security matters such as censorship, the Press Code, the Newspaper 
Press Union/South African Defence Force Agreement and other strictures that defined the 
relationship between the apartheid government and the media will then be analysed. The 
thesis will then proceed to analyse Beaufre’s “Total Strategy” and the Department of 
Defence’s White Paper of 1977 “Total Onslaught” discourse. It will be suggested that such 
discourse insinuated itself into South African society which will be shown to be a “Garrison 
State”. To strengthen the argument that apartheid South Africa was a “Garrison State”, the 
thesis will analyse measures taken to manipulate and monitor the media. These include the 
Military Intelligence Department’s secret media reports that reveal how it monitored press 
coverage relating to the SADF and Prime Minister PW Botha. The thesis will also scrutinize 
the relationship between the South African media and the Department of Defence as well as 
how they interacted with regard to the coverage of defence matters. The possibility that 
Operation Savannah and Operation Reindeer were public relations disasters will be 
investigated by the thesis. The political fall-out of these PR disasters of Operations Savannah 
and Reindeer as well as the roles played by the Department of Defence and international 
media stemmed from international coverage of events to which local media were not granted 
access thereby increasing the tensions between the latter and the SADF. Finally, the thesis 
will show how the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Reporting of Security Matters 
Regarding the South African Defence Force and the South African Police as well as the 
Report of The Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media, made significant 
recommendations with regards to the reinforcement of the status quo in terms of reporting on 
security matters. 
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It should be stressed that very little research has been done previously regarding this field of 
study. This research will seek to fill that gap that exists in the body of knowledge. The 
research project spans the fields of History and Journalism. More specifically, it borrows 
insights from the sub-disciplines of military history and media studies. Although the thesis 
emphasises the role of the press, the term “media” is used interchangeably with “the press” 
as the thesis does mention other types of media (magazines, television etc.) besides the 
press. Also, the thesis makes a distinction between the use of the terms “SADF” and “South 
African military”. When the term “South African Military” is used, both SADF and the 
Department of Defence are being referred to. The research is undertaken within a specific 
historical time frame (1975-83) as it was a very tumultuous time in the relationship between 
the media and the SADF. The time period coincides with the height of apartheid South Africa 
as a “Garrison State” with censorship laws and a culture of secrecy creating an incredibly 
difficult environment for the media to operate within.  Also, the time frame was chosen for 
pragmatic reasons, as the nature of the relationship between the media and the SADF was 
particularly strained between 1975 and 1983.  
 
The central task of social research is that the production of knowledge is prioritised.1 The 
manner in which the research was undertaken was via analysis of documentation and media 
coverage of historical events dating mainly between 1975 and 1983. The methodology was, 
firstly, to identify relevant material which sheds light on the relationship between the SADF 
and the media. This was done by searching for relevant material from Cory Library at Rhodes 
University. Then, secondly, the relevant material and necessary documents were located in 
and obtained from the appropriate repositories. Lastly, a critical analysis of these documents 
was undertaken to show what light they shed on the main issues involving the topic of 
research. Critical, in the sense that the word is used in this thesis, does not necessarily mean a 
negative view, but rather involves a reading of the documents in such a way as to evaluate 
what light they shed on the relationship between the SADF and the media. 
 
It should be noted that all primary sources, except the Military Intelligence Department’s 
media reports, as well as material relating to P.W. Botha, were obtained from the Cory 
                                                          
1 U. Flick, Introducing research methodology: a beginner's guide to doing a research project (Los Angeles, 
2011), p.7. 
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Library at Rhodes University. The MID media reports were obtained from the SANDF 
Archives in Pretoria and are analysed to illustrate what newspaper coverage MID deemed 
important and what subjects it monitored. Material relating to P.W. Botha was sourced from 
the Centre for Contemporary History at the University of the Free State in Bloemfontein. 
Newspapers, obtained from the Cory Library provided coverage of defence matters that 
afforded insights into the relationship between the SADF and the media. Newspaper samples 
from 1975-83 of Die Burger, Rand Daily Mail, Cape Times, Die Afrikaner, EP Herald and 
Daily Dispatch, were consulted so as to provide evidence of how defence force matters were 
covered by a range of newspapers. Die Burger should be viewed as an example of a pro-
government publication whereas the Rand Daily Mail was more critical. It should be noted 
that the thesis deliberately sampled mainstream media publications so as to capture a narrow 
spectrum of reporting on the military from 1975 to 1983. Also, availability of newspapers 
played a role in this selection process. The spectrum which the thesis identified was 
representative of what the (mainly) white public was reading at the time. The importance of 
language should also be mentioned in that English and Afrikaans readers shared some 
perceptions about matters relating to the military, but not all. It should be noted that not all 
media institutions were critical of the SADF, and that conservative media institutions tended 
to support the activities of the SADF. Thus the use of newspapers as primary sources is 
important to the project of the thesis as it sheds light on the range of opinion expressed by the 
press on military matters.  
 
The Defence Act of 1957 (with amendments up until 1980) is another primary source utilised 
in the thesis. It is analysed as an example of legislation instituted by the apartheid 
government to ensure that it had almost complete control of defence reporting and access to 
information regarding security matters. Other primary sources such as the Department of 
Defence White Paper of 1977 was consulted to show where the “Total Strategy”/ “Total 
Onslaught” discourse which gained currency in apartheid South Africa during the 1970s and 
80s originated from. This discourse was employed not only by the apartheid government but 
also by the media. Thus this discourse became common currency as it was circulated the 
public sphere. The media commissions headed by Justice MT Steyn, namely The Report of 
the Commission of Inquiry into Reporting of Security Matters Regarding the South African 
Defence Force and the South African Police (1980), and The Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry on the Mass Media (1983) are analysed specifically to show how the apartheid 
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Government sought to redefine the local media environment following the damage caused to 
the reputation of the SADF by international media coverage of Operations Savannah and 
Reindeer. 
 
 
During the process of producing the thesis, various problem areas were encountered. The 
unavailability of resources such as the in camera submissions made to both Steyn 
Commissions, not only hampered the research phase, but also the writing process. 
Unfortunately, no trace could be found of the in camera submissions made to both Steyn 
Commissions and thus the thesis had to make do without them. Language issues were also 
encountered. A fair amount of the resource material was published in Afrikaans, and thus 
had to be translated into English. Die Burger, for example, is an Afrikaans newspaper and 
its reports are widely quoted in the thesis. Difficulty with translating these reports were 
experienced as the reports generally used colloquial Afrikaans which could not always be 
directly translated as there existed a risk that the meaning and emphasis of the reports 
would be lost.  
 
 
The thesis has referenced numerous published works. Books, journal articles and theses were 
consulted. One of the main secondary sources used is a M.A. thesis in Journalism by Graeme 
Addison entitled Censorship of the Press in South Africa during the Angolan War: A Case 
Study of News Manipulation and Suppression (MA Thesis: Rhodes University, 1980). 
Addison provides an account of how the military attempted to censor local media coverage of 
Operation Savannah when the story was broken by the international press. This thesis forms 
the basis for understanding the censorship of security information and how this influenced 
defence correspondents. Defence correspondents played a crucial role in the relationship 
between the SADF and the media and the nature of this relationship depended on the access 
to security information granted to defence correspondents and how they treated that 
information. Thus Addison’s work informs my framing of the relationship between the SADF 
and the media. However, this thesis builds upon Addison’s work by extending the time frame 
and drawing upon other published literature.  
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Apartheid South Africa’s status as a “Garrison State” forms a key component of the argument 
of the thesis. In order to understand the concept of a “Garrison State” (phrase coined by 
Harold Lasswell in 19412) more profoundly within the context of apartheid South Africa, 
various secondary sources were consulted. P. Frankel’s Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military 
Relations in South Africa (Cambridge,1984) as well as B. Magubane’s From Detente to the 
Rise of the Garrison State (Chapter 2 in The Road to Democracy in South Africa Volume 2 
(1970-1980),Pretoria, 2006) specifically analyse the notion of the “Garrison State” with 
respect to apartheid South Africa. The reason for employing the notion of the “Garrison 
State” is to explain how apartheid South Africa conducted its relationship with the media and 
more specifically how it treated the print media. The relationship between the media and the 
South African military during the 1970s and 80s was extremely intricate and consisted of a 
fragile balance between self-censorship practised by the media and legislation ensuring that 
the media did not expose any of the activities of the South African military, unless the 
military gave them permission to do so.  
 
 
A “Garrison State” can be characterised as a society in which the most powerful people are 
members of the defence establishment or are individuals closely linked with the military.3 
This was true of apartheid South Africa from 1975 – 83. Hence, the media, and more 
specifically defence correspondents were expected to operate within a very secretive 
environment. The thesis will show how the MID ‘screened’ information about military 
matters for public consumption and frequently misinformed the public. The thesis will then 
proceed to look at the history of censorship in South Africa and how tensions between 
government and the media have many different sources. The thesis will show how the history 
of censorship in South Africa and the many varied sources of tension between the 
government and the media informed the relationship between the SADF and the media. 
 
 
In order to analyse the relationship between the SADF and the media, the discussion has to be 
situated within a wider media context. The relationship between the SADF and the media was 
                                                          
2 HD. Lasswell, “The Garrison State”, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, 4, 1941, p.455. 
3 Ibid., 
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a microcosm of a broader relationship between the media and the apartheid government. The 
apartheid government had invested heavily into getting its opinion into the public domain. It 
had practical difficulties in controlling the alternative media, which operated outside of the 
focus of mainstream media publications. The mainstream, commercial media was frequently 
criticised for applying a policy of self-censorship based on uncertainty about the apartheid 
government’s intentions as well as feeling intimidated by the apartheid government.4 Under 
the circumstances, editors invoked the sarcastic slogan describing how the media operated: 
“when in doubt, leave out”.5 The mainstream media in apartheid South Africa could be split 
into two language groups, namely English and Afrikaans. While the Afrikaans media 
supported the ruling political class, the English media (owned and controlled by big finance 
houses) was more neutral, although they still did not criticise the apartheid government 
extensively on security matters.6 The apartheid government also had its own media 
organisation namely the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). According to 
Christopher Merrett, the SABC was a mouthpiece for the apartheid government and it left 
white South Africans in complacent ignorance.7 The SABC saw its role as fostering 
economic and military preparedness and a spirit of optimism about the future which meant 
that it reflected National Party pragmatism.8 The apartheid government also had two front 
media organisations, the Citizen and To The Point. These were secretly state sponsored which 
proves how far the apartheid government was willing to go to gain influence in the public 
sphere. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission contextualised the relationship between 
the apartheid government and the media as follows: “Thus, even though some of the media 
may have opposed the government, the social and political system created by apartheid was 
sanctioned by the media. The media analysed society from inside that system and did not 
provide alternative perspectives and discourses from the outside.”9   
 
The manner in which other scholars characterise the relationship between the military and the 
media provides a point of departure for this thesis. Leopold Scholtz argues that the military 
                                                          
4 Merrett. C., Culture of Censorship: Secrecy and Intellectual Repression in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg, 
1994),p.86. 
5 Ibid., 
6 Hepple. A., Press Under Apartheid (London, 19774),p.58. 
7 Merrett, Culture, p.91. 
8 Ibid.,p.90. 
9 The Report on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998, Volume 4, p.186.  
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and the media are not only adversaries, but they are also independent allies, each with their 
own agenda.10 Thus for Scholtz, the media and the military can be both adversaries and allies 
depending on the situation. It is true that there can be overlap and/or contrasting interests 
regarding the respective agendas of the military and the media. However, one should tread 
carefully as characterising the military and the media as either “allies” or “adversaries” is an 
oversimplification of the nature of the relationship and does not make allowance for nuanced 
analysis.     
 
Militaries have always had challenging and complex relationships with the media. The 
relationship between the military and the media, though unequal, can also be mutually 
beneficial. Thus it is important to place the relationship between the SADF and the South 
African media in a specific context. This context can be viewed as a typical relationship 
experienced between all militaries and the media. There exists certain general characteristics 
which can be found in any military/media relationship which needs to be recognised before 
the unique traits of the SADF/South African media can be analysed. These general 
characteristics also apply to the SADF/South African media relationship. It is important to 
note these general characteristics as they inform our understanding of what a relationship 
between the military and the media tends to look like. For example, all militaries attempt to 
control the flow of information regarding its activities as well as monitor what is being 
reported about them in the media. There also exists a trend amongst militaries to draw a 
distinction between different defence correspondents they consider part of the “in-group” and 
“out-group” (case studies of different defence correspondents will be analysed in chapter 4 of 
the thesis). It is important to note these shared relationship traits are broad in scope and thus 
the more specific and unique characteristics which defined the SADF/South African media 
relationship is of greater importance to the goals of the thesis.    
 
Abel Esterhuyse describes the relationship between the SANDF (the successor of the SADF) 
and the media as a potential “difficult marriage”.11 This same analogy can be applied to the 
relationship between the SADF and the media, with some qualification. With regards to the 
                                                          
10 L. Scholtz, The media and the military: Allies or adversaries? Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of 
Military Studies, Vol 28, 2, 1998, p.251. 
11 A. Esterhuyse, The South African armed forces and the media: a difficult marriage? (2004) in War, Military 
and the Media from Gutenberg to today, ME Ionescu (ed.), (Bucharest: Military Publishing House), p.143.  
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relationship between the SADF and the media, it has to be noted that the relationship was 
never equal. The media was always reliant on the SADF to provide it with information 
regarding security matters via press statements issued by the SADF. This reliance caused the 
media to become compliant and dependent on the SADF. Also, due to the arsenal of 
legislation regarding the publication of information deemed to be secret, the local media very 
rarely strayed from the process of self-censorship. Thus if the relationship between the SADF 
and the media is characterised as a “difficult marriage” it most certainly was a lopsided 
relationship favouring the interests of the SADF. The local media was muzzled to a great 
extent from ever truly criticising the SADF. However frustrating this was for media 
institutions, they could not simply “divorce” themselves from this “difficult marriage” due to 
the reliance on the SADF for information. Thus recognition of the status of the SADF as a 
primary gatekeeper of security information is crucial when attempting to characterise the 
relationship between the SADF and the local media. The SADF did use the media almost as a 
mouthpiece for conveying its press statements, however it could be argued that the SADF 
(due to its massive budget and support from the apartheid government) could have 
accomplished this on its own, and thus it did not really need the media for this task. The 
SADF had its own mouthpiece, Paratus, which was a monthly publication targeted at 
primarily SADF soldiers but it was also available to the general public. Paratus focused on 
issues pertaining to the SADF. Thus the SADF propagated its views through its own media as 
well as using the private media to do so. The readership of government and SADF-sponsored 
publications was limited, thus they wanted to reach as large an audience as possible and this 
necessitated the use of the mainstream press. Shanker describes the relationship between the 
US military and the media as a “dysfunctional marriage”.12 This formulation, along with 
Esterhuyse’s “difficult marriage” analogy is useful as it assists in understanding the 
relationship between the SADF and the media.  
 
The thesis uses analogies because analogies are linguistic/heuristic tools used to compare 
things we know with that which is relatively unknown and thus aids our understanding. 
Therefore, the relationship between the media and the SADF can be characterised differently 
                                                          
12 T. Shanker, The Military-Media Relationship. A Dysfunctional Marriage? (Interview with Major General 
Mark Hertling, U.S. Army), Military Review, 2009, p.2. sourced from: 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/shanker_mil_media.pdf 
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from the perspective of either side. For the SADF, its relationship with the media can be seen 
as a “convenient marriage”. Interacting with the media when it was necessary for the SADF 
was convenient as the SADF could use the media as its mouthpiece when it chose to do so. 
For the media, the relationship can be characterised as a “marriage out of necessity”. The 
media was dependant on the SADF as a supplier of defence information and thus its 
“marriage” with the SADF was one of necessity for it depended on the SADF for almost all 
of its information. Had the SADF taken the media into its trust, they might have created a 
mutually beneficial relationship. However the distrusting nature of the SADF towards the 
media lead to it only utilising it when it saw a convenient need to do so.  
 
Chapter Synopsis 
 
Legislation governing military reporting played a vital role in the relationship between the 
South African military and the media. Chapter 2 will provide an account of the legal context 
and background with regards to the environment in which defence reporters operated. The 
thesis will show how this legislation was crucial in shaping the nature of the reporting 
regarding defence matters. The main legislation referenced in the thesis is the Defence Act of 
1957 (and its amendments up until 1980).  According to the Act, the task of the SADF was 
fourfold. It involved defending the Republic, preventing and suppressing terrorism, acting to 
preserve life, and undertaking duties prescribed by the civil authorities of the country. During 
the Angolan War, whilst South African troops were actively engaged on the side of the 
Unita/FNLA alliance, the local media was prohibited from publishing any or disclosing 
information about the country’s role in the conflict which was not predetermined by the 
SADF. 13 Under Section 118 of the Defence Act of 1957 (as amended in 1967), no 
information regarding SADF troop movement could be published without the permission of 
the Minister of Defence or his nominees.14 The thesis will show how this type of legislation 
influenced the relationship between the SADF and the media and the legislation almost 
always favoured the SADF at the expense of the public’s right to know.   
                                                          
13  Addison. G., Censorship of the Press in South Africa during the Angolan War: A Case Study of News 
Manipulation and Suppression (MA Thesis: Rhodes University, 1980), p.1. 
14   Ibid., 
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Chapter 3 will investigate the notion of “Total Strategy”. The term 'total strategy' is taken 
directly from the French military theorist Andre Beaufre's An Introduction to Strategy.15 
“Total Strategy” attributed the internal problems of South Africa to external manipulation 
and, where it was unable to find persuasive evidence of “Total Onslaught” on South Africa, it 
fell back on fabricated threats.16 Following Frankel, the thesis will show that the logical 
conclusion of “Total Strategy” is a more perfectly defined and streamlined version of what 
was South Africa's already authoritarian climate.17 “Total Strategy” legitimized the 
development of apartheid South Africa turning into a “Garrison State”.18 It is important to 
note that the apartheid government used the notion of “Total Strategy” as a response to the 
perceived threat of “Total Onslaught” by its enemies. “Total Onslaught” was seen as the 
manner in which apartheid South Africa was being targeted on all fronts, and the only 
effective response to this would be a “Total Strategy” to repel the “Total Onslaught”. The 
thesis will also show how the SADF attitude towards to media was framed by these doctrines 
and discourses.  
 
The highly secretive and militarised nature of apartheid South Africa played a key role in 
understanding the nature of the relationship between the SADF and the media. As the thesis 
will show, the militarization of apartheid South Africa cannot be understood when it is 
considered apart from the enormous military bureaucracy which existed during the 1970s and 
80s. It will be argued that the fact that the Department of Defence was analysing and 
capturing information regarding media reporting strengthens the argument that apartheid 
South Africa was a “Garrison State”. The Military Intelligence Division was an important 
functionary within the “Garrison State”. It was the bureaucratic arm which collected 
intelligence for the Department of Defence. The thesis will show that from 1970 onwards 
South Africa assumed many of the institutional features of the so-called “Garrison State”.  
 
Chapter 4 will analyse the political fallout of Operations Savannah and Reindeer. The thesis 
will ask whether they were PR debacles. The SADF and the Department of Defence 
                                                          
15   P. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians Civil-Military Relations in South Africa, (Cambridge,1984), p.46. 
16   Ibid.,p.69. 
17  Ibid., 
18  Ibid.,p.70.  
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unsuccessfully attempted to cover up inconvenient truths regarding their activities in Angola. 
The Department of Defence played a key role in keeping the South African public in the dark 
about the operations themselves, as well as the aftermath of these military operations. The 
fact that the Department of Defence instituted a blanket censorship over defence reporting 
was never done in the interest of national security as the Department of Defence claimed it 
was; it was to protect the image and reputation of the SADF, the Department of Defence and 
the apartheid state. It was also instituted to ensure that no embarrassing or unwanted 
information about the SADF or the Department of Defence was published. Ironically, it was 
this policy of secrecy that added to the magnitude of the fall out regarding Operations 
Savannah and Reindeer.  The thesis will show how the consistent reply of “no comment” by 
the Department of Defence and the SADF had a negative effect on the relationship between 
the SADF and the local media because it hampered communication between the two parties 
and thus failed to build mutual trust.  
 
Chapter 5 will investigate and analyse both Steyn Commissions and discuss the nature, role 
and purpose of these commissions. The thesis will also show what they entailed and how they 
pronounced upon the relationship between the media and the SADF. The findings of both 
Steyn Commissions regarding media freedom will also be analysed. Newspaper articles on 
the Steyn Commissions will also be investigated to show the response of the press to its 
findings. It is important to note that the historical context within which the two Steyn 
Commissions took place is vital to the analysis of the Commissions themselves. At times, the 
Commissions attempted to directly address questions relevant to the then current political 
situation in apartheid South Africa. Thus for both Steyn Commissions, the role of the local 
media was to form part of apartheid South Africa’s “Total Strategy” against the “Total 
Onslaught” posed by the enemies of South Africa. Thus it was of crucial importance for the 
apartheid Government that the Steyn Commissions investigate the effectiveness of the 
relevant legislation governing the media to ascertain whether or not it was serving this 
purpose. Their recommendations only served to redefine (or fine tune) the strictures under 
which the media operated in reporting on defence matters. 
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Chapter 2  
 
 
Introduction  
 
It is the purpose of this Chapter to analyse the relationship between the SADF and the media. The 
interactions between the apartheid government and the media will also be of relevance due to the 
intertwined relationship between the SADF and the apartheid government. It will also discuss the 
media commissions since the Second World War and what they entailed, the legislation that 
governed reporting of defence matters and the media as a whole as well as the mechanisms that the 
apartheid government used to control security intelligence. All of these facets tie into the 
relationship between the SADF and the media and will provide insight into the nature of this 
relationship. Using the liaison machinery that was set up, the apartheid government had succeeded 
very largely in putting across a one-sided definition of the military situation which suited its 
objectives in foreign and domestic policy.1 Censorship is such a prevalent accompaniment of an 
authoritarian state like apartheid South Africa. Thus it is important to explore the relationship that 
the government and the military had with the press. Without a sufficient analysis of the intricacies 
regarding the relationship between the SADF and the media, the relationship between the SADF 
and the media itself cannot be fully understood.       
 
Relationship between Government/SADF and the media 
 
Before the relationship between the apartheid government/SADF and the media can be analysed 
and understood, the relationship between the apartheid government and the SADF has to un-packed. 
Various arguments surrounding the role of the SADF in apartheid South Africa exists. It can be 
argued that two main sides regarding this issue exists. Firstly, that the SADF cannot be held 
accountable for the crimes of the apartheid government, and that it was just another state institution 
following the orders given to them by the government of the day. The other argument states that the 
SADF was implicit in defending white privilege and helped insure the foothold gained by the 
apartheid government. Thus it has to be asked whether the SADF was simply doing their duty in 
defending their country from a foreign threat or was it complicit in keeping an oppressive 
government in power.  
 
The legitimacy of the National Party government has to be very carefully scrutinized when dealing 
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with issues of complicity. The characteristics of the National Party government then comes into 
question. Thus it is important to first establish some of the characteristics of the apartheid 
government under the National Party. It was a government that was not elected into power by the 
majority of the people of South Africa, it was highly authoritarian and oppressive, extremely 
militaristic and allowed its citizens very few freedoms. It was also implicit in various forms and 
instances of human rights abuses. It is then fair to say that the National Party government was not a 
legitimate government, thus implicating the SADF in being part of an oppressive system due to the 
close ties that existed between the government and the SADF at that time. The highly militarised 
nature of South African society during the 70s and 80s can then be explained by looking at the close 
ties between the South African government and the SADF. A very strong argument can hence be 
made that the SADF is guilty of defending the apartheid government. Thus the relationship between 
the apartheid government and the press, and the relationship between the SADF and the press, can 
almost be seen as two separate yet intricately intertwined relationships that worked parallel to each 
other.   
  
The different actors involved in the relationship between the government/SADF and the press can 
be placed into two main categories. These two main categories consisted of defence correspondents 
on the one hand and the military public relations officers on the other.2 The military public relations 
officers can be labelled as external primary gatekeepers.3 The phrase “external primary 
gatekeepers” should be viewed in terms of access to information. Thus a “gatekeeper” in the context 
of this thesis relates to an individual exerting control over the access to information. The military 
public relations officers was a monopoly source who used its unique access to information as a 
means of inducing co-operation from journalists.4 Thus military public relations officers could 
manipulate the media by using its status as a gatekeeper. In the symbiotic relationship between 
reporters and sources, the sources gives or withholds information to reward or punish compliance or 
non-compliance with its demands.5 If the only source was a military public relations officer, then 
the monopoly on information that the SADF had was only further entrenched. The SADF as a 
source needed the media to carry its message to a broader public but demanded that its 
communication goals be given more attention than those of the media.6 What these goals were and 
how they were projected in the South African defence context is very important.7 When the SADF 
succeeded in blackmailing the media to carry its message the way it wanted the message carried, the 
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apparent independence of news organisations masked the real official control of the media that 
occurred.8  The SADF's success in this regard would then always be detrimental towards the 
freedom of the media to report on defence matters unhindered.  
 
It should be noted that whenever different media organisations were in competition for information, 
the power of the SADF as a primary gatekeeper of information increased.9 This in turn entrenched 
the SADF’s monopoly on access to information regarding defence matters. Therefore the two 
divergent goals of news coverage, the need for exclusive scoops and the need for stories matching 
those carried out by the opposition, both added to the manipulative power of the SADF regarding 
defence reporting.10 The SADF used this manipulative power to ensure that the media complied 
with its demands. With the one and only source of major defence news in Pretoria, editors felt it was 
obligatory to cover whatever briefings were given or tours arranged for their correspondents.11 This 
naturally aided the centralisation and standardisation of the news around official definitions.12 At 
the same time, by feeding titbits of news to favoured media organisations, the SADF let it be known 
that a co-operative attitude amongst the press would pay off.13 This resulted in a situation whereby 
all news relating to defence matters had been influenced by the SADF. The SADF became the only 
source for the media regarding defence matters. Thus compliance from the press would be the result 
most often than not.  
 
It is also important to examine the relationship between the SADF/government and the media with 
specific reference to the Angolan War and apartheid South Africa’s involvement in it. During the 
Angolan War there was little doubt in the official mind what news policy amounted to.14 The 
Minister of Defence’s rulings had made it absolutely clear that there was to be no news of South 
African involvement and there was to be a loyal press.15 Being “disloyal” would lead to sanctions 
being imposed such as exclusion from access to information given to other media organisations. 
Thus the SADF used its gatekeeper role to directly affect what was being reported in the media 
regarding the Angolan War. At intervals during the Angolan War the Minister of Defence issued 
confidential directives to the media via SAPA (South African Press Association) banning reports or 
speculation concerning South African troop movements and activities.16 Editors were warned that 
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unauthorised publication would result in the Defence Act of 1957 being invoked.17 This ensured 
that editors kept to the official narrative that the government/SADF gave them.  As a general rule, 
the major goals of a military’s communications policy in wartime are to protect security secrets and 
to raise morale while undermining that of the enemy.18 From a military viewpoint it is imperative to 
maintain secrecy where the enemy could benefit from news of the deployment of armed forces, 
details of their weaponry and their planned actions.19 Thus from a militaristic standpoint, it made 
absolute sense for the SADF to impose censorship on the media regarding its involvement in 
Angola. Another motive for censorship can be to maintain morale, the morale of the soldiers and 
that of the public.20 The short term censorship of “bad news”, of military defeats or setbacks can 
prevent morale from plunging and prevent panic at home.21 Thus for the SADF it was crucial to be 
in control of what was being reported regarding the Angolan War. It is important to note that once 
military news ceases to be credible it becomes damaging and could contribute to defeat.22 However 
this will only be a consequence if it is made public that military news is not credible.   
 
The SADF was of the opinion that in time of war, the mass media should be regimented to instil a 
warlike spirit and imbue the foe with terror or win him over.23 This ties in with the idea of the 
importance of having a loyal press. The SADF had a programme to ensure that its goals were placed 
before anything else within the media. The truth was strictly secondary in this programme but 
important nonetheless for reasons of credibility and therefore also morale.24 The SADF was also 
discriminatory towards different media.25 A kind of hierarchy of favouritism came into being before 
the war and was refined during and after it.26 Loyalty towards the SADF would result in 
favouritism. The SADF gave preferences to pro-government over anti-government media, The 
SABC over the press as a whole, and Afrikaans over English newspapers.27 They were also accused 
of catering more for daily than weekly papers and more for the Reef and Pretoria media than 
others.28 This blatant form of favouritism can be seen as censorship in itself because it forced the 
un-favoured press to conform. Sanctioned media organisations could thus not compete with those 
favoured by the SADF on the defence reporting front. This form of patronage helped the SADF to 
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cement its gatekeeper status regarding access to information relating to defence matters.   
 
It is important to note the attitude of the SADF/government regarding the media and the type of 
reporting it was doing at the time. The SADF/government thought that reports of malpractice could 
only cause the country “intense embarrassment” and could “jeopardise the security situation”.29 The 
media, said Mr Botha, had an indispensable role to play in upholding the country's security.30 This 
role was to dispense apartheid government propaganda. To threaten press freedom in the name of 
national security was nothing new for Nationalist Prime Ministers, but Mr Botha was going further 
than his predecessors.31 The press was to be subsumed under a Grand National plan.32 As Minister 
of Defence, Mr Botha had painstakingly devised ways of co-opting the press to serve the ends of the 
SADF.33 He had made it clear in a number of pronouncements over the years that he expected the 
country's newspapers to contribute to “total strategy” of defence against South Africa's enemies.34 
This entailed using techniques of mass persuasion to gain support for a Government embattled 
against external and internal foes.35 To a very large extent, in the military field at least, Mr Botha's 
arrangements for the dissemination of news and opinion had succeeded in warping standards of a 
press otherwise jealous of its right to choose its own news and hold its own opinions.36 Botha's 
strategy with dealing with the press was highly manipulative, which is most likely why it was so 
effective.  
  
In September 1973 the South African Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster, declared his intention to take 
action against the press in 1974.37 He said he would give “certain press chiefs” until January 1974 
“to put their house in order” and warned them that if they were seeking a confrontation with the 
government they would get it.38 At the Cape Congress of the Nationalist party on 5 September 1973 
Vorster said some newspapers, individuals and organisations were doing everything in their power 
to bring about a confrontation between white and black and he asserted that some of these bodies 
would stand against the white populace if such a confrontation should occur.39 A fortnight later, at 
the party's Orange Free State congress, he directly attacked the Rand Daily Mail, saying that the 
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newspaper had told him it would refuse to subject itself to self-censorship.40 This, he said, was 
clearly seeking a confrontation, and was what the Rand Daily Mail would surely get and he would 
close down the newspaper.41 The Rand Daily Mail would in fact close later on, however due to 
financial reasons. The hostility towards the newspaper came as a result of the Rand Daily Mail's 
liberal form of journalism and anti-apartheid editorial stance. Even though the Rand Daily Mail did 
close due to financial reasons, it is a very clear example of the apartheid government targeting non-
conformist newspapers.   
 
Various other Sources of tension between government and the media also existed. These included 
the National Key Points Act of 1980 which was promulgated in the aftermath of the sabotage 
attempt on the Sasol refinery.42 The tension generated related to those clauses prohibiting the 
publication without permission of matters concerning key points, more specifically the 
interpretations of the relevant clause and the ambit of the prohibition.43 Also the appointment of the 
Steyn Commission caused tension. It is apparent that the appointment of the Commission in June 
1980 also contributed to heightening the perception of a clamp-down by Government in certain 
sectors of the media.44 Closure of the newspaper Post was another source of tension. The forced 
closure of Post, a newspaper with a black readership early in 1981.45 It was closed by its owners, 
the Argus Printing and Publishing Company, due to Government indicating its unwillingness to re-
register the newspaper in terms of the provisions of the Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act of 
1971.46 One of the main factors which contributed to the state of tension was the political, cultural 
and historically based dichotomy that existed between the English-language and Afrikaans-language 
press.47 The media itself was also a source of tension. A move from a healthy abrasive to unhealthy 
adversary relationship caused plenty of tension.48 Media non-accountability was probably also an 
important contributor to the existing state of tension.49 And finally the government, with all of its 
laws and regulations and unwillingness to work with the media.   
 
From this it clear that the apartheid government had a very hostile attitude towards the press, 
especially if the press did not act in a manner that the apartheid government found appropriate. 
However the apartheid government did realise that the media was a valuable resource if utilised 
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properly. The relationship between the government and the media could be described as a balancing 
act in terms of the government attempting to uphold the illusion of a free press within a free society 
and still keeping potentially sensitive information secret. When considering the relationship 
between the government and the media, it is important to understand the socio-political 
environment in which this relationship was taking place. A free press cannot function in a society 
which is not free. Apartheid South Africa was not a free society. Thus in order to create the illusion 
that apartheid South Africa was indeed a free society with a free press it had to make certain 
concessions in favour of the press. It should be noted that apartheid South Africa was an 
authoritarian state, not a totalitarian one, thus certain sectors of the press did in fact gain access to 
information that was sensitive if they played by the rules that were set forth by the apartheid 
government.    
 
    
South African media commissions since the Second World War. 
 
 
South African media commissions between the Second World War and the Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Reporting Of Security Matters Regarding the South African Defence 
Force And The South African Police (Steyn Commission 1979-80) commencing were few and far 
between. Only one commission on the press was appointed in this time period.50 This commission 
was the Van Zijl Commission.51 
 
The Press Commission, known by the name of its chairperson, J.W. Van Zyl, was set up in 
November 1950.52 Its terms of reference included an investigation of the control and monopoly 
tendencies, the activities of foreign correspondents and stringers, the accuracy, responsibility and 
patriotism of South African journalists, restraints on the founding of new newspapers, the incidence 
of sensationalism and triviality, and the general health of the free press.53 Some of these were later 
abandoned as subject of investigation, and they strike a note of hypocrisy, since the government had 
already by that time declared its intention to ban publications it deemed communist.54 The apartheid 
government wanted to keep the suggestion alive that South Africa possessed a free press whilst still 
being able to ban unwanted publications.    
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The appointment of the press commission in 1950 brought no slacking of the Nationalist campaign 
against the press.55 Throughout the twelve years that the commission was busy with its 
investigations the ruling party continued to thunder against editors and journalists, blaming them for 
the rising vociferousness of black protest against the many steps being taken by the government to 
implement its policy of separate development.56 It is important to note that the commission did not 
mention any issues regarding defence reporting. This could be due to the fact that at the time of the 
commission's inception, South Africa was not at war, nor was the possibility of going to war very 
likely. Thus defence reporting simply was not an issue at that time.  
 
 
Legislation governing reporting of defence matters and the media – South 
African Defence Act 1957 (including amendments made up until 1980) 
 
Numerous Acts, laws and different legislation was enacted during the apartheid years to ensure that 
public criticism of the regime was either non-existent or so minuscule that it made no real impact on 
the lives of South Africans. However this was not the only function of this legislation. It also served 
to protect state secrets, and ensure the militarisation of South African society at the time. It also 
helped block journalists who were deemed to be “unpatriotic” by the apartheid government from 
gaining access to information other “patriotic” journalists were given access to. These different Acts 
were sinister weapons used to control and manipulate society and ensure that public opinion 
especially amongst the white populace was on the side of government. These laws helped entrench 
the “Garrison State” and moulded South African society (with specific reference to the white 
population) into an easily coerced group of people. The Defence Act, Newspaper Bill, Protection of 
Information Act and Publications Act were all pieces of legislation specially crafted to ensure that 
opposing opinions and sensitive information did not receive the attention it deserved. Many 
journalists and editors were frustrated by this and rebelled against these censorship laws, however 
others played along, such as military correspondents not wanting to lose their accreditation for 
reporting on defence matters.  
 
A year after the enactment of the Official Secrets Act, the government introduced a revised and 
consolidated Defence Act to replace the old Act of 1912.57 The new law considerably extended the 
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censorship provisions in force in the past.58 The old law and its amendments had allowed for direct 
censorship in time of war of newspapers, magazines, books and other such materials.59 Provisions 
were made for censorship of all types of postal telegraphic, telephonic, and photographic and radio 
communications, and recorded material in time of war.60 Moreover, emergency regulations could be 
promulgated, making it possible for the authorities to suppress a newspaper or periodical for a 
specified period.61 The new Act once again made it an offence for any member of the Defence 
Force or of the civil service to reveal information in connection with the defence of the country 
unless authorised to do so by the Minister of Defence or under his authority.62 It forbade the taking 
of photographs or sketches of any classified military area.63 However, it did not prohibit the 
publication of news items about the Defence Force in peacetime.64 The activities of SADF 
personnel, their weaponry and their movements could be reported so long as this did not contravene 
other sections of the Act or other security legislation.65 Naturally, in wartime this would not be the 
case and the government would invoke its powers to institute censorship of the press regarding 
these issues.66  
 
The Defence Act of 1957 was a ground breaking piece of legislation with regards to reporting on 
defence matters. The Act which was mostly concerned with defence matters, also makes special 
room for censorship issues as well as the disclosure of information with regards to defence matters. 
The Act not only looks to censor publications, but also Defence Force members and public servants 
as well. Under the Subheading “Censorship”, the Act states:   
 
“In time of war the Governor-General may establish and do all things necessary to 
enforce a censorship over all or any description of postal, telegraphic, telephonic or 
radio matter or communications passing within, into or from the Union, and over all 
or any description of letters, written or printed matter, parcels, pictures, drawings, 
sketches, photographs or gramophone records (including any article, apparatus or 
device upon which or by means of which intelligence or sounds of any kind have 
been recorded and can be reproduced) addressed or intended to be delivered or 
conveyed to any person, and prescribe the conditions under which the postal, 
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telegraph, telephone or radio service may be used. Any person who contravenes or 
fails to comply with any regulation, order or instruction issued in terms of this section 
shall be guilty of an offence (section 101).”67  
 
Under the “Improper Disclosure of Information” section within the Act, publications were 
specifically targeted in order to ensure that they cannot print or publish any information that was 
deemed by the Union Defence Force (to be renamed in 1961 to the South African Defence Force or 
SADF) to be secret/confidential or sensitive in nature. This gave the UDF and later the SADF an 
iron-grip on the flow of information regarding defence issues. The Act states that, “In any 
proceedings it shall be presumed until the contrary is proven that any information relating to the 
defence force of the Union is secret or confidential.”68 This gave the SADF carte blanch to target 
any publishing of information that was not pre-approved by the SADF themselves. Thus the SADF 
could control all information published about it in the public domain. The Act goes on to make 
further provisions:     
 
 
“No person shall in time of war publish in any newspaper, magazine, book or 
pamphlet or by radio any other means, any information relating to the movements or 
dispositions of the SADF or any force of a country which is allied to the Union, or of 
any South African or allied ships or aircraft or any statement, comment or suggestion 
calculated directly or indirectly to convey such information, except when the 
information has been furnished or the publication thereof has been authorised by the 
Minister or under his authority.  
 
No person shall at any time publish in any manner whatsoever any secret or 
confidential information relating to the defence of the Union, or any information 
relating to any works proposed, undertaken or completed for or connected with the 
fortification or defence of the Union except where the information has been furnished 
or the publication thereof has been authorised by the Minister or under his authority. 
 
Any proprietor, printer, publisher or editor of any newspaper, magazine, book or 
pamphlet in which any such information as aforesaid is published, and any person 
responsible for the publication of such information by such or any other means, shall 
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be guilty of an offence, and proceedings in respect thereof may be taken against all or 
any of such persons.  
 
Any person who discloses to any other person any secret or confidential information 
relating to the defence of the Union which came to his knowledge by reason of his 
membership of the SADF or by reason of his employment in the public service of the 
Union or in any other office, post, appointment or capacity under the Government or 
by reason of any contract relating to the defence of the Union or  
 
Any employment by a contractor under such a contract, or which was given to him in 
confidence by any other person who was authorised or whose duty it was to give him 
such information, shall be guilty of an offence, unless such a disclosure was 
authorised by the Minister or under his authority or by order of a competent court or 
if it was the duty of such person in the interest of the State to disclose such 
information to such other person (section 118).”69  
 
In 1967 the principle of pre-publication censorship of military news in time of peace (or undeclared 
war) was written into law.70 Section 118 (as seen above) now stipulated that information about the 
SADF, their equipment and installations could only be published with the permission of the 
Minister of Defence or someone delegated by him.71 The prohibited information included not only 
the composition, movement and disposition of the SADF and its auxiliary services (including 
nursing auxiliaries) but also those of “any force a country which is allied to the Republic”.72 The 
implications were far-reaching for a country entering an era of regional strife in which alliances 
would be concealed and military campaigns waged in secret.73 Section 118 also prohibited the 
publication of “any statement, comment or rumour” about South African troops “or any force of a 
foreign country calculated to prejudice or embarrass the government in its foreign relations or to 
alarm or depress members of the public.74 Speculation, as well as hard fact, could disappear from 
the public arena.75 The penalty for contravening the Act could lead to a fine of up to R1000 or 
imprisonment for 5 years or both regarding the nature of the offence.76 This section of the Act 
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ensured that the SADF could continue its mandate given by the apartheid government without 
having to be constantly concerned with being exposed in the public domain. Any activities or inner 
mechanisms of the SADF which it wanted secret would be kept secret. However if information 
deemed to be secret is published in the public domain, the SADF would have had the ability to 
penalise the offender(s) due to this section of the Act.  
  
Opposition spokesmen expressed support for the government regarding the issue of national 
security but strongly disagreed with the very wide terms of the censorship clause.77 Minister of 
Defence at the time, P.W. Botha's reply was intended to be reassuring.78 He said he did not want to 
be a “small dictator over the press” although he appreciated that he was accepting tremendous 
responsibility in passing this “drastic measure”.79 The authorities would not, according to Botha, try 
to create “absurdities” of censorship.80 This reassurance unfortunately had no legal standing.81  
 
The Newspaper Bill was another piece of legislation that helped enforce censorship specifically 
among newspapers. When the Publications and Entertainment Act, 1963, was passed, newspapers 
published by publishers belonging to the Press Union of South Africa were excluded from the 
provisions of that Act because this body undertook to establish its own disciplinary body, the Press 
Council, for investigating and deciding on complaints concerning matter published in newspapers.82 
When the Act was superseded in 1974 by the Publications Act, 1974, the above mentioned 
newspapers were also excluded from the provisions of the 1974 Act.83 Notwithstanding this 
provision, complaints from the public and bodies were continually received that matter published in 
newspapers is offensive to their moral standards, or is detrimental to public welfare or is harmful to 
good relations between the population groups in South Africa.84 Under these circumstances it was  
decided to make legislative provision for a press code with which reporting and other matter in 
newspapers must comply, and for establishing a press council for the investigation of complaints of 
non-complaints with the press code, for deciding thereon, and where guilt is determined, for the 
reprimanding and punishing of the guilty parties.85 The difference between this bill and other pieces 
of legislation was that this bill specifically targeted a specific form of publishing, whereas other 
pieces of legislation would be more general. It is important to note that the Newspaper Bill does not 
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include or mention any aspects regarding defence reporting. This is because defence reporting is 
covered in other pieces of legislation. However the Newspaper Bill is still important because it is in 
fact a piece of censorship legislation and had an effect on the relationship between the 
government/SADF and the media.    
 
The Protection of Information Act, or as it is formally known, to provide for the protection from 
disclosure of certain information, and to provide for matters connected therewith. The Act itself was 
incredibly broad and this was done with a specific purpose to ensure that maximum secrecy could 
be maintained. The Act places a large emphasis on the prohibition of obtaining and disclosure of 
information such as any official secret code, passwords, documents, models, articles or information 
used or kept, made or obtained in any prohibited area.86 The Act also prohibits the possession or 
control of such information, and assisting any other agent from also gaining access or control of 
such information.87 The “agent” referred to can be any hostile threat, be it an individual, 
organisation or a foreign state.88 
 
 
Mechanisms for controlling Security Matters  
 
Apartheid South Africa had various mechanisms to control the flow of information regarding 
security matters. These mechanisms ensured a tight grip on security intelligence. It can be argued 
that three main mechanisms existed with regards to the control of security matters. Formal 
Censorship, the Press Code and lastly the Agreement between SADF and the National Press Union. 
These three mechanisms created a society where access to factual information regarding security 
matters was almost non-existent. Restrictions on reporting the activities of the SADF resulted in the 
death of information about the intervention of the SADF in Angola.89 Thus real consequences 
existed due to these mechanisms. The apartheid government's deception and denial regarding 
almost all of its abuses would be assisted by these mechanisms.  
 
Censorship 
 
Censorship has many faces including banning of individuals, house arrest and restriction of 
movement. Censorship is a form of surveillance, a mechanism for gathering intelligence that the 
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powerful can use to tighten control over people or ideas that threaten to disrupt established systems 
of order.90 Censorship controlled by state or religious authorities remains the norm in many parts of 
the world.91 A censor is an official in some countries whose duty it is to inspect all books, journals 
dramatic pieces, etc. before publication, to ensure that they shall contain nothing immoral, heretical, 
or offensive to the government.92   Censorship in the context of apartheid South Africa focussed 
heavily on any information criticizing the apartheid government's policies regarding racial 
separation. An obsession communism was also one of the defining features of South African 
censorship during apartheid. Apartheid South Africa was a very socially conservative place, thus 
any information deemed explicit or immoral by a censor would immediately be banned. Extremely 
tight controls with regards to the flow of information within the public sphere was the order of the 
day.  
 
One of the most important characteristics of the South African censorship system has been its 
longevity.93 The roots of widespread, systematic state censorship can be found in the Suppression of 
Communism Act of 1950.94 Censorship in South Africa prior to 1950 comprised three related 
strands.95 Firstly, the political economy of colonialism and its attendant social mores, secondly, 
specific legislation designed to control area where Africans lived, and thirdly, repression directed at 
the trade union movements and communists.96 The history of South Africa after 1950 was 
characterised by an avalanche of security legislation which among other effects, created a massive 
structure of censorship and self-censorship.97 The nature of this avalanche of security legislation 
was highly militaristic, for example the Defence Act of 1957 which set the tone for the development 
of a highly militarised society. 
 
Pressure from the apartheid government intensified on the press in the 1960s and in the 1970s.98 In 
1974, Prime Minster BJ Vorster suggested an amended Press Code, granting power to penalise 
editors and journalists with fines.99  The Press Code was established in 1960 when it was chosen 
instead of a Publications and Entertainments Bill. To a large extent formal control was not 
necessary because censorship was achieved through various informal means.100 There was an 
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instinctive reaction to accept and print anything from the side of the authorities, including security 
police propaganda.101 The structure of the commercial press reinforced social and political 
tendencies in South African society.102  
 
 
Formal censorship was suggested in 1937, when Hertzog had threatened to restrict the press 
because of attacks on Hitler and Mussolini, in particular by means of restrictions on imported 
newspapers.103 One of the characteristics of a proposed South African republic was to be the 
elimination of “anti” and “un” national elements of the press, together with a disciplined radio 
service.104 The fact that most whites did not see negotiation and the dismantling of discrimination as 
according with their interests in part explains the need for the following four decades of repression 
and censorship.105 The hopes of the late 1940s proved transitory and illusory, the war years 
providing both psychological and legal preparation for later types of censorship in a process of 
repression that in retrospect appears seamless.106   
 
The closed mind of South Africa society between World War One and World War Two is revealed in 
the provisions of the Entertainment (Censorship) Act.107 This regulated the control of films and 
public entertainment through a Board Censors and allowed the banning of films or published 
pictures that showed a range of topics in a way considered “offensive”.108 Censorship of the pre-war 
years was aided by an informal and unofficial system of social conformity and silence.109 
Unconventional white writers were ostracised and their work was suppressed by the refusal of 
bookshops to stock it.110 The white press virtually ignored African opinion, although liberals 
promoted those views they perceived as moderate and perpetuated a climate of trusteeship.111  
 
As previously stated, the history of South Africa after 1950 was characterised by an avalanche of 
security legislation which, among other effects, created a massive structure of censorship and self-
censorship.112 This trend was set in motion by the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950.113 It 
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defined communism as the doctrine of Marxian socialism expounded by Lenin, Trotsky, the 
Comintern or Cominform or any related political philosophy which aimed at dictatorship of the 
proletariat, the use of disorder or foreign assistance to effect socio-economic change, or the creation 
of inter-racial hostility.114  
 
The harassment of editors and journalists placed severe strains on publication of anti-apartheid 
periodicals.115 The Suppression of Communism Act allowed banning for possession of publications 
deemed to be promoting communism, and by 1960 two newspapers had been banned (Guardian 
1952 and Advance 1954).116 The apartheid state Interfered with the mail, had confiscation powers 
over required evidence in the name of state security, and banned the publication of certain 
statements.117 A climate of self-censorship was encouraged by government statements of intent and 
a long drawn out process of investigation into undesirable publications and the press.118 The 
Commission of Enquiry in Regard to Undesirable Publications (Cronje Commission) reported in 
September 1957.119 It was particularly sensitive to inter-group relations and the propagation of 
communism, but failed to define publications which promote it.120 Publications such as the African 
Communist which was deemed to be an illegal publication under the suppression of communism act 
were banned as well.  
 
During the 1950s sections of the press were subjected to threat and intimidation as the policy of 
apartheid became better known to the international community.121 The press was feared as an 
Anglicising influence and for its potential links to critical overseas opinion.122 Although most of the 
English-language press was closely connected to and influenced by big capital, which was hostile to 
the Congress movement, it failed to live up to the requirements of the National Party, which thought 
of the press as part of the National Party's party machinery.123  
 
In 1960 P.W. Botha, then Deputy Minister of the Interior, introduced a Publications and 
Entertainments Bill which provided for pre-publication censorship.124  As previously stated it was 
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dropped in favour of a Press Code which was amended in 1974.125 Under the Customs Act, from 
1956 to 1 November 1963, 8629 publications had been banned.126 Refusal by journalists to reveal 
sources to the police in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act was a long standing problem and led to 
the jailing of two journalists in 1960.127 Action against anti-apartheid newspapers was extended in 
1962. It became impossible to register a publication under more than one name, a method used to 
counter banning.128  
 
Press Code 
 
The apartheid government intensified the pressure on the press during the 1970s.129 As before the 
1960s, it was not covered by publications legislation necessarily but was continually threatened by 
National Party politicians.130 In 1974, B.J. Vorster suggested an amended Press Code, granting 
power to penalise editors and journalists with fines.131 To a large extent, formal control was not 
necessary because censorship was achieved through various informal means.132  Thus the Press 
Code itself was a form of censorship, because it manipulated the press to perform self-censorship. 
 
The monopolistic structure of South Africa's press during the 70s and 80s facilitated contact at the 
highest level between newspaper management and the state.133 Since the early sixties the 
Newspaper Press Union (NPU) had adopted a policy of appeasement towards the government.134 To 
forestall the threat of direct censorship of the press under the Publications and Entertainment 
Control Act of 1963, the NPU had instituted self-censorship governed by a Press Code and enforced 
by a non-statutory Press Council.135 Initially the Press Council had few real powers and in many of 
its adjudications came down on the side of newspapers against official and non-official 
complaints.136 In response to further threats of legislative censorship the NPU increased the powers 
of the Press Council and broadened the scope of the Press Code.137 This process was dubbed 
“surrender by instalment” by the Rand Daily Mail expressing the view that the press should not do 
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the government's censorship for it.138   
 
 
NPU/SADF Agreement 
 
An integral part of the relationship between the apartheid government and the media was the 
various agreements that were made and signed between them. These agreements were important to 
both sides. It was important for the government because the government knew it was impossible to 
create legislation prohibiting the publishing of everything it deemed to be harmful. The agreement 
was also important for the press because it helped facilitate the relationship and it kept the 
relationship functioning. An agreement between the Minister of Defence and the Newspaper Press 
Union was reached on 11 January 1967, with the latest amendment on 26 January 1979.139 The aim 
was to create a work and liaison mechanism between the Directorate for Public Relations of the 
SADF and the Press Union.140 In accordance with the agreement, a liaison committee was 
established with the purpose of discussing matters of policy as well as matters of principle on a 
regular basis, and indeed, as often as necessary.141 It should, however, be noted that the main aim of 
the agreement is stated as follows “The release to the press of as much information as may be 
released within the framework of security and with the least possible delay” (clause 2).142 An 
agreement between the SADF and the media was also signed as well as between the SADF and the 
Newspaper Press Union. A SADF/NPU Liaison Committee was also established. 
 
As previously stated, on 11 January 1967 the Minister of Defence had summoned representatives of 
the NPU and had explained to them the need for control of security information.143 In a circular to 
all its members in April the NPU gave a summary of what had been agreed.144 The Minister said the 
SADF would be appointing a full-time public relations officer who would answer “factual 
questions” on behalf of the SADF but would not be able to make statements or answer questions on 
policy.145 Newspapers could take up with the Minister any rulings by the PRO.146 As a special 
concession, newspapers were to be allowed to publish any items originating abroad without 
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clearance – provided that “the impression is not created that the contents of the news item be 
accepted as factual”.147 However the Minister could ask newspapers to play down certain overseas 
news items.148 This limiting the impact any revelation from foreign media would have on South 
African society. 
 
This aspect of the Agreement, as worded in the circular previously mentioned, became fixed in the 
later written Agreement and proved to be a stumbling block to the press during the Angolan War.149 
The circular appealed to newspaper managements to ensure that there was “no misunderstanding” 
in editorial departments concerning defence reporting.150 The Defence Act of 1957 and the Official 
Secrets Act had evidently caused editors problems.151 In April 1969, a second meeting between the 
Minister and an NPU delegation was held to clarify certain problems under the Defence Act.152 The 
outcome was a written agreement, approved by the Minister, and circulated to all NPU members.153 
The written agreement of 1969 was a relatively brief two page document.154 It specifically agreed 
that the SADF would have a public relations service “available to the press at all times”.155 This 
would be expanded and improved upon.156 As far as internal military matters were concerned, the 
PRO of the SADF as well as Chiefs of Staff could be approached for information and clearance.157 
The 1969 agreement remained in force throughout the Angolan War.158 Thus once more limiting the 
scope and context from which defence correspondents could report.   
 
Effectively the Agreement gave an interpretation to the Defence Act suiting the needs of the 
military and political authorities.159 In some ways it even added to the Act's scope.160 The Act did 
not provide specifically for the appointment of military PRO's or the creation of the Directorate of 
Public Relations nor did it suggest that the Minister or his representatives could tender “advice” to 
the media.161 The stipulation that Ministerial requests be treated as directives was nowhere in the 
statute.162 The fact that defence related statements originating from unnamed or non-governmental 
                                                 
147 Ibid., 
148 Ibid., 
149 Ibid.,p.103. 
150 Ibid., 
151 Ibid., 
152 Ibid., 
153 Ibid,. 
154 Ibid.,p.104. 
155 Ibid., 
156 Ibid., 
157 Ibid., 
158 Ibid.,p.105. 
159 Ibid.,p.107. 
160 Ibid., 
161 Ibid., 
162 Ibid., 
31 
 
sources abroad had to be cleared by the SADF meant that even foreign news fell under 
censorship.163 The mere fact that the Agreement existed gave the Minster ready access to the NPU, 
with predictable consequences.164 Minister Botha used the Agreement to discipline newspapers.165 
For its part, the NPU sometimes acted in defence of newspapers which were accused of breaking 
the Agreement or contravening the Defence Act.166 At times it had been necessary for the NPU to 
warn certain newspapers that they had broken the Agreement and to apologise on its behalf to the 
Minister. 167 This being just another example of how influential Botha became with regards to the 
press reporting on defence matters.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The apartheid government was happy for criticism from the press as long as it took place within a 
framework consistent with unquestioned white domination.168 This can be seen as an example of 
repressive tolerance.169 The vagueness of much of the legislation controlling public information 
gave the press the impression it was also on the edge of breaking the law.170 Thus the press would 
constantly be trying to anticipate what would upset the government.171 Caution would generally be 
the result.172 This was the system of self-censorship that the apartheid government was seeking.173 
Government policy towards the English-language press was paranoiac at best.174 The English-
language press was frozen out of the information flow surrounding parliament and was subjected to 
government/SADF misinformation tactics.175 Control of official information became tighter.176 The 
range expanded to include any security or police matter, any military matter, and any statement or 
rumour which might cause alarm or prejudice foreign relations and embarrassment to the 
government, regardless of whether the country was at war.177 The Minister of Defence was given 
power to suppress certain court evidence if in his opinion it threatened national security.178 
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Government in general became more secretive.179 These measures were employed to inhibit the 
press.180 It should be noted that the apartheid government was very precise and tactical with regards 
to their policy towards the press. The balance between controlling the press and still have the 
illusion of a free press exist was the ultimate goal of the apartheid government.  
 
The numerous laws and regulations which muzzled or inhibited the South African press during 
apartheid were products of the country's political system, a political system that allowed a minority 
of the population to hold sway over the greater majority of the population.181 Against this 
background it can be seen that South African press had a particular responsibility. Its role was to 
both provide news and disseminate the opinions of the ruling class.182 The enforcement of apartheid 
would have been much easier with a silent and passive press that worked with the National 
government and not against it. Journalists and editors were placed under an enormous amount of 
pressure and any attempt to push back against the system was met with abuse and scorn from both 
the majority of the white population and the apartheid government. This enabled the security forces 
to have almost complete control of what information and opinions were being published about 
them. This only served to further entrench the militarisation of South African society during 
apartheid. This militarisation will be discussed in the following chapter.   
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Chapter 3: The Militarisation of South African Society  
 
 
Introduction  
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the militarisation of the South African society from 1975-
83. Militarisation can be defined as primarily a process of socialisation achieved through 
reinforcing militaristic values in homes, schools, churches, and the military itself. This chapter will 
show how this process shaped apartheid South Africa. This chapter will discuss Andre Beaufre's 
“Total Strategy” and how the Department of Defence adopted this notion of “Total Strategy” and 
wrote it into the Department of Defence White Paper of 1977. The “Total Onslaught” discourse 
within the White Paper will also be discussed. This Chapter will also analyse apartheid South 
Africa's war economy and how the manufacturing of arms became a large part of its economy. The 
notion of the “Garrison State” and the role played by the National Security Management System in 
ensuring that apartheid South Africa remained a “Garrison State” subject to the influence of security 
forces will also be discussed. The chapter will show how the “Garrison State” was a result of the 
militarisation of the South African society.  Lastly, the monitoring of the media by the Military 
Intelligence Department will be investigated along with the roles played by P.W. Botha and the 
SADF in militarising South African society.  
 
During the process of militarisation of the South African society, strategy became a very important 
focal point. Strategy consists of making choices, devising a scheme and selecting means to support 
policy.1 It is a process in which practitioners are conscious of the requirements of the objective.2 
Broadly speaking, the agents responsible for the militarisation of apartheid South Africa were the 
SADF and the Department of Defence. They created the environment in which it was possible to 
manipulate South African society. It is possible to argue that P.W. Botha was the most important 
playmaker in the militarisation of apartheid South Africa. He was Minister of Defence (1966 – 
1980) and later on Prime Minister (1978 – 1984) as well as the executive State President (1984 – 
1989) of the country whilst it was undergoing its militarisation. It is an overly simplified statement 
to say that Botha was the sole agent responsible for the militarisation of apartheid South Africa, 
however his contribution and influence should not be underestimated.   
 
P.W. Botha became an avid reader of Beaufre’s work, and it made a particularly strong impact upon 
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him.3 According to Alden, the SADF used Beaufre’s work as a starting point, and developed a 
comprehensive strategic doctrine embodied in the 1977 White Paper on Defence.4 This doctrine 
called for the marshalling of all state resources to combat revolutionary warfare.5 The strategic 
writings of Beaufre, drawn from France’s experience in colonial Algeria and Indochina, provided 
South Africa with a comprehensive prescription for countering revolutionary warfare.6 Beaufre 
states, in his definition of strategy, focussing attention on the interaction between belligerents: “the 
art of the dialect of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.”7 Thus apartheid South 
Africa used various strategies to confront revolutionary activity according Beaufre’s prescription. 
The SADF turned towards Beaufre’s theoretical work in formulating a response to the “Total 
Onslaught” the country was facing.8 Beaufre’s influence will be discussed in more depth later on in 
the following section of this chapter. Alden believes that the 1977 White Paper on Defence still 
stands as the most explicit summation of “Total Strategy”.9 With the publication of the 1977 White 
Paper on Defence, the SADF had firmly committed itself to the concept of “Total Onslaught”, for 
which the solution would take the form of “Total Strategy” (to be discussed below).10 Botha 
presided over the establishment of a comprehensive state apparatus for the management and 
coordination of government policy in the event of a national emergency, called the National 
Security Management system (NSMS).11 The NSMS implemented in conjunction with the host of 
bureaucratic reforms represented the security side of Botha’s approach to reform.12  
 
 
Beaufre's “Total Strategy” and the Department of Defence White Paper – 
1977 “Total Onslaught Discourse” 
 
F.W. de Klerk noted Botha’s influence on “Total Strategy” in his autobiography. According to de 
Klerk it has become fashionable over the years to ridicule PW Botha’s view that there was a “Total 
Onslaught” against South Africa.13 However, even retrospectively, de Klerk believes, during the 
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1980s the intelligence that was received in briefings in the State Security Council underlined the 
grave situation that confronted the country.14 There was a strong belief that, not only internal but 
also external threats existed.15 And it was in response to these perceived threats that Botha and his 
security advisers developed the concept of “Total Strategy”.16 The vehicle that Botha chose to 
implement his governments “Total Strategy” and to coordinate all its activities in response to what 
was viewed as a “Total Onslaught” on the country was the State Security Council.17 The Council 
was established in 1972 during the premiership of John Vorster, but was seldom convened by him.18 
However de Klerk believes that under Botha it was given a far more important central position 
within the apartheid government.19 The State Security Council presided over an intrusive 
bureaucratic system, known as the National Security Management System which was previously 
mentioned and will be discussed in greater detail later on in this chapter.20 
 
It is important to note that the Apartheid government used the notion of “Total Strategy” as a 
response to the perceived threat of “Total Onslaught” by its enemies. The Apartheid government 
had a wide range of both real, and perceived enemies. These enemies ranged from the Soviet Union 
and liberation forces such as SWAPO, to internal threats such as the ANC, PAC and the Black 
Consciousness Movement. All of these threats were perceived by the Apartheid government as 
agents of the “Total Onslaught” on the country. “Total Onslaught” was seen as the manner in which 
apartheid South Africa was being targeted on all fronts, and the only effective response to this 
would be a “Total Strategy” to repel the “Total Onslaught”. The SADF attitude towards to media 
was framed by these doctrines. These doctrines would become key tools with regards to 
legitimating the militarisation of apartheid South Africa as well as the strict controls surrounding 
reporting on security matters.  
 
“Total Strategy” draws inspiration from a wide variety of historical and cultural sources.21 In tracing 
the intellectual origins of “Total Strategy” it is readily apparent that South African military leaders 
had learnt from the counter-revolutionary experiences of the US in Vietnam, of the British in 
Malaya and the French in both Algeria and Indo-China.22 At the same time, the ideological and 
strategic spirit of the South African military had been particularly and peculiarly Francophile in 
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character.23 The single figure whose writings had such an immense effect on the Defence Force 
leaders of the 1970s and 1980s on how they perceive the world of counter-insurgency was 
undoubtedly Andre Beaufre, the French military general.24 Beaufre, whose various works were the 
basis of virtually every lecture at the Joint Defence College, the primary institution for socializing 
South Africa's military elite, one of the main contact points for communication between 
government, the private sector and the state security apparatus, and, since the early seventies, the 
think-tank for the formation and development of South Africa's total strategy.25 The term “Total 
Strategy” is taken directly from Beaufre's “An Introduction to Strategy” described by the 
distinguished military historian Liddell Hart as 'the most comprehensive and carefully formulated 
treatise on strategy ... that has appeared in this generation.'26 Beaufre was predominantly writing 
during the 1960s and 1970s which was also during the peak of the Cold War. Thus it is important to 
frame his work within this historical context. 
 
In the books Introduction a la Strategie (published in 1963) and Dissuasion et Strategie (published 
in 1964) the concept of “Total Strategy” has to be seen against the background of nuclear deterrence 
and the constraint this had in pursuing political aims with violent means.27 It should be noted that 
this was not necessarily the case with either France or apartheid South Africa, however apartheid 
South Africa did start research and development into nuclear weapons during the 1960s and 
continued its nuclear programme until the early 1990s when it was halted. At first, Beaufre's 
understanding of “Total Strategy” was limited to its traditional sense.28 Beaufre emphasises that in 
the context of the Cold War, in armed conflicts means other than military force become more 
important in order to compel the opponent to do one's will. Beaufre's definition of “Total Strategy” 
changes therefore, from “the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their 
dispute” to “choice of means likely to achieve the ends laid down by policy”.29 Beaufre's strategic 
thought represents the synthesis of Western thought on the art of war since the French Revolution. 
Beaufre's formulation of the concept of “Total Strategy” did not only broaden the sense of strategy, 
or only open the application of strategic thinking to any form of conflict resolution, it has also been 
a first step in the formulation of a methodology that provides the strategist with a tool to evaluate 
different scenarios allowing them to come up with different alternative short term courses of action 
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which will be coherent with long term political aims.30 Thus it is very important to understand 
“Total Strategy’’ in theory, as well as the history of the phrase, before its implementation is analysed 
within the context of apartheid South Africa.   
 
“Total Strategy” had the ability to mystify and obscure reality in a manner entirely appropriate to 
what the ideologue terms “false consciousness”.31 It wrote off the internal problems of South Africa 
as external manipulation and, where it was unable to find persuasive evidence of the “Total 
Onslaught” on South Africa, it fell back on the fabricated series of perils historically so effective in 
advancing the white laager mentality – the old “black peril” or “red peril”.32  Thus Total Strategy 
attempted to ensure that apartheid South Africa could never be identified as the wrongdoer as it 
always shifted the blame regarding the crimes it committed away from government agencies. In 
essence, the logical conclusion of “Total Strategy” is a more perfectly defined and streamlined 
version of what was apartheid South Africa's already authoritarian climate.33 “Total Strategy” 
legitimized this development, it created the psychological and institutional atmosphere conducive to 
the growth of a “Garrison State” and, through a series of mechanisms, brought the idea of such a 
state into operation.34 “Total Strategy” became the blueprint of the apartheid government to justify 
and legitimise all of its actions in the name of state security. 
 
“Total Strategy” was designed to address the multiple problems that the integration of black labour 
as a permanent feature of apartheid South Africa posed in the context of the advances of the 
frontiers of independent Africa to the borders of apartheid South Africa.35 The “Total Strategy” 
doctrine was first outlined in 1977 in a White Paper on Defence, under the heading 'National 
Security'.36 The White Paper defined the threat that faced white South Africa in typical Cold War 
terms.37 It claimed:  
 
“Russia has maintained a multi-dimensional campaign against the West since World War II. 
Consequently we are today involved in a war, whether we wish to accept it or not. It is 
therefore essential that a Total National Strategy be formulated at the highest level. The 
defence of the Republic of South Africa is not solely the responsibility of the Department of 
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Defence. On the contrary, it is the combined responsibility of all government departments. 
This can be taken further – it is the responsibility of the entire population, the nation and 
every population group.”38  
 
This can be seen as a prime example of how “Total Strategy” was implemented. A perceived foreign 
threat is identified (primarily the USSR), the external threat is blamed for the internal upheaval in 
South Africa caused by oppressive apartheid legislation, and then a call to arms on all fronts of the 
society is made in order to repel this external threat.  
 
The most prominent of the “Total Strategy” advocates in the SADF was General Magnus Malan, 
then Chief of the SADF.39 General Malan and other Military officers such as Charles ‘Pop’ Fraser, 
influenced by their overseas training and contact, adapted the military/strategic doctrine of “Total 
Strategy”, particularly the Beaufre variant, and applied it to the South African conditions.40 By 
1977, under the intense pressure of the Soweto uprisings and the international isolation that 
followed the Angolan invasion, the SADF had codified its new strategic doctrine.41 The Defence 
White Paper presented to parliament on 29 March that year, spelt out the concept of a unified 
National Security doctrine in some detail for the first time.42 In the introduction to the White Paper, 
P.W. Botha explained that Pretoria's strategic situation had to be seen in the context of a perceived 
global East/West conflict in which South Africa was a major battlefield.43 As stated earlier, the 
Soviet Union was one of apartheid South Africa's perceived enemies. In that context, military 
strategy formed part of a broader national strategy to ensure the survival of a society in which the 
principle of the right of self-determination of the white nation must not be regarded as being 
negotiable.44 Thus the basic purpose of this strategy was to ensure that the country/government 
would not succumb to pressure to dismantle apartheid. The White Paper continued: “The resolution 
of a conflict in the times in which we now live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in 
all fields – military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, 
ideological, cultural etc.”45 This was one of the key characteristics of “Total Strategy”, its ideal that 
all facets of society should work together in combating a “Total Onslaught” on the way of life of 
white society.  
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The basic premise of the SADF's doctrine, that there was a communist “Total Onslaught” in all 
spheres against the security of the state, was a product of Cold War thinking which gradually 
established itself in the minds of apartheid security planners during the 1950s and 1960s.46 The 
Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, for example, defined 'communism' in the broadest 
possible terms.47 The notion of a “Total Onslaught” became particularly prevalent in the SADF 
officer corps.48 By the time P.W. Botha took up the post of Defence Minister in 1966 he was well 
versed in these concepts, and many of his speeches in the first few years of his ministership 
reflected his conviction that the state was facing a “Total Onslaught”.49 The development of a total 
response to this perceived “Total Onslaught” took somewhat longer to materialise.50 Probably the 
first concrete indication of a movement towards a unified state security doctrine was the report in 
1970 of the Potgieter Commission of Inquiry which argued the case for the establishment of a 
centralised intelligence agency, BOSS (Bureau of State Security).51 This first step in building a 
security network in total response to the “Total Onslaught” being waged against apartheid South 
Africa would eventually become “Total Strategy”.                                     
 
While the White Paper advanced a working framework for the implementation of a comprehensive 
security strategy, it did not specify the content of the social, political, and organisational 
modifications called for.52 Owing to the continuing struggle in the National Party, the SADF was 
not yet in a position to oversee the implementation of a unified doctrine on all the necessary 
levels.53 But the military's strategy, with its promise of far reaching reforms and increased security 
efficiency, gained powerful adherents in top industrial and financial circles and amongst strategic 
analysts and economic partners.54 The development of apartheid South Africa's war economy can be 
viewed in terms of it being a facet of the “Total Strategy” doctrine.  
 
 
Apartheid South Africa's War Economy 
 
Apartheid South Africa's economy during the period of militarisation and “Total Strategy” had 
come under massive strain. The result of this was the creation of a war economy. Apartheid South 
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Africa's war economy also ties in with its status as a “Garrison State” as the budget of the country 
as tilted heavily towards the military. The following section will show how defence expenditure 
changed the make-up of the economy of apartheid South Africa, and also how this in turn furthered 
the process of militarisation of South African society at the time. The history of apartheid South 
Africa's defence expenditure provides the necessary context for showing how the country was a 
“Garrison State”. After World War II, while other nations began progressively modernizing their 
defence forces, the SADF was maintained on a very small scale.55 The Defence budget in 1961/62 
amounted to only R61 million.56 Changes in Africa such as decolonisation and the fact that 
apartheid South Africa at that time no longer had any important defence ties with any other 
countries made the development of self-sufficiency in this field essential.57 The Defence budget 
consequently doubled the following year and doubled again in 1964/65.58 At this stage the Defence 
budget represented 21% of state expenditure.59 Following the initial increase, Defence spending was 
restricted to the absolute minimum for the next nine years in order to help fight inflation.60  
 
Both the real and perceived threats against apartheid South Africa at the time were escalating and 
consequently the need arose to strive for full military preparedness at an increased rate.61 In view of 
long lead times of up to five years from initiation to acceptance into service of major equipment, a 
five year expansion programme for the Defence Force was approved and immediately launched.62 
This resulted in a sharp increase in Defence expenditure to R700 million in 1974/75 and advanced 
liabilities of R1000 million in subsequent years.63   
 
Almost immediately after acceptance of this expansion programme, it was drastically affected by 
certain developments.64 Portugal and her colonies collapsed unexpectedly thereby rendering their 
support to apartheid South Africa useless.65 Worldwide inflation led to abnormal increase in military 
costs and this meant that commitments incurred at 1975 price levels had to be adjusted by at least 
15% per annum.66 Devaluation further increased existing long-term commitments by an average of 
12% and also the SADF became involved in Angola and consequently had to maintain a drastically 
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increased level of operations on the Namibia/Angola border.67 The effect of these events was, 
therefore, an accumulation of expenditure from 1975/76 due to price increases and military threats 
as seen by the apartheid government.68  
 
In public, the SADF supported the apartheid government's campaign against inflation and it was 
also supportive of the campaign to ensure higher productivity and financial savings.69 However in 
reality wasteful expenditure was the order of the day. The SADF’s economic campaign was 
launched during 1976 to encourage economy in the SADF and to cultivate awareness of thrift 
among its members.70 In this way the apartheid government could maximise its defence spending.71 
National Defence Bonds were also issued for the partial financing of Defence expenditure.72 
Subscription lists opened on 1 July 1976.73 In August 1976 the SADF undertook to promote the sale 
of bonds amongst its own personnel by appealing to their sense of patriotism and by stressing sound 
financial investment.74 By the end of January 1977 applications to the amount of R100 million had 
been received.75 This suggests that the levels of support that the SADF were receiving were very 
high especially amongst patriotic sectors of society namely white NP supporters. Financial backing 
from the public in the form of sales of bonds was a massive boost for the SADF.  
 
The production of arms also became a large part of apartheid South Africa's war economy.76 It was 
announced towards the middle of 1976 that the Armaments Board and the Armaments Development 
and Production Corporation would merge to form a single organisation namely the Armaments 
Corporation of South Africa Limited (ARMSCOR).77 A practical merger had already taken place on 
11 August 1976, while formal conditions were laid down in legislation during the 1977 Session of 
Parliament.78 Considerable effort was made to make apartheid South Africa self-sufficient when it 
came to armaments production.79 Apartheid South Africa made progress in armaments 
manufacturing during the late 1970s.80 Manufacturing of small-arms and heavy ordnance artillery 
showed an increase varying from 300% to 500%.81 Progress was made with the building of 
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maritime assault vessels.82 The infantry combat vehicle, the “Ratel”, was successfully industrialised 
and manufactured.83 A locally designed missile was successfully developed.84 And lastly large scale 
utilization of the private sector for the maintenance, upgrading and modernisation of existing 
armaments of the SADF was also highly successful.85   
 
The South African war economy had various effects on society. The diversion of resources to ensure 
a properly resourced and prepared SADF came at a cost. Resources that were usually spent on, or 
could have been spent on, public utilities, education or healthcare were directed towards the SADF.  
Thus military readiness was placed ahead of society's basic needs. Due to the arms embargo and 
isolation that was placed on apartheid South Africa, more money than usual was needed and spent 
on researching new military technologies which in turn had a negative effect on the economy in the 
form of unnecessary expenditure although this did create more jobs. The systematic increase in the 
periods of national service also had a draining effect on the economy. Conscription in South Africa 
started in 1967, taking the form of service for all white males aged between seventeen and sixty-
five for nine months. In 1972 it was increased to one year. By 1977 it had increased to two years. 
This had a negative effect on the economy because all of those conscripts were being forced into the 
military instead of contributing to the economy. Conscription depleted the human resources the 
economy needed to thrive. This was due to conscripts being removed from the workplace for 
extended periods of national service and subsequent camps. Thus apartheid South Africa's war 
economy contributed to the militarisation of its society.   
 
State Security and The “Garrison State”  
 
It is the purpose of this section to consider the notion “Garrison State” and how apartheid South 
Africa could be described as a “Garrison State”. Nearly two-thirds of a century has passed since the 
late Harold Lasswell’s (1941) seminal work, “The Garrison State,” was published in the American 
Journal of Sociology.86 His thesis provided a “developmental construct” that has proven useful in 
the scientific study of world politics for several generations.87 Influenced by political and military 
events in Germany and Soviet Russia during the Second World War, and especially the advent of 
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aerial bombardment, Lasswell’s thesis was that trends of the time pointed toward “a world in which 
the specialists on violence [read soldiers] are the most powerful group in society”.88 Arguably, the 
contextual basis of Lasswell’s claim is the underlying premise for contemporary conceptualization 
of a military state, one reflecting Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union.89 This notion was 
developed in the context of a body of literature that stated Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet 
Union were totalitarian states and had much in common.  
 
Lasswell states: 
 
The Garrison State is a “developmental construct” about the future course of 
world-politics, whose function is to stimulate the individual specialist to clarify 
for himself his expectations about the future as a guide to the timing of scientific 
work. The trend of the time is away from the dominance of the specialist on 
bargaining, who is the businessman, and toward the supremacy of the specialist on 
violence, the soldier. It is probable that the ruling elite of the Garrison State will 
acquire most of the skill that we have come to accept as part of modern civilian 
management. Particularly prominent will be skill in the manipulation of symbols 
in the interest of morale and public relations. Internal violence will be directed 
principally against unskilled manual workers and counter elite elements who have 
come under suspicion. The practice will be to recruit the elite according to ability, 
authority will be dictatorial, governmentalized, centralized, integrated. The power 
pyramid will be steep, but the distribution of safety will be equalized.90 
 
How then can the notion “Garrison State” then be defined for the purposes of this thesis? We start 
with the word Garrison: The noun form means “troops stationed in a fort or fortified town.”91 The 
verb form means “to provide with or occupy as a garrison.”92 It seems that Lasswell exercised 
literary license in using “garrison” as an adjective to modify the noun “state.”93 Used in 
combination, “Garrison State” simply refers to a society in which the most powerful people are 
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members of the defence establishment or are individuals closely linked with the military.94 It should 
be noted that this does not include the entire security apparatus of apartheid South Africa. Samuel 
Huntington points out that Lasswell often used “garrison-police state” or “garrison prison state” 
interchangeably with “garrison state” in order to emphasize that all specialists in violence are 
included in the concept.95 For the purpose of this thesis only the military, as defined above, is 
considered.96  
 
By the time the information scandal finally forced Vorster to leave office, the whole country was in 
the grips of 'war psychosis'.97 An article in the Financial Mail entitled 'The March of Militarism' 
captured the mood of the times and deserves citing at some length.  
 
It begins:  
 
A bakery in central Johannesburg displays in its window a birthday cake in the shape 
of an army tank.98 A few blocks away a toy shop reports that sales of 'war games', 
bearing names like Attack on Moscow, have jumped fivefold in the past year.99 A 
Defence Force appeal to the public to give dogs to the army for border-patrol duty 
elicited more than 200 offers.100  
 
For the Financial Mail, this indicated a growing 'march to militarism' and was evidence that 
'psychologically and in practice South Africa was being prepared for the gathering storm.101 Gone 
were the heady days of detente and outward-looking policy.102 The military had become one of 
South Africa's biggest employers.103 Nearly 60 000 civilians were called up for military duty in 
1977, while applications to join the permanent force had leapt by 80% from 1976 to June 1978.104 
More disturbing for the Financial Mail was the increasing militarisation of schools with the Cadet 
programme.105  
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What the Angolan adventure demonstrated was the growing influence of the military on a society 
girding itself for what the generals described as 'total war'.106 The generals were already advocating 
some form of military regime.107 Major General N. Webster contended at the time that a strong 
defence force would underwrite political stability and economic potential and would 'allow 
necessary changes to come about in an orderly and secure manner.'108 The army chief, General 
Magnus Malan, was only a little less vague when he talked of the 'conflicting requirements of a 
total strategy and a democratic system of government.'109 Since the generals were advocating 
preparations for a 'total war', the natural assumption was that where this conflicted 'with a 
democratic system', the former must prevail.110 The number of military parades, fly-pasts and 
television shows featuring the army's strength increased dramatically, as did those covering 
weapons and troops on manoeuvres.111 This show of strength by the SADF can be seen as another 
trait of a “Garrison State”.  
 
The scope of operations of the South African Defence Force had been spelled out as early as 1957, 
in the Defence Act and its subsequent amendments (1977), which extended powers previously 
granted to the regime in time of war to apply in situations defined as 'operations in defence of the 
Republic or for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the Republic or in the 
neighbouring countries in the region'.112 The Act itself gave the SADF extremely wide parameters 
permitting it to undertake a wide range of operations inside and outside South Africa's borders 
without the need for parliamentary authorisation.113 
 
The militarization of apartheid South Africa cannot be understood without considering the 
enormous changes in the country's internal and international situation since the accession of the 
National Party in 1948.114 From 1948 onwards South Africa took on many of the institutional and 
psychological features of the so-called “Garrison State”.115 At the material level the long period of 
National Party rule witnessed the transformation of apartheid from a crude and loosely articulated 
doctrine of racial repression to a highly sophisticated programme for the design and development of 
authoritarian state structures.116 The result was a social network which, if not entirely authoritarian, 
was still sufficient, in its centralised power structures and denial of popular aspirations, to support 
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systems of military influence and political organisation.117 The extensive reliance on conscripted 
manpower had two important implications.118 Firstly, the perennial infusion of civilian influence 
into military institutions and the subsequent circulation of personnel between the civil and military 
sectors of society.119 Secondly, the extensive national service system provided channels through 
which military influences could be projected into civil society.120  
 
Without destroying at least the appearance of press freedom the apartheid government had for 
several years been engaged in tightening the leash around the media, adding new pieces of 
legislation to the more than one hundred laws restricting press reporting in South Africa.121 The 
bulk of these restrictions were only concerned with 'security' matters, with several broad pieces of 
legislations overlapping to make effective reporting on police and military issues almost 
impossible.122 The single most powerful restriction was introduced in 1975 as an amendment to the 
Defence Act.123 
 
This empowered the regime to prohibit the publication of any information relating to the 
composition, movement or disposition of the SADF.124 Thus any breach of this prohibition would 
be met with sanction. The Act was used to considerable effect during the 1975/76 invasion of 
Angola, when a complete blackout on news was imposed for several months.125 Thus the obscuring 
of the SADF’s movements were of paramount importance to the apartheid government. The clamp-
down was so effective that a crisis of confidence began to build up in the white community when 
news of South African actions leaked out through international press and radio.126 As a result, the 
press was later given permission to record reports covered in overseas newspapers, provided the 
SADF was approached for comment first.127 The regime never again attempted a complete 
blackout, preferring to make arrangements with the press for the release of pre-censored 
information.128 The argument could also be made that the military changed its strategy from 
imposing a complete “blackout” to one in which they tried to control the flow of information. This 
“lesson” drawn from the Angolan debacle did not necessarily result in a “concession” to the media 
nor reduce the influence of the military in matters of governance. 
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Lastly, the rise to power of F.W. de Klerk has to be acknowledged. F.W. de Klerk inherited the 
“Garrison State” from his predecessors (most notably P.W. Botha). It would seem that de Klerk’s 
rise to power might undermine the idea that apartheid South Africa was a “Garrison State”. For a 
country to qualify as a “Garrison State”, the most powerful members of its society (i.e. the political 
elite) must be part of the military establishment. It is so that de Klerk was never part of the military 
establishment of apartheid South Africa, but this does not diminish the argument that the county 
was a “Garrison State”. The argument cannot be made that de Klerk was voted into power as a great 
reformer. If anything the opposite is true. de Klerk always held strong conservative views and it was 
on this basis that he was voted into power. The widespread reforms which characterised his time in 
office was not part of his presidential campaign. Even to this day de Klerk has gone as far as 
defending certain apartheid policies and saying that apartheid was never a crime against humanity. 
Thus it is not convincing to argue that F.W. de Klerk coming to power means that apartheid South 
Africa was never a “Garrison State”. The question has to be asked that if apartheid South Africa was 
never a “Garrison State” in the first place, why was it necessary for de Klerk to dismantle such a 
massive and entrenched military bureaucracy in order to help bring about a new democratic 
dispensation? It is also important to note that the main focus of this thesis lies within the time 
period of 1975 to 1983 and that the widespread reforms and the dismantling of the “Garrison State” 
which was mainly spearheaded by de Klerk falls outside of the focus of this thesis and will not be 
discussed further.          
 
The National Security Management System  
 
The key to understanding the National Security Management System within the realms of apartheid 
South Africa’s “Garrison State” is that the military usurped executive and legislative powers by 
taking decisions and shaping policies without consulting elected officials. This formed the basis of 
apartheid South Africa’s “Garrison State” in that those individuals who formed part of the security 
establishment of the country (and who were not elected by the citizenry) was given the ability to 
influence the country in a substantial manner. The State Security Council (SSC) should also be 
noted as it presided over the National Security Management System (NSMS) of President Botha's 
apartheid government. Its function was to advise the government on formulating and executing 
policy regarding national security. Botha himself chaired the SSC. The following persons formed 
members of the State Security Council: Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Minister of Justice, Minister of Police, Chief of the Defence Force, Chief of the South 
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African Police, Director-General of Bureau for State Security (BOSS) (later National Intelligence 
Service (NIS)), Secretary of Foreign Affairs Secretary of Justice and anyone one else required to aid 
the discussions.129 It is very important to note that all of the above mentioned members formed part 
of the security establishment of the country. The fact that the members of the security establishment 
received such an elevated status within the Botha regime shows that apartheid South Africa was 
indeed a “Garrison State”. It also went further than this with Botha placing his trust in the 
military/security establishment that he had cultivated, and he had more faith in their intelligence 
gathering than any other state agencies. At the same time that the rest of the government was 
undergoing reorganisation, the NSMS was officially established by the Cabinet on 16 August 
1979.130 Utilising the outline already presented by committees and commissions, the Botha 
administration established a five-tier structure for the management and coordination of national 
security.131 At the executive level, it consisted of the State Security Council (SSC), the Work 
Committee of the SSC, the Secretariat of the SSC, and the Interdepartmental Committees.132 
Working in tandem with the executive level was a national system of regional management 
committees, or JMCs, that were further subdivided into local management committees.133  
 
When P.W. Botha assumed the office of Prime Minister in 1978, he believed that he was inheriting a 
country under siege and that it was being attacked from various different fronts.134 This is key in 
understanding Botha’s decision making processes regarding the security of the country and his 
“hawkish” outlook on foreign policy. Moving to address the crisis, Botha initially turned for 
guidance to the institution to which he had devoted over a decade of service as its chief minister, 
namely the South African military.135 The Bureau of State Security (BOSS) was eliminated and 
replaced by the National Intelligence Service (NIS).136 Coupled with this was the 
institutionalization of an extensive internal security apparatus, namely the NSMS, to be activated in 
emergency situations.137 The Joint Management Centres (JMCs), a national system of regional and 
local management committees supporting the executive of the NSMS, were said to be inspired by 
the example of the French national security system.138 Botha wanted to increase the role that the 
security establishment had to play within the country. The securocrats of the country started to 
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become the most powerful and influential members of society under Botha’s leadership, and this, as 
is emphasised throughout the thesis, is a key characteristic of a “Garrison State”.  
 
Belief in an onslaught against South Africa encouraged reliance on militaristic measures, about 
which the military personnel of the SSC had the best advice and plans.139 Even if this belief were 
not shared by top politicians, Botha was an ardent believer and he chaired the meetings of the SSC, 
which preceded cabinet meetings.140 Under his leadership, deliberations of the SSC generated a 
decision making momentum that was hard for the cabinet to stop.141 The SSC’s initial form and 
functions were to advise in the manner of a national security agency, but later inquiries showed it 
lacked the administrative means to perform tasks.142 By the late 1970s, the SSC became caught up 
with the larger cause of improving administrative efficiency, which was directed by the then Prime 
Minister, it became the pinnacle of the National Security Management System (NSMS), in effect 
from August 1979, which was designed to co-ordinate government’s executive functions better.143 
The NSMS took powers of presidential executive discretion to previously unknown heights.144 At 
the upper levels of the NSMS, the SSC was strengthened by adding a staff and secretariat.145 In 
addition, 15 interdepartmental committees and a working committee were created to pool efforts.146  
 
The administrative headquarters of the NSMS was located in Pretoria and, later on in 1986 it 
acquired operational headquarters chaired by the Deputy Minister of Law and Order. 147 The NSMS 
was intended to shorten and simplify the bureaucratic chain of command.148 Each NSMS entity had 
four committees.149 A committee for security (known by its Afrikaans acronym Veikom) required 
participation by the Department of Defence, the national intelligence service, the SADF, the South 
African Police, and the chief civil defence officer of the given region.150 Every government 
institution had to participate in one or other committee of the NSMS on national, regional and 
municipal levels.151 The individuals on the committees varied, but official representation by the 
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most senior bureaucrat or her/his delegate was required.152 NSMS entities liaised with 
developmental associations.153 Interpretations of the significance of the NSMS regarding civil – 
military relations have undoubtedly varied.154 Others argued that it represented a creeping military 
coup because it involved military ideas and men.155 Similarly, others were concerned about the 
decision making powers of the NSMS, which usurped those of parliament and other elected 
bodies.156  
  
The NSMS’ design came from the President’s office in the late 1970s.157 A vast array of bodies were 
subsequently created to act as special overseers of administration. This was done via a specific 
interpretation of the law which had created the SSC and which suited the apartheid government. 
The President (then Prime Minister) also took over the portfolio dealing with the public service.158 
Although the chain of command led to the cabinet, it first passed through the SSC, which was 
chaired by the President.159 In less than a decade the NSMS developed from the basics mechanism 
that characterised the newly established SSC in the early 70s to the complex interlocking committee 
structure that managed the state of emergency in the late 80s.160 The expansion of its scope was 
similar to the perception within the Botha administration that government reform might cause 
revolutionary reaction.161 Combining the security and welfare functions called for by counter-
revolutionary theorists, the NSMS was to be Botha’s answer to any outbreak of violence that 
threatened his control.162 
 
MID and the Monitoring of the Media 
 
It is important to note the role that MID played within the apartheid security apparatus. MID only 
started to play a major role within the state security spheres after P.W. Botha came to power in 
1978. Under Botha’s control, and military departments assumed the duties of civil departments. It is 
important to understand the history of MID and how it became so influential. The Bureau of State 
Security’s (BOSS) attempts to exert influence over MID (as well as the Security Police) created 
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problems from early on in their relationship.163 The tension between the two organisations appears 
to have been based on the downgrading of MID’s intelligence capacity.164 The relationship would 
deteriorate further following the failure of the security forces to curtail the urban rioting in 1976.165 
In early 1977 PW Botha offered his resignation to John Vorster after Botha discovered that his 
telephone had been tapped by BOSS.166 Vorster’s decision to keep Botha on and the latter’s ascent 
to power and his curbing of BOSS’s powers lead to the rise of MID. This also lead to the 
subsequent close collaboration between MID and PW Botha. The struggle between BOSS and MID 
was essentially a bureaucratic war.167 The argument over who should be responsible for the defence 
of South Africa stretched as far back as the early 1960s.168 General Hendrik van den Bergh (former 
head of BOSS) spoke later in life against PW Botha’s total onslaught strategy on public platforms 
and Botha’s use of MID to gain intelligence information.169 With Botha’s victory, the MID was 
given an extremely prominent role in the South African intelligence community after years out in 
the cold.170 The fortunes of MID had risen with Mr PW Botha.171 In the past, General van den 
Bergh had always supported Prime Minister BJ Vorster, leading to BOSS being the prominent 
intelligence department in apartheid South Africa.172 However this would change when Vorster 
stepped down. PW Botha consolidated his own control of the intelligence services after appointing 
Kobie Coetsee as Deputy Defence Minister and of National Security.173 Coetsee was a National 
Party MP and a Botha loyalist. This brought the MID under Botha’s control.174 The Department of 
National Security was also relocated to the Armscor building.175 The fact that the civilian 
intelligence agency was housed within the state’s arms development and procurement capacity 
symbolised the dominance PW Botha and his military Generals who were loyal to him.176  
 
A sign of  MID’s influence was that it had engineered a masterful spin operation in South Africa 
which had managed to convince the white population that the invasion of Angola would have been a 
success if the SADF was not let down by the unreliable CIA.177  Another sign of the growing power 
of the South African armed forces, and by extension of the MID, was the extraordinary growth in 
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the annual defence budget.178 By 1986-87 around R6.7 billion was allocated for defence.179 It is also 
important to note that in 1972 1 Reconnaissance Commando was established in Oudtshoorn under 
the command of Commandant Jan Breytenbach.180 1 Recce was placed under the control of MID 
shortly after its foundation, thus giving MID influence within the SADF. The MID, however, was 
never credited with the mythical power that observers attributed to Hendrik van den Bergh and 
BOSS during the 1970s.181 One reason for the lack of spook mythology was that MID did not seek 
publicity and has so far managed to avoid being held accountable for its actions.182 The MID 
believed that it handled real power in South Africa.183 Apartheid had been engaged in an ideological 
retreat since the revolts of 1976 but it was forced to face the very real prospect that the security 
forces had lost control of the insurrection which started in September 1984 and persisted until the 
end of 1986.184 The inability of BOSS and the police to contain the unrest in 1976 had led 
inexorable to van den Bergh’s fall in 1978.185 P.W. Botha remained in thrall to the MID solution of 
extreme repression, military efficiency and regional control.186 It is important to note the role that 
the Military Intelligence Department played. It was a functionary of the “Garrison State” and 
performed important duties for the apartheid security apparatus. The scale of the bureaucratic power 
of MID added another level of control and influence to P.W. Botha’s already substantial arsenal. It 
should be noted that the media reporting on the SADF and P.W. Botha comprised the two main 
themes covered by the MID media analysis reports.   
 
The media analysis reports examined how the SADF was being portrayed and reported on in the 
local media. These reports contained a section which laid out the implications of media reporting. 
The implications were stated as the following:  
 
“It seems that the media gave the SADF publicity when the SADF is active rather 
than demonstrative. Thus the invasion of Angola and the uplifting programs for 
black people in SWA got more attention than a show of force. The military has to 
clearly separate its target groups and what it hopes to accomplish. South Africa is 
a country with plenty of diversity and it is impossible to reach everyone at once in 
the intended manner. If the SADF wants to portray its clout and ability in the 
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public sphere, then that is what should happen. If this is the only manner in which 
the SADF can reach its goal is still to be decided.”187 
 
This section will show which aspects of media reporting regarding the SADF was analysed and 
focussed on by the MID reports. 
  
The 13 December 1979 report analysed the following news report regarding the SADF. The issue of 
the SADF shooting game and Botha criticising the media for reporting the matter was highlighted in 
the report. The Daily News reported on the matter on 27 November 1979 with an article entitled: 
“Ungrateful!” referring to Prime Minister PW Botha in his capacity as Minister of Defence 
admonishing the media for publishing reports that discredited the SADF even though it was the 
media who initiated the investigation into the incident by reporting on it.188 The 14 May 1980 report 
noted that Parents of Conscripts felt bitter due to secrecy of SADF regarding its activities. The Star 
reported on 21 April 1980 with an article entitled “Mother Horrified by army attitude” which was in 
relation to her son being missing yet the SADF remained silent and unwilling to break its secrecy.189 
Another issue which was picked up on in the report was that conscripts felt that they were not being 
paid enough. This was reported by the Sunday Express on 13 April 1980 in an article entitled: 
“Could you live on Army pay?”190 And lastly, Willem Steenkamp invited conscripts to comment on 
medal awards in his editorial “On Parade” so that they too could have a voice.    
 
The 6 June 1980 report noted that conscripts with a degree in engineering felt that the SADF was 
not utilising them appropriately, and transport of conscripts from basecamp remained an issue. The 
report also contained a section which laid out the implications of the media reporting. The 
implications were stated as follows: It became clear via the report that the media, especially the 
English media’s attitude and opinion regarding the SADF was highly variable. Even though some 
anti-government newspapers found it difficult to demonstrate positive criticism of the government, 
the same cannot be said in relation to the SADF. The positive reaction amongst the English media 
should be noted with the debut of new weapons for the SADF. The article by the Rand Daily Mail 
published 7 May 1980 entitled “Navy blasts into the missile era” was used as an example.191  
 
The 15 August 1980 report highlighted the following issues as the major events being reported on in 
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the local media: Students who completed their compulsory military training were being called up 
during exams and this was interfering with their ability to study and prepare therefor. The SADF 
was required to help the police with some of their duties. Border duty had to be spread evenly so 
that everyone received an opportunity to render such service. And lastly why were immigrants who 
lived in SA for years not forced to become conscripts? It should be noted that legislation was 
introduced later on to compel naturalised South Africans to become conscripts. Alternatively they 
could choose to emigrate. Die Oosterlig reported on 10 July 1980 that an Irish citizen went to court 
over conscription in South Africa.192 His name was Liam Keeley, and he felt that he should not be 
compelled to do military duty.193 
 
The reports summarised that the SADF received plenty of negative criticism, especially from 
English media that objected to its “no comment” replies. The SADF’s policy of secrecy was 
harming its image. The balance between positive and negative reporting was very good. MID 
believed that the Afrikaans media’s positive attitude towards the SADF neutralised the slightly 
negative attitude of the English media. 
 
The MID’s media analysis reports also focussed on how the local media reporting and represented 
P.W. Botha. When the focus on Botha is taken into account, it becomes important to note his 
political background. This would in turn help answer the question as to why so much focus was 
placed on Botha by the MID’s media analysis reports. P.W. Botha was elected Prime Minister of 
South Africa on 28 September 1978 after a struggle of various personalities within the National 
Party.194 In his first decade as Prime Minister he presided over sweeping changes in politics, the 
economy and society.195 In some cases he initiated reforms and in others merely responded.196 He 
was the first Afrikaner Nationalist leader to publicly admit the inherent flaws of apartheid, and 
challenged his supporters to accept limited power sharing with people of other races. This was a 
move that split his party and the Afrikaner people.197 But the promise shown by Botha in his early 
years were not met in his first decade in office.198 His programme of adaptive change became 
increasingly erratic, confused and ineffective.199 Security concerns became paramount to Botha and 
he was no longer a “reformist” president. By early 1978 the National Party Government was 
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paralysed by factionalism.200 Prime Minister Vorster was an ill man and did not seem effective in 
terms of handling domestic and international problems.201 Then came the succession struggle after 
Vorster’s reputation was tarnished due to what was called the “Information Scandal”.202 As the 
ramifications of the scandal were revealed piecemeal through relentless investigative journalism, 
judicial inquiry and leaks, it was primarily presented as a tale of corruption, mismanagement and 
political misdirection by National Party MP’s.203 The Information Scandal enthralled the South 
African public from 1977 to 1980.204 P.W. Botha, as Minister of Defence, was asked to allocate 
chunks of his budget, for which he was responsible to Parliament, to the Department of Information, 
with no say in its use or knowledge of its purpose.205 Botha only did this under protest. It became 
clear that Vorster would have to resign when these actions became public, and so he did.206 Then 
there was four immediate candidates for the Office of Prime Minister.207 Fanie Botha the Minister 
of Labour, Pik Botha the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Connie Mulder (heavily implicated in the 
Information Scandal) the Minister of Information, Social Welfare and Pensions, and of Immigration. 
P.W. Botha, then Minister of Defence, was the fourth.208 P.W. Botha won the close contest and 
became Prime Minister after a National Party caucus vote on 28 September 1978.209 Having 
consolidated his hold on power, Botha was able to rely on the generals and the military bureaucracy. 
Botha reached the pinnacle of his power between November 1983 and September 1984.210  
 
The unravelling of Vorster’s position in the wake of the Information Scandal in 1977, an episode 
which further discredited his administration, gave Botha an opportunity to make a bid for the 
premiership.211 Narrowly selected to replace Vorster by the NP caucus in October 1978, Botha 
found himself in a position to activate the Beaufeian prescriptions of “Total Strategy”.212 Botha's 
service as a cabinet member from 1961 onwards spanned much of Verwoerd’s and all of Vorster’s 
premiership.213 When he became Prime Minister in September 1978 he had held the defence 
portfolio for over 12 years.214 According to David Welsh, Botha had a hawkish stance and a true 
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belief in the so-called “Total Onslaught” theory.215 It is the opinion of Herman Giliomee that the 
route to power of the first President of apartheid South Africa, P.W. Botha, passed through the 
ministry of Defence.216 Giliomee believes that this strengthened Botha’s personal inclination 
towards authoritarian leadership which was coupled with administrative teamwork.217   
 
The MID reports regarding media analysis focussed heavily on Botha’s interactions with the public, 
and how they were reported and portrayed in the local media. Lastly the report also mentions the 
fact that PW Botha displaced many leaders, and that he had been warned against this.218 The report 
also contained a section which would give perspective regarding all of the reports pertaining to 
Botha. Thus the positive and negative criticism which he received in the media would be 
summarised. The leadership shown by Botha as well as his reception of the opinions and advice of 
others was praised.219 Negative criticism was that Botha’s temper was highlighted at times and 
criticised.220 The 20 July 1979 edition of Die Afrikaner newspaper contained a report with the 
heading “P.W. makes adjustments for dramatic changes” which accused him of appointing “left-
wing” individuals in key areas and keeping right-wing individuals away from positions pertaining 
to the racial policies of the country.221 It should be noted that the term left-wing is of course a 
relative term and that in this instance it was a conservative Afrikaans newspaper using the term and 
thus it was not used in the generally accepted sense of the word.  
 
Botha received the most attention as an individual in media, and according to the MID’s media 
analysis reports, there existed a growing neutrality towards him regarding reporting about him. 
Botha also concerned himself with the media in various ways. P.W. Botha’s major effort to find a 
lever was through the mechanism of the “Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media”, usually 
called the Steyn Commission, which held hearings from November 1980 to April 1981 and issues 
its final report to Parliament on February 1982.222 The Steyn Commission was one of several 
established by P.W. Botha that concerned themselves in one way or another with the media.223 
Opponents of the apartheid government regarded such commissions as PR gimmicks.224 This will 
be discussed in greater length later on in the thesis.  
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Botha accumulated massive power, with no realistic chance of being voted out.225 He attempted to 
govern without meaningful internal reforms and, in an attempt to deflect pressure, pursued détente 
with the rest of Africa, which ultimately failed.226 Botha also made fatal errors.227 He was unable to 
move beyond the homeland policy in meeting black demands.228 Also, for too long he bought into 
the military’s perspective that the Communist threat rather than black political exclusion and 
widespread poverty caused instability in the country.229 Lastly, he also kept Nelson Mandela in jail 
after he had already long been a symbol of the struggle for freedom and also apartheid’s 
inhumanity.230  
 
Monitoring of the Media: MID’s Analysis of the roles of the SADF/Prime 
Minister 
 
The notion of the “Garrison State” and how it is linked with capturing media information will now 
be discussed. As a “Garrison State”, apartheid South Africa not only sought to control the media, 
but also scrutinize its depiction of its agencies such as the SADF. The collection of media 
information and analysis regarding the SADF was a major part of the then secret inner workings of 
the Department of Defence’s Military Intelligence Department. The Department of Defence put a 
lot of effort and resources into capturing information. The information they focussed on was media 
reports regarding the workings of the apartheid government. The information would then be 
analysed and compiled into a report which would then be handed over to relevant parties such as the 
office of the Prime Minister or the head of the SADF. The reports themselves were “secret” and 
were only declassified in 2009.  
 
It should be noted that these are samples from the archive and that only elect reports were analysed 
which specifically focussed on the SADF and P.W. Botha between 1979 and 1980. The thesis will 
not only look to analyse the specific content noted by the reports, but also the Department of 
Defence’s own analysis of the information it captured regarding media reporting. Another important 
fact to note is that these reports are not uniform. They differ from report to report, focussing on 
different aspects of media reports regarding The SADF and P.W. Botha. Some are more focussed on 
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statistical information whereas others are more concerned with issues being reported on and the 
related content. Special attention is paid to how P.W. Botha in his role as Prime Minister and the 
SADF is portrayed. All reports were however judged according to the same criteria: “Reaching 
strategic and tactical ends especially reflected via the symbolic and sentimental meaning of the 
SADF for all racial groups: the acceptance of a common enemy: and the positive attitude of foreign 
military forces with regards to South Africa’s interests.”231 Thus any report criticising the SADF or 
its influence within apartheid society was flagged as potentially dangerous. Also, a summary of a 
version of only the articles that were of consequence in terms of the previously mentioned criteria, 
were analysed by the Department of Defence. It should be noted that not all reports which fit the 
criteria were analysed and included in the report. Attention was limited to the nature of “normal 
reporting” (MID reports do not specifically state what was meant by “normal reporting”) of 
newsworthy events of other authorities. Attention was also only given to local media institutions.   
 
With regards to the case of militarisation of South African society, certain issues have to be 
mentioned in this context. In an environment in which it was possible to manipulate information, 
the Department of Defence thrived. The ability to keep tabs on the media and to capture and analyse 
its reporting was highly advantageous for the Department of Defence. The militarization of 
apartheid South Africa cannot be understood when it is considered apart from the enormous military 
bureaucracy which existed during the 1970s and 80s. It was the bureaucratic arm which collected 
intelligence for the Department of Defence.  
 
Changes in the country’s internal and international relations, as well as issues relating to media 
freedom made the apartheid government concerned not only about perceived threats, but also how 
those threats were being portrayed in the media. The fact that only local media institutions were 
being focussed on in the reports and that only local media institutions were having their content and 
reporting analysed by the Department of Defence shows two things. Firstly that the Department of 
Defence did not trust the local media to be loyal towards state institutions such as the SADF and 
that negative reporting was a reality. And, secondly, it further strengthens the argument that 
apartheid South Africa was indeed a “Garrison State” as it is not necessarily customary for free and 
democratic countries to have its Department of Defence secretly analysing said country’s local 
media. In countries such as the United State or the United Kingdom such practices are conducted by 
civil agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA) in the USA or MI5 in the UK. Thus the 
fact that a military agency such as MID conducted aforementioned practices in apartheid South 
Africa, strengthens the argument that the country was a “Garrison State”. From 1948 onwards South 
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Africa took on many of the institutional features of the so-called “Garrison State”. It was not only 
the overt actions which confirms the “Garrison State” status of apartheid South Africa, but also the 
secret covert actions taken subtly behind the scenes and away from public scrutiny.  
 
The reports examined cover the period from 1979-80. Each report has a front page with the title 
“Media analysis in connection with the Prime Minister” or “Media analysis in connection with the 
SADF” depending on which subject was the prime focus of the report. However in general all of the 
reports attempted to achieve the same goal which was to capture information reported by the media 
relating to important persons or events, and then analyse the manner in which the reporting was 
done. The tone of the media reports was also analysed and categorised as either a positive, negative 
or a neutral report. Each report that was used as a sample for this thesis will be analysed 
individually according to the date it was compiled. The label “secret” implied that the contents of 
the report could only be shared by a small circle of functionaries and politicians; an inner sanctum 
of the apartheid state. Thus the secrecy of the reports was constantly emphasised. The handling of 
the reports were also subject to the rules of the SADF security instructions. Each report came with 
the following sentence: “If it is needed to destroy these documents, proper procedure should be 
followed as outlined by SADF security instructions.”232 Thus it should be noted that the Department 
of Defence was so secretive regarding these reports that measures were put in place to ensure that 
they would be destroyed according to protocol if need be. Each report also came with its own 
definitions. Positive reporting meant positive criticism regarding military preparedness and military 
clout. Neutral reporting meant simply a factual reporting of events related to the SADF or relevant 
parties. And lastly, negative reporting was seen as any attempt to discredit the SADF or relevant 
party, to place it in a bad light, or to criticise its state of preparedness or strength. Both English and 
Afrikaans newspapers were analysed.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear from the above mentioned information and reports that the military apparatus of apartheid 
South Africa placed considerable emphasis on monitoring the local media to assess whether it was 
harming the image of the country within the court of public opinion. Special attention was paid in 
these reports to the manner in which the media reported on political issues such as apartheid laws. 
Attention was also given to the manner in which P.W. Botha was represented in the local media 
along with the SADF. In handwritten notes of Botha obtained from the Archive of Contemporary 
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Affaires Botha refers to a Cape Times article as a lie (unfortunately he does not specify which 
article) thus it can be deduced that criticism lodged against Botha was always noted by the 
establishment.233 The manner in which detailed reports were compiled with the emphasis on 
capturing reporting done by the media shows how far the apartheid government was willing to go to 
monitor the local media and to thus ensure that it was “loyal” and “patriotic” and that it subscribed 
to the “Total Strategy” doctrine. These reports can be seen as providing a significant insight into the 
relationship between the SADF and the media. The activities of the security apparatus of apartheid 
South Africa only strengthens the argument that apartheid South Africa was indeed a “Garrison 
State”. The fact that state resources were used to monitor private media institutions proves that the 
apartheid government wished to uphold the idea that a free and independent press existed in 
apartheid South Africa even though the greater majority of its actions went towards curtailing the 
independence of media institutions. These reports form part of the evidence that the apartheid 
government did not trust, nor did it fully understand how to control the local media without harming 
the idea that a free press existed in the country. This lends weight to the argument which is made 
throughout this thesis that the relationship between the media and the SADF was highly complex 
especially when it is taken into account that the media’s activities in terms of how it was reporting 
certain issues was being monitored by the security apparatus of apartheid South Africa. Apartheid 
South Africa was a “Garrison State”, and it allocated a multitude of state resources into a 
bureaucratic arm of the security apparatus (the MID) of the country to investigate the local media’s 
perception and reporting regarding the SADF and PW Botha.   
 
It is important to note that “Total Strategy” as the apartheid government used it help further 
entrench apartheid South Africa's “Garrison State” status. The relationship between the apartheid 
government/SADF and the media became ever more complex due to the highly militarised nature of 
apartheid South Africa. How effective “Total Strategy” was is debatable, as apartheid did come to 
an end as did the “Garrison State”. However “Total Strategy” did set the tone for further 
entrenching the “Garrison State” and thus making access to security information very limited. The 
notion of apartheid South Africa being a “Garrison State” along with Botha's “Total Strategy” needs 
to be seen as the background with regards to the relationship between the apartheid 
government/SADF and the media. Without understanding apartheid South Africa's “Garrison State” 
status and its use of “Total Strategy” it would not be possible to understand the relationship between 
the apartheid government/SADF and the media. Lastly, it is also important to note the role that the 
NSMS played. The NSMS gave structure to the security establishment of apartheid South Africa. It 
formed part of Botha’s Beaufre inspired “Total Strategy” and helped to further entrench the 
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“Garrison State”. The NSMS functionaries were securocrats and as previously stated came from the 
office of the President during the 1970s. The NSMS tightened the hold Botha had and increased the 
role that the security establishment played within the country. The NSMS assisted in creating a 
militarised environment which the South African media had to operate in. The experiences of the 
South African media within the “Garrison State” will be discussed in the following chapter.      
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Chapter 4: The Media and Case Studies 
 
Introduction 
 
Taking into account the scope of strict legislation regarding defence reporting, as well as the highly 
militarised nature of South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s, it should be noted that the 
relationship between the Department of Defence and the media was very complex in nature. 
Apartheid South Africa's “Total Strategy” gave the Department of Defence the framework it needed 
for controlling the press. The scope of strict legislation as shown in chapter 2 provided the measures 
the Department of Defence needed to ensure that it had control over defence reporting. It is the 
purpose of this chapter to analyse the relationship between the media and the Department of 
Defence and how journalists interacted with the Department of Defence regarding the coverage of 
defence matters.   
 
The chapter will also analyse the public relations disasters of Operations Savannah and Reindeer 
and show what the role of the Department of Defence and military intelligence, as well as how the 
international media reacted towards the two military Operations. It is important to note how the 
relationship between the South African media at the time and the Department of Defence heavily 
impacted on the South African media's coverage of Operations Savannah and Reindeer. The strict 
legislation as well as an environment in which national security was placed ahead of public interest 
made it almost impossible for the South African media to report on the PR disasters of Operations 
Savannah and Reindeer. Thus it is the combination of the environment dominated by secrecy in 
which the media had to report as well as the PR disasters of Operations Savannah and Reindeer that 
is key to understanding the relationship between the Department of Defence and the South African 
media, as well as understanding why it was the international media that “broke” the story on 
Operations Savannah and Reindeer. The manner in which journalists interacted with the Department 
of Defence regarding coverage of defence matters then also becomes very important with regards to 
defining the broader relationship between the Department of Defence and the media.  
 
Under apartheid, practicing journalism in South Africa had been incredibly difficult. Journalists or 
any individual/group who operated independently from state or NP media, and who expressed any 
serious criticism of apartheid were persecuted and harassed. A number of journalists had been the 
victims of attempted assassinations, detentions, and prosecutions. It is important to not only look 
specifically at defence correspondents but also the experiences of all journalists working during 
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apartheid. The plight and difficulty in which famous anti-apartheid journalists such as Ruth First, 
Donald Woods, Allister Sparks, Percy Qoboza and Schalk Pienaar operated has to be acknowledged 
in order to understand the relationship between the apartheid government/SADF and the media. 
Government intolerance and hostility toward opposition media, which was already widespread in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, intensified as the decade unfolded.1 It was not only government 
intolerance and hostilities which the journalism industry had to deal with during apartheid, but there 
was also the matter of their readership. The public was not always necessarily interested in the 
message of dissent being pushed by the media.2 Thus journalists had to operate within an extremely 
hostile environment, whilst at the same time attempting to sell stories that will keep a readership 
interested. It took a careful balancing act from apartheid journalists to ensure that they do not 
alienate their readers whilst still trying to combat apartheid without being prosecuted for dissent.   
 
The most important tension that a defence correspondent of the 1970s and 1980s had to juggle when 
reporting defence matters lay between adopting what can be called an “independent-newsman” 
stance and a “military-supportive” one.3 This choice became increasingly difficult for defence 
correspondents to make as the Department of Defence tightened its grip on defence information and 
continued its policy of blatant favouritism towards journalists supportive of the apartheid 
government. However these choices were never really separated in reality because defence 
correspondents viewed their roles differently in different circumstances. However there also existed 
a moral dilemma that defence correspondents increasingly had to face, which was whether to 
consciously be an active opponent of the apartheid government and the Department of Defence, or 
to support these institutions and gain access to information regarding defence matters which one's 
opposition newspapers did not have. The media’s “marriage out of necessity” played a role as it was 
dependent on the military for supplying it with defence information to report on.  Another restraint 
was the policy of secrecy which the Department of Defence vigorously imposed at times. The 
consistent reply of “no comment” added another dimension to the already overly complex 
relationship between the media and the Department of Defence. Thus, as will be shown throughout 
this chapter, the relationship between the Department of Defence and the media was multi-pronged 
and highly complex.  
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Relationship between Media and Department of Defence as well as their 
interaction and coverage of defence matters 
 
The relationship between the Department of Defence and the media has always been complex due 
to the Department of Defence being the primary gatekeeper of information regarding security 
matters, and because the Department of Defence and the media not always sharing the same goals 
with regards to defence reporting. The nature of the relationship between the Department of 
Defence and the media was also strained in certain instances. The strict legislation regarding 
defence reporting referred to in chapter 2 that the media had to negotiate, as well as the Department 
of Defence being extraordinarily cautious about the information it made available to the media 
made defence reporting extremely frustrating at times for defence correspondents. In this chapter it 
will be shown that the Department of Defence practiced blatant favouritism regarding the media. 
The blatant favouritism by the Department of Defence as well as “Total Strategy” doctrine within 
which the media were expected to operate created a very circumscribed environment. The blatant 
favouritism by the Department of Defence in terms of favouring one media organisation over 
another sent a clear message that compliance was the only way to receive information for defence 
reporting from the Department of Defence. Also, the media was only utilised when it was deemed 
convenient to do so. Thus giving credence to the “convenient marriage” analogy.   
 
It is important to note that there were two media groups, namely the South African Press 
Association and the Newspaper Press Union that operated in apartheid South Africa. The South 
African Press Association or SAPA as it is commonly known, was and is still an independent, non-
governmental news agency, registered as a Section 21 not-for-gain company, dedicated to providing 
the media industry with material.4 The Newspaper Press Union (mentioned briefly in Chapter 2 of 
the thesis regarding its agreement with the SADF) represented the owners and managements of the 
main press groups.5 These bodies were intermediaries with regards to the relationship between the 
media and the Department of Defence. The NPU (as shown in Chapter 2 with regards to the 
negotiations with the SADF) negotiated on behalf of the media groups it was representing. SAPA 
was used as a platform via which media groups could gain quick access to directives issued by the 
Department of Defence.   
 
Having a working relationship with the military liaison officials was also very important. Journalists 
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acting as defence correspondents for their respective newspapers firstly had to receive accreditation 
from the Directorate of Public Relations of the Department of Defence before they could be attested 
as defence correspondents. Then they also had to have news items cleared before publishing. Also 
due to the agreement between the Newspaper Press Union and the Minister of Defence at the time, 
P.W. Botha, newspapers were not allowed to print news covered by the international press regarding 
the SADF.6 Thus the defence correspondents had to rely on the liaison officials of the Department 
of Defence for information regarding defence reporting, and were at the mercy so to speak of these 
officials to quite a large extent. This constrained the local media from reporting “breaking news” 
regarding important military events which the SADF was part of. This blockade of defence 
information led to the South African public being kept in the dark regarding the activities of the 
SADF. Thus when news broke of SADF activities in Angola via the international media, the local 
media felt as if it was not being utilised properly by the Department of Defence and it was being 
purposely kept out of the loop. For example when the international media broke the story on events 
surrounding Operation Savannah and Reindeer which will be discussed later on in this chapter.   
 
 The Department of Defence fed titbits of information to some defence correspondents and not to 
others proving that they favoured compliance and emphasising how compliance would lead to 
access to some information that may not have been included in the official statement made by the 
liaison officials of the Department of Defence. The majority of defence correspondents complied 
and were granted access to some information by insiders within the Department of Defence. And 
thus for the majority of the time the system functioned relatively smoothly. However some 
newspapers and defence correspondents did not comply with the strict environment in which 
defence reporting at the time was taking place. As a general summary the communication goals of 
the Department of Defence can be seen as the message containing specific information which the 
Department of Defence was willing to make public at that time. Thus only the information it wished 
to convey formed part of the communication goals, which is why it was so important for the 
Department of Defence that defence correspondents complied with its rules.  As soon as a defence 
correspondent stepped outside the boundaries of these goals and became critical, the defence 
correspondent, for example Bob Hitchcock, would have lost his accreditation as a defence 
correspondent. This was very important leverage that the Department of Defence exercised over 
defence correspondents.   
 
 
Newspapers such as the Rand Daily Mail still remained critical of the apartheid government and 
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more specifically the Department of Defence for keeping such a tight grip on the access to defence 
information. The Rand Daily Mail openly criticised the Department of Defence and protested 
military censorship vehemently. The most sensational protest against censorship during the Angolan 
war came from the Rand Daily Mail, which twice in a matter of four days carried blank spaces on 
its front page.7 The protest was prompted by government censorship but also a decision made by the 
Directorate of Public Relations to give another newspaper, The Star, the initial break on information 
relating to a defence news item.8 This decision was never officially explained by the Department of 
Defence and one can only speculate that The Star was the first paper to request clearance and thus it 
was favoured.9 The first blank space appeared in an issue of the Rand Daily Mail on Saturday 15 
November 1975. In a small white box below the main story about the Soviet Union backing the 
MPLA, the newspaper stated the following regarding the previously mentioned news item, “which 
would have occupied this space has not been published because permission which is required in 
terms of the law for such publication has not been granted.”10 The item being referred to was the 
report of British Independent Television showing South African troops and armoured cars in 
Angola.11 The Rand Daily Mail did not specifically say which law was involved neither what the 
nature of the news item was. Thus the protest was not explicitly against the military censorship, but 
rather against censorship as a whole.   
 
By Tuesday of the following week the Rand Daily Mail's had decided not to comply with 
regulations regarding defence reporting any further.12 The front page lead, headed: “More 
servicemen killed in action” began with a 15cm double-column blank space in which appeared the 
following paragraph: 
 
For reasons totally unrelated to the military considerations or the security of the state, 
an announcement of the death in action last Thursday of South African servicemen has 
been delayed by the Defence authorities. This information, of vital concern to the 
country, will only be released officially for publication this afternoon, although the 
Minister of Defence approved it for publication yesterday.13  
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It is important to note that it was not only the Rand Daily Mail’s management that protested military 
censorship. The Rand Daily Mail's defence correspondent, Bob Hitchcock, was also very outspoken 
and criticised the Department of Defence for its military censorship. The relationship between Bob 
Hitchcock as a defence correspondent for the Rand Daily Mail and the Department of Defence can 
be seen as an example of how the Department of Defence abused its control over the media. The de-
accreditation of Bob Hitchcock as a defence correspondent for the Rand Daily Mail should be seen 
as a highly significant incident in terms of the relationship between the Department of Defence and 
the media.14 This happened in March 1976, not long after the official list of accreditations had been 
drawn up and ratified, though by that time Hitchcock had been the defence correspondent for the 
Rand Daily Mail for some years.15 Hitchcock was one of the very few defence correspondents to be 
publicly critical of news censorship during the Angolan War. He also carried his watchdog function 
on the SADF further than most defence correspondents did at the time.16 On the question of 
censorship, he felt there was a definite political agenda and that the Department of Defence had 
been managing the news to its own advantage. He could accept censorship if it were fairly done and 
necessary for strategic reasons, which he thought had been the case when he reported the Yom 
Kippur War.17 Hitchcock's general point was made in an article he wrote at the time of the Angolan 
War, arguing against too restrictive censorship, which he said left people suspicious of every official 
statement issued.  
 
In the article in the Rand Daily Mail dated 22 November 1975 Hitchcock stated:  
 
Rational military censorship is not easy to achieve. It takes experience and a talent for 
balanced and imaginative thinking on the part of the military authorities. This is no 
reflection on the efficiency on South Africa's war machine, which is strong and runs 
smoothly. Though the censorship issue, unless solved, could soon affect the 
performance of the machine.18 
 
Thus from this statement it is clear that Hitchcock was not necessarily irrevocably opposed to the 
Department of Defence and the SADF. Hitchcock's attempted criticism was meant to be 
constructive. Hitchcock wanted to streamline the system and make it more efficient and transparent. 
This was a very different approach to what other defence correspondents such as Willem 
Steenkamp, for example, took. Willem Steenkamp was a part time soldier and an officer in the Cape 
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Town Highlanders who worked as a defence correspondent for the Cape Times.19 He started 
working for the Cape Times in 1973 as a military correspondent and subsequently witnessed the 
Border War both as a reservist and a journalist.20 As a reservist of the Citizen Force he spent three 
months as an infantryman in Angola on call-up during Operation Savannah.21 He also made many 
trips to the operational area as a journalist and accompanied strike forces on extensive cross-border 
operations.22 Steenkamp's reporting should be seen as part of the spectrum of reporting on the 
Border War. What is meant by the “spectrum of reporting” is that media organisations and their 
subsequent defence correspondents of the 70s and 80s can be classified according to whether they 
supported the apartheid government or not. Thus conservative defence correspondents like Gideon 
Joubert of Die Burger for example could be placed at one end of the spectrum whilst more critical 
defence correspondents like Hitchcock of the Rand Daily Mail could be placed more towards the 
other end of the spectrum. It should be noted that Hitchcock and Steenkamp were not necessarily at 
opposing ends of the spectrum as both did not always criticise the apartheid government. 
Steenkamp’s role and importance will be discussed later on in this chapter.    
 
It has to be emphasised that openly criticising the Department of Defence was not the norm during 
the 1970s and 1980s. Hitchcock did not flinch from exposing the weak links within the relationship 
between the Department of Defence and the media. As an example of the weak links in the 
relationship between the media and the Department of Defence, Hitchcock said it had taken the 
Department of Defence five days to release to the media the names of four soldiers killed in action 
on the South West African border (with the benefit of hindsight we now know that those soldiers 
were in fact killed in Angola).23 This had the potential to amount to misinformation as the public 
still did not know the numbers of wounded in those military operations nor the names of the 
wounded.24 He suggested that a team of military censors who had the knowledge should be 
appointed to work in shifts serving morning, evening and Sunday newspapers.25 They should be 
instructed to cut only specific details of men and military hardware operating in war zones.26 The 
SADF did not entertain his suggestions.   
 
In the same article mentioned above (Rand Daily Mail 22 November 1975), Hitchcock went on to 
say: 
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There are few other considerations involving security and reporting on activities in 
operational areas. But keeping from one's own population information that the world 
has access to is not one of them.27 
 
This statement amounted to criticism that summarized the pitfalls of military censorship in 
apartheid South Africa perfectly. The lack of access to information regarding defence reporting 
could not be justified for Hitchcock, especially taking into account the fact that the international 
media had access to the same information. The fact that the Department of Defence kept the South 
African public in the dark was something that Hitchcock felt compelled to criticise. It is important 
to note that Hitchcock did not back away from politicising the issue, but he was to pay the price for 
not being cooperative and compliant with the regulations that the Department of Defence had set 
out regarding defence reporting and military censorship as set out in chapter 2. Hitchcock received a 
telephone call from the Directorate of Public Relations telling him that his accreditation as a 
defence correspondent for the Rand Daily Mail had been withdrawn.28 The decision was never 
explained but Hitchcock figured that he had been too independently critical of the Department of 
Defence to be tolerated any longer. His non-compliance with the status quo had cost him his 
accreditation. An event which most likely figured in the decision regarding him losing his 
accreditation concerned something he had written about lax security precautions at a SADF briefing 
at a military camp in Cape Town which he attended. He described how early in 1975 he had 
attended a top-level briefing for military correspondents on arms manufacturing and distribution.29 
He entered the camp and then the briefing room without an identity check or a search for concealed 
weapons.30 In the room were the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff, and according to 
Hitchcock they were unguarded.31  
 
On 10 December 1975 Hitchcock wrote a piece in the Rand Daily Mail stating:  
 
That morning, had I been bent on assassination, I could have eliminated, with two sharp 
bursts from a hidden weapon, the entire top strata of South Africa's Defence system.32 
 
Hitchcock explained that this article, like most of his previous articles, had been written in a spirit 
of constructive criticism to persuade the army that electronic devices and more vigilance were 
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needed to strengthen the security set-up especially to protect the top strata of South Africa's Defence 
system.33 The article had been cleared by him personally with the Directorate of Public Relations 
and after it was published a number of senior officers congratulated him on doing it. Another item 
which may have played a role with Hitchcock's de-accreditation was a news report Hitchcock had 
written on the possibility of the SA Air Force using its Mirage Jets to do battle with the Russian 
MiGs coming into Luanda.34 This had been discussed in the international media.35 Hitchcock 
questioned a senior Air Force spokesman about the issue, and as Hitchcock states, “and at no time 
as far as I was concerned, was that conversation off the record.”36 And thus he continued with a 
speculative piece which appeared early in February 1976. He predicted the likelihood of aerial 
combat becoming a new dimension of the war in Angola. Later he heard that the military authorities 
thought this story had embarrassed South Africa.37 An argument can be made that Hitchcock had 
crossed a line with this article. It is important to note that this line was determined by the 
Department of Defence and that it was variable in nature. This variability was due to the fact that it 
was never spelled out to the defence correspondents. It was something that was vaguely insinuated 
or more often left unsaid. Hitchcock speculating about the war machinery that the SADF would use 
certainly did not sit well with the Department of Defence. This undoubtedly only added to the case 
being built against Hitchcock and the necessity and timing of the article can also be questioned.  
 
Certain of Hitchcock's own colleagues in the media had felt that at the time he had gone too far.38 
Several felt that Hitchcock, though supportive of the military and loyal to the country, had 
overstepped the consensus of “correct” journalism and respect for the military.39 This consensus 
was reproduced and imitated throughout the media industry. It was felt that issues like the lack of 
security at military camps should be brought to the Department of Defence attention privately.40 
One journalist remarked that Hitchcock could not have been of much account as a military 
specialist if the Department of Defence felt they could get rid of him with as little effort as they 
did.41 Hitchcock had been a “thorn in the flesh” of the system, and for that his punishment would be 
de-accreditation as a defence correspondent. According to the editor of the Rand Daily Mail at the 
time, Raymond Louw, attempts to obtain a statement of specific reasons for Hitchcock's de-
accreditation all failed.42 After personally approaching the Department of Defence, Raymond Louw 
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put his queries through the National Press Union.43 The National Press Union discussed the case at 
a meeting but declined to take it up officially.44 The General Secretary of the NPU told the author 
that matters like this were usually left to the newspaper proprietor concerned, but in any event it 
was not the Department of Defence's normal practice to give reasons for its rulings.45 Later word 
got back to Hitchcock that he was regarded as a security risk and he immediately offered to resign 
from the Rand Daily Mail in order not to embarrass the paper.46 Louw refused the resignation, and 
Hitchcock got reassigned to the race relations beat while another Rand Daily Mail staff member, 
Don Marshall, took over as defence correspondent for the paper.47  
 
The Hitchcock saga illuminates the dysfunctionality of the relationship between the media and the 
Department of Defence. Bob Hitchcock, as a representative of the media, had a unique and 
awkward relationship with the Department of Defence. The interactions between Hitchcock and the 
Department of Defence occurred in an environment where defence reporting was extremely 
frustrating for defence correspondents. Hitchcock can be seen as an example of a defence 
correspondent who did not comply with the status quo. Even though Hitchcock claimed to be 
patriotic and supportive of the Department of Defence (some of his peers concurred with this view), 
he was still seen as a disruptive influence in the public domain. His open and independent criticism 
of the defence establishment and subsequent de-accreditation due to this behaviour proves that the 
Department of Defence did not tolerate any dissent. The only interaction(s) which the Department 
of Defence did in fact tolerate was if the journalist(s) were compliant and willing to fit into the 
system that the Department of Defence had created. The media, and more specifically defence 
correspondents, had a specific role to play for the Department of Defence regarding its 
communication goals. It is important to note that the communication goals of the Department of 
Defence varied from event to event.  
 
When analysing the interactions and the relationship between the Department of Defence and 
defence correspondents, it is important to also look at a range of examples regarding the spectrum 
of defence correspondents. Many more defence correspondents were compliant than non-compliant 
with regards to the rules and regulations regarding defence reporting that the Department of 
Defence had drawn up. Thus it is important not to only view Hitchcock's interactions with the 
Department of Defence as the only manner in which defence correspondents interacted with the 
Department of Defence. Willem Steenkamp was not necessarily the complete opposite of Bob 
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Hitchcock with regards to how he played his part in ensuring the communication goals of the 
defence establishment was met. However there were differences. Unlike Hitchcock, Steenkamp was 
compliant, part of the system, and did not question or openly criticise the Department of Defence or 
the SADF. He appreciated the communication goals of the Department of Defence and abided by 
the rules and regulations. He never truly looked to be controversial in any sense. However, like 
Hitchcock, he was also supportive and patriotic. Other than those characteristics, there were very 
few similarities between Hitchcock and Steenkamp as defence correspondents. Also, their 
experiences as defence correspondents were significantly different. This can possibly be attributed 
to the difference in attitude towards the defence establishment. Steenkamp was willing to be more 
compliant, whereas Hitchcock wanted to be more independent and critical. Steenkamp should be 
seen as an example on the spectrum regarding the interaction and relationship between defence 
correspondents and the Department of Defence. However it is of more significance in terms of 
showing how the Department of Defence treated compliant defence correspondents and what they 
expected defence correspondents to do in terms of meeting the communication goals of the 
Department of Defence.    
 
Willem Steenkamp was most definitely a staunch supporter of the SADF. He worked as an 
intelligence officer with a Cape Town regiment, and then went into Angola in January 1976 and 
remained there until the South African withdrawal in March. Before his call-up Steenkamp 
monitored the Angolan situation carefully and kept his editor at the Cape Times briefed.48 This is 
important to note because it shows how Steenkamp was both a military officer and a defence 
correspondent and how these roles overlapped at times. Steenkamp had thus positioned himself 
brilliantly in both camps. Being part of the military establishment gave him insight other defence 
correspondents did not have, and as a defence correspondent, he could act as a mouthpiece for the 
Department of Defence. As part of the military establishment, Steenkamp was trusted more than 
defence correspondents who were civilians at the time. And because he was a defence 
correspondent with a fairly large newspaper it allowed him more leverage within the Department of 
Defence itself for information pertaining to defence matters. Steenkamp's military background gave 
him the edge over his competitors.  It should be noted that the newspaper which he worked for as a 
defence correspondent, the Cape Times, was outspoken against censorship (similar to all other 
South African newspapers at the time barring those publications which supported the apartheid 
government and the National Party). Steenkamp personally enjoyed excellent contacts with the 
SADF and the Department of Defence due to his willingness to comply with rules and regulations 
as well as his military background. With his military background he regarded himself as one of the 
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few properly equipped specialists on the subject of defence reporting. It can also be argued that 
Steenkamp was the most conservative reporter working for the Cape Times at that time.  
 
The relationship between the Cape Times and the SADF thus became very strained during the 1970s 
and 1980s. According to Gerald Shaw, a former assistant editor of the Cape Times, the fact that 
communication between the newspaper and the military did not break down entirely was largely 
due to Willem Steenkamp.49 Steenkamp wrote a regular column on military topics, paying special 
attention to the welfare and interests of the “troopies”, the thousands of young conscripts, most of 
them just out of school, who bore the brunt of the combat in Namibia and Angola.50 It should be 
noted that Shaw speaks very highly of Steenkamp, stating that he championed the cause of the 
“troopies” with the SADF high command and that this was greatly appreciated by their families.51 
Although the argument could be made that Shaw's opinion of Steenkamp is biased due to the fact 
that they were colleagues for a long time. Still, there is no doubt that Steenkamp had a genuine 
interest in the welfare of the so-called “troopies”.    
 
Steenkamp in general agreed with the strategic outlook of the Department of Defence and therefore 
his criticism of the Department of Defence was very mild and took place within the legal 
parameters (see chapter 2). However, as Steenkamp was conservative, those parameters were also 
self-defined at times. The only real criticism Steenkamp made of the Department of Defence was 
that the Angolan War had opened up a credibility gap between newspapers and the public because 
the public started to realise that they had been misinformed. This lack of trust was due to the 
Department of Defence hiding information from the South African public. Certain pro-government 
newspapers assisted the Department of Defence by not reporting on defence matters. Even anti-
government newspapers did not publish certain defence information due to fear of being 
reprimanded by the Department of Defence. Thus the South African public was kept in the dark. 
Rumours and speculation then became the order of the day. For Steenkamp, the best form of counter 
information was hard fact and the apartheid government had erred during the Angolan War because 
it did not understand this.52 Steenkamp thought that this gap between newspapers producing defence 
information for the public and obtaining this information from the Department of Defence should be 
filled by defence correspondents, who like Steenkamp had a military background, and were 
specialists in the field. To Steenkamp the press was as much at fault as the Department of Defence 
for not employing specialists as defence correspondents who could put facts clearly before the 
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public and interpret them correctly.53 Thus Steenkamp favoured defence correspondents, who like 
himself, wanted to protect the Department of Defence in the public domain and assist the 
Department of Defence with their communication goals. It can then be argued that Steenkamp was 
toeing the government lines by protecting the Department of Defence in the court of public opinion. 
It should be noted that Steenkamp did not represent Cape Times reporting during the 70s and 80s.    
 
Willem Steenkamp's technique in obtaining information was to keep up a stream of inquiries in 
order to get results. Based on what he learnt from his military background and the SADF's 
background briefings, he knew when a report from an agency or some other non-military source 
verged on sensitive areas and thus he would not publish anything about it.54 Like all journalists on 
specialised beats, defence correspondents tried to cultivate friendly “inside” contacts in the SADF 
and also relied on tip-offs to local news stories, agency copy, and so forth for leads on newsworthy 
items.55  Thus due to different approaches, Steenkamp and Hitchcock had dramatically different 
interactions with the Department of Defence, and thus they had rather different relationships. 
 
Apart from Steenkamp and Hitchcock, Die Burger also had a defence correspondent who should be 
viewed in terms of the spectrum of reporting on the Border War. The Defence correspondent of Die 
Burger, Gideon Joubert, drew a distinction between the military and political aspects of intervention 
in Angola.56 Joubert served as an officer for the South African Navy from 1951 and after 16 years of 
service retired with the rank of commander and then started working for Die Burger.57 He said a 
newspaper should back the country's armed forces “100 percent” and “try to keep the morale of the 
people high”58 He also noted that it had been unfortunate and “a bit unfair” on parents that they sent 
their sons to fight in a war they did not know about, but it was an extremely delicate diplomatic 
issue at the time and the government “had no option in this thing”.59 Thus from these quotes it is 
clear that Joubert had a pro-government stance with regards to military intervention in Angola. His 
military background, much like the case of Steenkamp, could be seen as the reason for his 
conservative stance on the matter. Being pro-government generally lead to rumours of favouritism. 
Joubert denied being fed news tips by the Minister of Defence or the National Party.60 Joubert said 
that on occasion he had approached the Minister as a journalist for information or comment, and 
once or twice Die Burger's political staff had been asked to persuade the Minister to release some 
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item – the outcome being either a refusal or a press statement.61 Other journalists thought this 
showed what an unfair advantage Die Burger had over competitors.62 Later on in this chapter it will 
be shown how pro-government Joubert and Die Burger was via their reports on Operations 
Savannah and Reindeer.   
 
As previously stated in Chapter 2, the military should be viewed as primary gatekeepers within the 
system of disseminating official information regarding defence matters. Defence Correspondents 
then become the secondary gatekeepers of this information. Some defence correspondents, as 
secondary gatekeepers in the system of official information dissemination were not just cogs in a 
machine, but actively took real decisions which affected the form and content of defence 
reporting.63 This gave them the power to negotiate with the primary gatekeepers, namely the 
Department of Defence, whose communication goals could not be realised without some co-
operation from the media. Thus the media did indeed have some leverage when negotiating with the 
Department of Defence. Defence correspondents, during this time, were already professionally 
entrenched within media organisations, unlike the official press liaison personnel who stood outside 
of these organisations.64 It has to be acknowledged that every news organisation at the time, 
whether private or state-owned, had its particular prejudice or policy norms incorporating the 
beliefs of the management, editors and audiences. Media policy was carried out by editorial staff 
whether or not there is any overt statement of policy or mechanism designed to put it into effect. 
News regarding defence issues from whatever source was adapted to conform to the overall pattern 
of news selection and presentation as long as it did not over step the boundaries set out by the 
Department of Defence.65 This adaptation of the news to conform with the will of the Department of 
Defence, resulted in many news organisations only publishing official briefs given by the 
Department of Defence. Thus editors became the interlocutor between the Department of Defence 
releasing official briefs, and newspapers being the unofficial mouthpiece of the military.  
 
However this system of forced compliance with the communication goals of the Department of 
Defence complicated the relationship between the media and the Department of Defence. The 
influence that the Department of Defence had within the media became increasingly negative. The 
issue of external influence upon the media is that it was not regulated. The Department of Defence 
could basically do as it pleased and if anyone objected it could make the argument that what the 
Department of Defence was doing was in the interest of national security and part of South Africa's 
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“Total Strategy”. Far too often, to their own disadvantage, the press liaison officials failed to pay 
due respect to the autonomy (the little autonomy that was left) of defence correspondents and tried, 
instead, to impose their will by dictating how reporting regarding defence issues should have been 
conducted.66 This was especially easy to discern during the Angolan War, and it was deeply resented 
by the media. Defence correspondents did not want to have their choices and judgement prescribed 
by outside agencies such as the Department of Defence any longer. Thus the Department of Defence 
had to employ sanctions against defence correspondents who did not ensure that the communication 
goals of the Department of Defence were met. De-accreditation and ostracism of defence 
correspondents were the order of the day to ensure compliance. The discretion of defence 
correspondents were severely inhibited by the Department of Defence and the little leverage that 
they had was not nearly enough to compete with the overwhelming influence that the Department of 
Defence had over the media. The cases of Hitchcock and Steenkamp exemplify how the Department 
of Defence would reacted towards compliant and non-compliant defence correspondents.   
 
It is important to note that defence correspondents working for commercial media were naturally 
inclined to see the system of publishing on defence matters as a competitive one in which 
competing media organisations strived to maximise publicity and profits and that each did this for 
themselves. This same concept can also apply to political parties, businesses, the media and even 
government departments, with the exception of the Department of Defence. Only when the military 
is used to serve a sectional interest is the national interest forfeited. What also happened during the 
Angolan War was that defence correspondents fell back on concepts of the public interest as distinct 
from the government's interest.67 This tension between the interests of the public and those of the 
government can be seen in the manner in which the Department of Defence supplied information 
regarding SADF activities to the media. It will be shown later on in this chapter how the 
Department of Defence squandered numerous opportunities to convey defence information to the 
public via the media. Instead of commenting on events, the Department of Defence would simply 
give a reply of “no comment” which in no way helped to advance their communication goals.  
 
There were occasions on which the Department of Defence and the media shared common ground. 
However this only existed within the relationship between the Department of Defence and the 
media when situations existed which suited both parties. The institutional needs of the media and 
the Department of Defence were better satisfied when there was no conflict between the 
Department of Defence as the primary gatekeeper of the news and the defence correspondent 
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receiving the news.68 Defence correspondents soon discovered that there were types of news that 
suited both institutional and communicational goals of the media and the Department of Defence. 
The possibility existed that news regarding defence issues could be produced by cultivating good 
relationships and joint participation in public relations campaigns.69 Thus both parties could in fact 
gain something, although inevitably the Department of Defence would always gain more. This was 
due to the fact that the Department of Defence was in control of the security information and thus it 
could manipulate the media. This cooperation by the media with the Department of Defence 
involved, knowing or unknowingly, complying with secrecy, suppression, news “stops”, 
smokescreens, and smears.70 The independent news organisations which did not take part in these 
tactics then generally found themselves frozen out specifically due to their lack of co-operation. 
Some defence correspondents, like their editors, recognised the political dimensions of military 
secrecy but as a rule they were more concerned with the everyday difficulties of finding something 
to write.71 At the liaison level there was a strong tendency to depoliticise the issue for sake of 
improved communications.72 The clear tension between the media's desire to print as much as 
possible about defence matters, and the Department of Defence's policy of allowing nothing on that 
subject to appear without prior clearance, created a conflicted situation. 
 
It should be emphasised that the relationship between the Department of Defence and the media 
was highly complex and shifting] in nature. A singular analysis of the relationship cannot fully 
explain the different facets and dimensions. Thus when attempting to understand this relationship as 
a whole it is important to analyse examples of specific relationships and how defence 
correspondents interacted with the Department of Defence. The manner in which defence 
correspondents handled their interactions with the Department of Defence caused the relationship 
between the two parties to either progress and develop or stagnate. It should be noted that the 
environment in which defence correspondents was working in was not conducive to accurate 
journalism. Thus the media had to do its best under difficult circumstances. Not all defence 
correspondents and news organisations placed the same emphasis on supplying the public with 
accurate information. However, the media itself achieved a consensus that the majority of defence 
correspondents did their best under difficult circumstances.73 While there was no consensus in the 
media as a whole over whether official policy was right or wrong, it was generally understood that 
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defence correspondents obtained all the information that was officially fit to be printed.74 Therefore 
it can be argued that the bulk of the media was easily satisfied with being “partners” with the 
Department of Defence rather than being critical of it. There was also a consensus that news 
regarding defence matters was important to the national interest, and thus had to be carried 
irrespective of any alleged prejudice compelled newspapers to co-operate with the Department of 
Defence.75  
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that the Department of Defence wanted to establish and 
promote an environment where respect for the SADF within the general public existed. The 
Department of Defence was concerned that if this respect did not exist, the ability of the SADF to 
carry out its functions would be severely affected. For this to be successful, the Department of 
Defence needed the help of the media and specifically defence correspondents. However the role of 
the media in meeting the communication goals of the Department of Defence stretches further than 
just ensuring respect for the SADF. The Department of Defence wanted to create an environment 
whereby it had strict control of all information pertaining to defence matters, and that access to 
information regarding defence matters had to be granted by the Department of Defence first.  
 
Therefore without prior clearance from the Department of Defence, no information regarding 
defence matters would be allowed in the public domain. It is therefore clear that secrecy was one of 
the major guiding principles of the Department of Defence. Obtaining this goal would have been 
impossible for the Department of Defence without engaging in a relationship with the media. The 
relationship between the Department of Defence and the media, and more specifically defence 
correspondents, became a system of integrated communications policies with authoritarian 
overtones. These authoritarian overtones were at their most evident when the interactions between 
the Department of Defence and defence correspondents are analysed. Over sensitivity by press 
liaison officials towards criticism led to the unnecessary suppression of information regarding 
security matters. A partnership entailing mutual trust and respect most likely would have served the 
Department of Defence better, however their obsession with control did not allow for this 
possibility. By exposing administrative malpractice, corruption, neglect and dishonesty, the media 
was not being disloyal. On the contrary, it was facilitating effectiveness and promoting a sound 
relationship between the public and the SADF.  The media did this and could have done this without 
having to publish sensitive facts about operational methods, equipment or actions of the security 
forces, which had to remain secret in any case. However the Department of Defence did not view 
the situation in this manner thus a policy of secrecy and censorship was the order of the day. 
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Public Relations disasters of Operations Savannah and Reindeer as well as 
the roles played by the Department of Defence and International Media 
 
Operations Savannah and Reindeer took place during a time when the political environment enabled 
secrecy and manipulation of military intelligence to take place. The Department of Defence 
managed the flow of information regarding the SADF and military matters very carefully and with a 
methodical approach. The Department of Defence also carefully managed the image of the SADF. 
The Department of Defence wanted to ensure that the reputation of the SADF remained untarnished 
in the eyes of white South Africans. In this section it will be shown that the Department of Defence 
was not successful in managing the reputation of not only the SADF as an extremely competent 
organisation but also of apartheid South Africa as a legitimate state. The public relations disasters of 
Operations Savannah and Reindeer caused massive damage to the image of the SADF, the 
Department of Defence and apartheid South Africa. When it became known to the public that the 
Department of Defence ensued directives to the South African media before the debacles of 
Reindeer and Savannah, it made the 'fall out' of these events even worse. The fact that Operations 
Savannah and Reindeer were undertaken in secret without the knowledge of the public, and that 
subsequent events relating to these Operations were also kept from the public, gives a strong 
indication of how influential the Department of Defence was with regards to its relationship with 
the media. The fact that the international media made the stories of both Reindeer and Savannah 
public also creates the impression that the Department of Defence was only concerned with the 
South African public being kept in the dark. However the stories leaked to the local media and thus 
causing the PR debacles.     
 
It has to be said that it was relatively easy for the SADF to undertake Savannah and Reindeer in 
secret. The highly militarised nature of South African society at the time, combined with apartheid 
South Africa's “Total Strategy” as well as its “Garrison State” status, created an environment 
whereby the SADF was never fully questioned regarding its actions. This especially never occurred 
in the public domain due to the censorship laws and regulations in place, as well as the influence 
that the Department of Defence had on the media. This section will look at two military operations 
undertaken by the SADF, namely Operation Savannah and Operation Reindeer as examples of PR 
disasters not only for the country as a whole, but also more specifically the Department of Defence 
and the SADF. These military operations were PR disasters because the apartheid government's 
reputation and credibility was severely tainted by them. The apartheid government had to engage in 
“damage control” enforcing the ideas that the general public did not have a “right to know” and that 
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it was a matter of “national security”. This section will look at what these operations entailed and 
why they were deemed to be so disastrous for the Department of Defence, SADF and the apartheid 
government. This section will also show how the South African media engaged with the PR 
debacles in belatedly publishing them.  
 
Firstly, it is important to provide context with regards to the historical period in which these 
Operations took place. Both Savannah and Reindeer were military Operations undertaken during 
the Border War.  In 1974, the SADF assumed responsibilities from the South African Police for 
defending the border and undertaking covert operations.76 As previously stated, by this time the 
length of conscription had increased to one year thus the SADF would have had the capacity 
required for the takeover. It should also be noted that apartheid South Africa's involvement in the 
Angolan War increased dramatically once the SADF took over responsibilities from the Police 
Force and the scope within which the media was allowed to report was also dramatically limited. 
Thus between 1975 and 1978 apartheid South Africa launched two major military operations in 
Angola. These covert military operation (as previously stated codenamed Operation Savannah and 
Operation Reindeer) were the first major military interventions made by the SADF.  
 
 
Operation Savannah, the code name for the SADF's invasion of Angola in 1975-6, had massive 
consequences for the apartheid government. Operation Savannah was conducted under a veil of 
secrecy and involved the Department of Defence manipulating and suppressing information relating 
to this military Operation. As stated by Rodney Warwick, Operation Savannah was “Authorised 
amidst debilitating secrecy by a miscalculating South African government, Savannah demonstrated 
significant South African military equipment inadequacies, particularly in terms of artillery, armour 
and the need for an infantry combat vehicle.”77 Operation Savannah not only highlighted military 
hardware inadequacies as stated by Warwick, but it also highlighted PR inadequacies by the SADF.  
It should be noted that the English journalist, Fred Bridgland, first exposed the news that South 
African troops had secretly invaded Angola and were fighting alongside Savimbi’s Maoist 
guerrillas. This was an embarrassment to the local media as it showed that it the SADF did not take 
the local media into its confidence. The local media was effectively shut out in terms of access to 
information and this in turn showed that the SADF did not trust the local media. This was in stark 
contrast with the international media as they had access to everything the local media did not have 
access to. The Fred Bridgland saga was a complete PR failure for the apartheid government as it did 
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not want information to make its way into the public arena. The apartheid government attempted to 
suppress accounts relating to Operation Savannah for fear of the political 'fall out' that coverage of 
the matter might have caused amongst the white electorate.78 This fear of political 'fall out' was due 
to the fact that nine South African soldiers were captured during and shortly after Operation 
Savannah. Eight of these soldiers were captured in Angola in three separate incidents by Angolan 
and/or Cuban forces, with the ninth and last captured in northern Namibia by SWAPO forces.79 
Thus coverage of the POW situation, besides causing political ‘fall out’, could also have 
jeopardised negotiations for the release of the captured soldiers. The capturing of these soldiers 
were not a military victory of any real consequences, but rather a massive PR victory for the 
Angolan forces. It is also important to note that the political ‘fall out’ also stemmed from other 
factors such as the fact that the military intervention itself was adjudged to be a debacle. Also, 
questions were raised regarding what was achieved with Operation Savannah. And why was it 
undertaken in the first place as the negative outcome far outweighed the potential gains.   
 
The Angolans scored another PR victory when two of the captured soldiers were displayed at a 
press briefing in Lagos, Nigeria on 18 December 1975.80 Subsequently, images of two handcuffed 
white SADF soldiers were widely syndicated and published in newspapers around the world.81 The 
photograph of the two soldiers and details of interviews with the captives were prominently 
reported in the South African media which served to expose the fraudulent nature of Pretoria’s 
previous denials that its forces were involved in Angola.82 The photograph appeared on the front 
page of the Rand Daily Mail on 19 December 1975, with the following comment: 
 
A single photograph … brought home, perhaps more than anything else so far, the 
implications of the country’s involvement in the Angolan conflict … Here were the 
first South African soldiers in a quarter of a century to be taken prisoner of war – two 
bewildered youngsters enduring public humiliation paraded before an international 
audience by their MPLA captors …83 
 
The Afrikaans newspaper, Die Burger, also reported on the South African soldiers taken captive. 
However the manner in which Die Burger went about reporting the incident was different from that 
of the Rand Daily Mail. The Rand Daily Mail criticised the Depart of Defence, whereas Die Burger 
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reported the events in a more neutral fashion. This can be seen in an article published on 2 
December 1975 on the front page of Die Burger with the headline “3 South Africans missing on 
Border”84. The article went on to say that three South African soldiers went missing on the Angola 
border after a mission and that they have been presumed to be dead.85 The article did not seek to 
criticise the Department of Defence or hold them responsible for the missing soldiers. Then on 14 
January 1976, Die Burger published a photo on the front page with the following caption: “Three 
South African and two Portuguese soldiers have been taken captive were displayed yesterday in 
Addis Ababa by the MPLA's Minister of Foreign Affairs to the representatives of the press core.”86  
Again the newspaper persisted with its impartial style of reporting on the matter, employing neutral 
language. The following day, 15 January 1976, Die Burger once more kept with its neutral stance 
and published a photo on the front page with the caption: “With shackled hands, three South African 
conscripts held captive by the MPLA are displayed to the media in Addis Ababa.”87 It should be 
noted that these were the same 3 soldiers shown the previous day and that another photo of them 
appeared on page two of the 15 January 1976 edition. Thus Die Burger can be seen as an example 
of a newspaper that was fairly loyal towards the boundaries set by the Department of Defence 
regarding reporting on military issues. Even though Die Burger did in fact report on the matter, it 
never attempted to break free from the restrictions imposed by the Department of Defence.  
 
When a comparison is made it should be noted that the coverage of Operation Savannah (as well as 
the subsequent POW crisis) by the EP Herald was far more substantial than that of the Die Burger. 
The EP Herald first reported on 2 December 1975 that three South African soldiers were lost after a 
flight on the border between Angola and Namibia.88 This was on the front page and it was a Sapa 
report similar to the report of Die Burger. Then on 8 December 1975 there appeared an article in the 
EP Herald with the heading: “Muller watches Angola closely”89 The article states that the then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hilgard Muller, categorically denied that SA troops were in Angola.90 
This article was placed on the front page right next to an article by Richard Walker reporting from 
UN General Assembly in which a motion to vote condemning SA military involvement in Angola 
was put forward.91 Five days later, on 12 December 1975, Walker reported that the motion had 
failed.92 The article appeared on the front page with the heading: “Delight as anti-SA attack 
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crumbles”93 On 18 December 1975 the EP Herald reported in an article which appeared on the front 
page titled: “Two men missing in Angola”94 The article reported that it is believed two SA soldiers 
have been captured by the MPLA.95 These suspicions proved to be correct as the newspaper 
reported on 19 December 1975 on the front page that “SA soldiers put on display in Lagos” at an 
MPLA news conference.96 The article was accompanied with the sub-heading “Two SA soldiers 
captured in Angola by forces of the MPLA were put on display here yesterday as evidence of South 
African involvement in the strife torn country.”97 Then on 9 January 1976 as well as 14 January 
1976 the EP Herald published small photographs of the captured soldiers being paraded in front of 
the media by the MPLA.98 On the front page of the 16 January 1976 edition of the EP Herald an 
article appeared regarding the SA soldiers held captive by the MPLA.99 The article was titled: 
“Assurances on Captured Soldiers.”100 The article was in regards to the Red Cross assuring the 
families of the SA troops held captive by MPLA that the SA troops will receive normal POW 
treatment.101  
 
During the middle of January 1976 the Daily Dispatch also made reference to the SA soldiers held 
captive by the MPLA. Although it should be noted that their coverage of the matter was not nearly 
as in depth as that of the EP Herald. On the front page of the 14 January 1976 edition of the Daily 
Dispatch a photo was published of the captured SA soldiers being displayed to the media by the 
MPLA in Addis Ababa.102 Also on the front page of that same edition, an article appeared entitled: 
“Captives may be exchanged” with the sub-heading “The Marxist MPLA might be willing to 
exchange its South African captives for Cubans held by FNLA and UNITA – meanwhile captives 
would continue to be used for propaganda purposes.”103 The Daily Dispatch also published a full 
page of pictures showing SADF soldiers getting ready to go to war.104 It was published on 17 
January 1976 on page five with the title “Wish me luck as you wave me goodbye”105  
 
The Cape Times limited its coverage of Operation Savannah and the subsequent POW saga. When 
Angola became independent on 11 November 1975, the Cape Times viewed the situation as 
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ominous, arguing that the only wise course was to avoid involvement in the Angolan Civil War.106 
This was to be the paper's consistent theme in the weeks ahead.107 On the front page on 17 
November 1975, the Cape Times published a statement headed: 
 
The Department of Defence last night prohibited publication of a dispatch by the Cape 
Times London correspondent which reported British Sunday newspaper accounts 
alleged developments in the Angolan civil war. The newspapers were the Sunday 
Telegraph, The Observer and the Sunday Times. This action, which deprives South 
African readers of information available to millions of people abroad, was taken in 
terms of the Defence Act.108  
 
It was easy enough to discern what the story emanated from the dispatches received in the Cape 
Times office from London.109 The Oberver's report, headed “South African Troops Join Angolan 
Civil War”, made it clear that South African troops had gone into Angola and were fighting on the 
side of Unita.110  The prohibition of publication in South Africa of the British newspaper reports 
was denounced by the Cape Times as inexplicable.111  
 
On 16 February 1976, the SADF issued a directive to the media in which the Minister of Defence 
requested that no further photographs of South African soldiers being held captive by the MPLA be 
published.112 An explanatory note added: “Defence HQ say they and the Minister [are] being 
flooded by objections from relatives to publication of such pictures”.113 The directive was sent to all 
newspapers via the South African Press Association (SAPA) announcing that a ban on reports about 
the POWs would take effect from 27 February.114  Thus the Department of Defence was trying to 
ensure that no further evidence of its failings could be published. The attempt at damage control 
was too late, and not nearly effective enough. The carefully crafted public image of the SADF and 
the Department of Defence could not be retroactively repaired. It should be noted that it was not so 
much the actual military Operation itself that caused the uproar and PR debacle, but rather the 
capturing of the soldiers which is seen as the aftermath of Savannah. The publication of the 
photographs of captive SADF soldiers dealt a heavy PR blow to the Department of Defence. It 
                                                 
106 G. Shaw., The Cape Times An Informal History, (Cape Town, 1999),p.264. 
107 Ibid., 
108 Cape Times, 17 November 1975 
109 Shaw, Cape Times, p.264. 
110 Ibid., 
111 Ibid.,p.265. 
112 G. Baines, “POWS”, p.110. 
113 Ibid., 
114 Ibid., 
85 
 
created doubt within South Africa itself about the nature of the involvement of the SADF within the 
Angolan War. The publication of those photographs also dealt a psychological blow to a specific 
section of the South African public who believed that the SADF and the Department of Defence 
were invincible. The subsequent doubt that was created in the minds of the South African public by 
the photographs was exactly the result the Cuban and Angolan forces needed. The photographs also 
produced a propaganda coup for the Cuban and Angolan forces on the international stage. Thus the 
capturing of the SADF soldiers during the aftermath of Operation Savannah resulted in a massive 
defeat for the Department of Defence on a propaganda and PR level. This defeat resulted in the 
Department of Defence reassessing its relationship with the media in terms of what the media could 
and could not report on regarding defence matters.     
 
The Department of Defence attempted to enforce its blanket censorship on media reports pertaining 
to the captivity of POWs.115 This blanket censorship was an attempt by the Department of Defence 
to create breathing space in order to address the problems it was facing without the added stress of 
having to deal with its 'dirty laundry' being published. The Department of Defence threatened to 
invoke the Defence Act (No. 44 of 1957) to prevent the media from reporting further on the 
POWs.116  The Defence Act would effectively nullify any rights the media had to report on events it 
deemed relevant. The Department of Defence insisted that any publicity would hamper negotiations 
to free the POWs, and that this adversely affected the relatives of the POWs.117 This was the reason 
proposed by the Department of Defence, however when analysing the actions of the Department of 
Defence it becomes clear that they wanted to keep its mistakes a secret. The authorities were 
prompted to act after an unsubstantiated report that the POWs had been shot apparently caused 
considerable anxiety amongst the latter’s next of kin.118 The Department of Defence expressed 
concern that such reports would be detrimental to the POWs’ families and circulated a confidential 
note to the press in which it “pointed out that any publication of reports and photos … will 
definitely be detrimental to the cause and safety of the POWs”.119 It should be noted that certain 
sectors of the media complied with the requests from the Department of Defence. Whilst the 
mainstream media refrained from mentioning the POWs for a year, the Department of Defence was 
unable to keep the issue out of the public domain completely.120 Some of the members of the 
Newspaper Press Union (NPU) were not prepared to comply with government’s wishes to keep 
these matters under wraps. For example, Die Afrikaner published 18 major articles and letters on 
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the subject between 6 February 1976 and 15 September 1978.121 The Department of Defence did 
little to suppress these articles. However they did take action at times. It could be argued that the 
reason as to why the apartheid government did not act against Die Afrikaner was for fear of 
alienating far-right support. Die Afrikaner was after all a very conservative right-wing publication 
and thus taking action against it would be alienating its readership.   
 
 
Operation Savannah tactically left apartheid South Africa in a very difficult position. South Africa 
still wanted to intervene in Angolan without any of the media backlash. The capturing of 9 SADF 
troops severely dented the confidence which the public had in the Department of Defence's ability 
to stage major military operations with minimal casualties. Also the public began to question why 
the SADF was fighting in Angola in the first place. Any additional PR debacle(s) would be 
disastrous for the Department of Defence and the image of apartheid South Africa as a whole. It 
should also be noted that the collapse of detente with black Africa also served to place further stress 
on apartheid South Africa. Thus the PR debacle of the aftermath of Operation Savannah came at a 
time when the South African government was already losing allies and was also under immense 
international pressure. The media coverage of the capturing of the SADF troops created further 
tension between the Department of Defence and the media. It can be argued that the status quo of 
the relationship between the Department of Defence and the media of the 1970s could have 
survived and continued into the 1980s if only a single PR debacle (Operation Savannah) had 
occurred. However another PR debacle, namely the aftermath of Operation Reindeer, caused the 
Department of Defence to completely reassess its relationship with the media, and thus any 
opportunity for lifting heavy censorship laws during the 1980s was completely destroyed.    
 
By the middle-to-late 1970s apartheid South Africa was in deep trouble with regards to a number of 
issues. In 1976 the Soweto uprisings took place as a response to Bantu Education imposed on black 
South Africans by the apartheid Government. And in 1977 the United Nations had imposed an arms 
embargo on the country, blocking South Africa from being able to acquire state of the art weapons. 
The Vorster government attempt at reaching out to black African states had been shattered by the 
Savannah debacle.122 Under these circumstances, the influence of the securocrats such as Minister 
of Defence PW Botha (he was only elected Prime Minister in 1978) increased. This led to more 
aggressive strategies, which resulted in a whole series of large and small cross border operations 
into Angola.123 Within a decade South Africa would find itself teetering on the brink of an all-out 
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war with Cuba and Angola.124 In this war, the role of the media became ever more present, 
especially during Operation Reindeer and its aftermath. It should be noted from the start and 
throughout that Operation Reindeer can be viewed as a military victory for the SADF, but it should 
also be viewed as a massive propaganda and PR victory for SWAPO. Botha deemed South Africa's 
involvement in the Angolan War as insufficient. Thus the only existing manner to recapture the 
strategic initiative was via more aggressive strategies. Thus, South Africa escalated its involvement 
in the Angolan War even though it was still dealing with the ramifications of Operation Savannah 
and the POW crisis. The Department of Defence took a gamble in so far as their previous major 
military operation did not produce the required PR effect as it created a negative image of the 
SADF even though it was a military success. However it should be noted that Operation Reindeer 
was not launched for PR reasons, but rather it was an operation with the military goal of destroying 
a SWAPO stronghold. It can be argued that the Department of Defence was concerned with the 
media image of the SADF especially at a local level as it went to great lengths to withhold the 
general public from gaining negative information regarding the SADF.  
 
Thus by April 1978, it was decided to attack Cassinga, a mining town 260km north of the border.125 
This attack would be code-named Operation Reindeer. To operatives Cassinga was codenamed 
“Moscow”.126 Unlike Savannah, which was an intervention in the Angolan civil war, Operation 
Reindeer and those that followed it was aimed primarily at SWAPO.127 If FAPLA or the Cubans 
placed themselves in the line of the South African fire, then it would be construed as collateral 
damage.128  It can be argued that the attack on Cassinga was undoubtedly the single most 
controversial battle of the entire Border War.129  The role that the media played in reporting what 
took place during Operation Reindeer, as well as reporting on the aftermath of it, was very 
important. Had the media not played the role it did, the controversy surrounding Operation Reindeer 
might never have allowed. Subsequent to the battle, major controversy developed around the nature 
of the camp at Cassinga.130 Was it, as SWAPO claimed, a refugee camp housing hundreds of 
civilians (mainly women and children who had fled, in SWAPO's view, cruel colonial oppression), 
or was it, as the SADF said, a military planning, logistics and training base?131 The fact that about 
600 people died in the attack made it, whatever the truth, an excellent opportunity for propaganda 
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for both sides.132  The possibility existed for the SADF to emphasise Cassinga as a military victory 
against a 'terrorist force' thus helping with troop morale and creating the impression back home that 
the SADF was successful and efficient. For SWAPO, the possibility existed to emphasise the 
assertion that the victims of Cassinga were women and children, and thus creating an even more 
sinister image of apartheid South Africa. This sinister image would no doubt lead to increased 
foreign support for SWAPO. Thus the post-Cassinga situation became a PR or propaganda battle 
between SWAPO and the SADF, a PR battle which the SADF and Department of Defence 
subsequently lost by some margin.  
 
The international media was the first to report on Cassinga. A few days after Operation Reindeer 
had taken place, SWAPO flew in a number of journalists to view the results of what had happened 
at Cassinga.133 This was a very important action taken by SWAPO, as it gave them a PR advantage 
ahead of the Department of Defence. This advantage would allow SWAPO to strike the first 
propaganda blow on the international stage, something that the Department of Defence did not 
anticipate. The international media was subsequently allowed to view the scene. One mass grave 
was already covered, but another was still littered with bodies.134 Jane Bergerol reported for the 
BBC and The Guardian with the following:  
 
First we saw gaily coloured frocks, blue jeans, shirts and a few uniforms. Then there 
was the sight of the bodies inside them. Swollen, blood-stained, they were the bodies of 
young girls, young men, a few older adults, some young children, all apparently recent 
arrivals from Namibia.135  
 
Sara Rodriguez from the Guardian, a left-wing New York publication, who was also in the party 
used similar words to describe the “brightly coloured cotton frocks of young girls, jeans, checkered 
shirts of the boys, a few khaki uniforms and the swollen bodies of the dead. The victims mostly 
very young and had no defence.”136 These quotations set the tone of subsequent coverage and 
became the primary sources for many of the allegations of brutality against the SADF.137 Many 
other allegations were added later, such as that the SAAF dropped poisoned gas on all inhabitants of 
Cassinga, and that the paratroopers indiscriminately bayoneted innocent old people, women and 
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children, even raping women before killing them.138 The left-wing activist Randolph Vigne wrote: 
“There was no battle. Botha's troops parachuted in on May 4, slaughtering 600, the great majority of 
'other followers' being women and children as revealed by photographs of the great mass graves 
taken by international media flown in on May 8”.139 It can be argued that SWAPO had gained the 
upper hand with regards to the PR battle. Apartheid South Africa had already had a negative image 
on the global arena, and with the events of Cassinga this image would only become worse. The 
incident was received in a very negative light internationally, however locally the response was 
neutral as the media was restricted in terms of what it was allowed to say.     
 
South African participants in the attack indignantly denied any wrongdoing.140 Cassinga was a 
legitimate military target, populated by PLAN fighters who bravely defended the base, they 
contended.141 Lieutenant General Constand Viljoen stated in an interview that Cassinga was “a huge 
logistics support base” from which it was suspected SWAPO was gathering its forces for an 
infiltration into South West Africa to upset the Turnhalle talks (held between the internal South West 
Africa parties to discuss the territory's future).142 Colonel Jan Breytenbach later wrote a book 
fiercely defending his men from the charges of wanton cruelty and murder.143 He found “no or very 
few” refugees at the base.144 As far as the war was concerned the civilians comprised mostly 
abductees who were forcibly “plucked from their neighbourhoods to fill the role of refugees”.145  
Even so, the PR damage had been done, and SWAPO had most definitely won a PR battle against 
the SADF. The SADF lost the PR battle due to the fact that it had not envisioned the manner in 
which the international media portrayed its role in Cassinga. SWAPO was portrayed as the victims 
of an attack which resulted in the massacre of civilians by the military force of an illegitimate 
government.    
 
The local media had initially only reported on the Operation itself, which was primarily in the form 
of press releases from the Department of Defence. The Rand Daily Mail also reported had a report 
on Operation Reindeer. The May 6 1978 issue of the newspaper had the following front page 
headline: “Five SA Men Die in Angola”146 It was written by Gerald Reilly, a journalist working for 
the Pretoria bureau of the Rand Daily Mail, and was accompanied by an aerial photo of “Moscow” 
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as the Cassinga base was known. The article made mention of the press conference held by the 
Department of Defence at Defence HQ in Pretoria and calling the Operation a “total success”. The 
article also mentioned that no MPLA or Cuban forces were encountered. The sub-heading of the 
article was the following: “The SA Army and SA Air Force in a combined operation moved into 
southern Angola early on Thursday (4th) morning and destroyed SWAPO headquarters base 
codenamed 'Moscow' and other bases”147 Only two days later, on May 8, Gerald Reilly wrote 
another piece on Operation Reindeer claiming “SADF mum on SWAPO losses”148 thus referring to 
the fact that the SADF as well as the Department of Defence had not released any statements 
specifically detailing SWAPO losses during Operation Reindeer. The following day, on May 9, The 
Rand Daily Mail ran with an article on page four with the headline: “SWAPO to assess Angola raid 
toll”149 The article mentioned SWAPO's Information and Publicity Secretary, Mr Katjavivi, being 
quoted as saying that Operation Reindeer was a “mass killing of Namibian refugees”150 On 
Wednesday May 10, 1978, a PR bombshell was dropped on the South African population. Bernard 
Cazaux, acting as a special correspondent for the Rand Daily Mail, wrote the article that would 
finally sink the image of the Department of Defence and ensure a propaganda victory for SWAPO. 
The newspaper was published with the headline: “Foreign Journalists Shown Mass Grave”151 on the 
front page. The article was accompanied by the following sub-heading: “Cassinga – Foreign 
journalists saw an open mass grave packed with bodies of 460 people whom Angolan authorities 
said were 'massacred' by SA troops during attack last week”152 The article made mention of brightly 
coloured dresses within the mass grave as well as an additional 122 Namibian bodies. What 
damaged the image of the Department of Defence even further was that it did not comment on the 
article when given the chance to do so. It stuck with its traditional “no comment” reply and kept 
with its policy of silence which only seemed to further incriminate them.  
 
Conversely, Die Burger reported very differently on Operation Reindeer. On 6 May 1978 on the 
front page of Die Burger the headline read: “'Moscow' demolished!” in large bold letters with the 
sub-heading stating: “Many terrorists shot and killed” accompanied by an aerial photo of the base 
burning.153 The destruction of “Moscow” (as previously stated the codename for Cassinga) was 
reported as a triumph for the SADF and a victory for South Africa by Die Burger. This is in sharp 
contrast to other newspapers who reported that Operation Reindeer was a war crime that was 
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committed by the SADF. On page two of the 6 May 1978 edition an article with the heading: 
“Celebratory Fires burning high in South West Africa” which continued to emphasize the SWAPO 
defeat and the SADF victory and how that situation was a victory for South Africa.154 Die Burger 
also reported on potential POW exchanges. On the front page of the 6 May 1978 edition of Die 
Burger there was an article with the heading: “SWAPO wants to trade SA soldier.”155 This was a 
reference to the SWAPO Secretary of Information saying they would be willing to trade a South 
African soldier, Johan van der Mescht, for SWAPO captives.156 The Die Burger's 11 May 1978 
edition contained a follow up article to the van der Mescht story. The heading was: “SA captive 
“confess” in front of SWAPO guns”157 The article was in relation to van der Mescht being 
interviewed by the BBC whilst still a captive of SWAPO.158 It should be noted that Die Burger saw 
the interview as anti-South Africa propaganda as the interview placed a very negative light on South 
Africa. What van der Mescht “confessed” to was that since being held captive, he has come to 
understand that the SADF should withdraw its troops and that apartheid is wrong and that he will 
never be part of the SADF again. The validity of this “confession” has to be questioned as it was 
made at SWAPO gun point.   
 
The EP Herald reported the events of Operation Reindeer as well. The 6 May 1978 edition 
contained an article on the front page titled: “SA forces destroyed SWAPO HQ in Angola.”159 The 
article also mentions the code-name (“Moscow”) for the base.160 The EP Herald was also one of the 
few newspapers to report on the mass graves found at Cassinga after Operation Reindeer. The front 
page of the 10 May 1978 edition had an article titled: “Open Grave at Cassinga.” with a subsequent 
subheading “Foreign journalists shown mass grave”.161 The article continues on page three of the 
edition and states that enquiries made to the SADF were met by a reply of “no comment” as was the 
case with other newspapers.162 Again, the “no comment” reply by the SADF only harmed their 
cause further. The SADF had a prime opportunity to respond to allegations that they were guilty of 
a massacre, yet they failed to do so.  
 
The Daily Dispatch also reported on the events of Operation Reindeer. On 6 May 1978 the 
newspaper reported on the front page “Main SWAPO base was target” along with a sub-heading 
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“South African forces destroyed two SWAPO terrorist bases – including SWAPO HQ codenamed 
Moscow”.163 The article also included a photo of “Moscow” and was placed next to an article titled 
“West Dismayed by SA Raid” which reported that countries such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom being disappointed due to the fact that South Africa chose to go ahead with 
Operation Reindeer.164 This disappointment came from the belief that Operation Reindeer 
undermined the peace talks. Placing these two articles next to each other could be seen as a form of 
subdued criticism of the SADF by the Daily Dispatch. On 10 May 1978 the Daily Dispatch 
reported on its front page “Desolation reigns as SWAPO buries dead”.165 This article continued with 
the narrative of foreign journalists being shown mass grave containing bodies of women and 
children with brightly coloured dresses on.166 Thus the Daily Dispatch joined a select few 
newspapers who chose to report this story. On 11 May 1978 the Daily Dispatch reported on the 
BBC interview with the South African soldier, Johan van der Mescht (previously mentioned in an 
article by Die Burger), on page eleven of that edition with the article titled “SA Sapper shown in 
pathetic plight”.167 The article also included a photo of van der Mescht.168 It should also be noted 
that in exact similar fashion as the case with the reports of mass graves at Cassinga a “no comment” 
reply was made by the SADF.169 As previously stated the “no comment” reply by the SADF only 
damaged the image of the SADF further. The SADF had numerous opportunities to convey their 
version of the events at Cassinga, with every newspaper asking for a statement. Yet short-
sightedness was the order of the day unless the newspaper at hand was part of the group that was 
among the favourites and thus given access to information other newspapers did not have. However 
this does not mean that there were newspapers that were guaranteed a comment.    
 
When an analysis is done with regards to the newspaper reporting on Operation Reindeer, the Cape 
Times reported information which none of the other newspapers reported. It should be noted that the 
bulk of the information was similar, however the Cape Times published details other newspapers 
knew nothing of or they would have published those details themselves. In very similar fashion as 
to the other newspapers sampled, the Cape Times published an article on 6 May 1978 on its front 
page with the title “SA loses five in raid on SWAPO.”170 It contained the general narrative found in 
other newspapers regarding the SADF raid on Cassinga, however also on the front page a 
continuation article can be found. Within this continuation article information is given regarding 
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female soldiers that were encountered at Cassinga.171 The article speaks of “women in terrorist' 
tunics” and that female SWAPO soldiers were encountered.172 It is also mentioned in the article that 
SADF General, General Dutton, supplied the information to the newspaper.173 It must be noted and 
emphasised that other newspapers did not report this. This strengthens the argument that the SADF 
in fact did feed tid bits of information to certain defence correspondents like Willem Steenkamp 
who was willing to cooperate. The reasons as to why these specific details were given to the Cape 
Times remains open to speculation. It could have been an attempt at enforcing the patronage system 
that existed between the Department of Defence and the media, and thus it was simply rewarding 
the Cape Times for being loyal towards the Department of Defence and the SADF. It is also possible 
that Willem Steenkamp's military background gave him access to information other defence 
correspondents did not have. A final possibility is that the SADF wanted to provide an alibi for the 
mass graves containing the bodies of women.   
 
On the propaganda front, Operation Reindeer was a disaster for South Africa. An SADF analysis of 
media reporting post-Reindeer found that initial reporting was mainly neutral, however as time 
progressed and more information became available to the South African media via the international 
media the reporting became increasingly negative.174 This was partly due to the fact that South 
Africa allowed SWAPO and Angola to capture the propaganda high ground by speaking to the 
media first and announcing that Cassinga was a refugee camp.175 The analysis previously mentioned 
recommended that the SADF should have engaged the media first with regards to the allegations 
made against the SADF.176 Luanda's first words to the world was that South Africa had attacked a 
refugee camp.177 This is the version that was generally accepted by the international media.178. It 
then becomes evident that with propaganda, it is perception rather than reality that matters, and 
public perceptions of Cassinga was shaped not by the referential but the symbolic value of the mass 
grave imagery.179 The assertion can then be made that the mass grave imagery was crucial with 
regards to shaping public perception regarding the events surrounding Cassinga. With regards to the 
events surrounding Cassinga it can be said that the exploitation of the social dimension of the 
conflict was used in order to gain political ground to debase the military action which took place.180  
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Operations Savannah and Reindeer were PR debacles because they were examples of how the 
SADF and the Department of Defence unsuccessfully attempted to cover up inconvenient truths 
regarding their activities in Angola. They were not only embarrassments on an international front, 
but also proof that information was being kept from the South African public, and that this same 
information was readily available in other countries. When analysing the PR debacles of Operations 
Savannah and Reindeer it is important to note the role that the Department of Defence played 
especially with regards to not only keeping the South African public in the dark about the 
Operations themselves, but also about the aftermath of these military Operations. The fact that the 
Department of Defence instituted a blanket censorship over defence reporting was never done in the 
interest of national security as the Department of Defence claimed it was. It was to protect the 
image and reputation of the SADF, the Department of Defence and the apartheid state. It was also 
instituted to ensure that no embarrassing or unwanted information about the SADF or the 
Department of Defence was published. Ironically, it was this policy of secrecy that added to the 
magnitude of the fall out regarding Operations Savannah and Reindeer. The consistent reply of “no 
comment” by the Department of Defence regarding SADF activities within Angola was part of this 
policy of secrecy. Thus the relationship between the Department of Defence and the local media 
provided the almost perfect environment for a PR debacle because the SADF and the Department of 
Defence never paid sufficient attention to the international media. Foreign correspondents had 
direct access to Angola and could report what they saw without any restrictions. It was extremely 
short-sighted of the Department of Defence to come to the conclusion that they could contain 
information regarding SADF activities in Angola.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Thus the negative press that was caused by both Operations Savannah and Reindeer caused the 
apartheid government to further stem the flow of security information. The caused the media to 
become more dependent on the military for defence information to report on. This gives credence to 
the analogy that for the media, its “marriage” with the SADF was a “marriage out of necessity”. 
Stemming the flow of security information meant that, for the SADF, its “marriage” with the media 
would be a “convenient marriage”. The militarised nature of the South African society, along with 
the pre-existing censorship structures and mechanisms, made it relatively easy for the apartheid 
government to further enhance its control of security information. The PR debacles of Reindeer and 
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Savannah taught the apartheid government harsh lessons with regards to propaganda and the 
importance of foreign media. Reindeer and  Savannah also led to the formation of the Commission 
Of Inquiry into Reporting of Security Matters Regarding The South African Defence Force and The 
South African Police (commonly referred to as the Steyn Commission -1980) to investigate issues 
surrounding defence reporting.  It also lead to the formation of The Commission of Inquiry into the 
Mass Media (second Steyn Commission - 1983). Both of these will be dealt with in the following 
chapter.  
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Chapter 5: The Steyn Commissions of Inquiry 
 
Introduction  
 
After the PR debacles of Operation Savannah and Operation Reindeer, the military/SADF 
was forced to re-evaluate its relationship with the media. The growing trend of militarisation, 
along with the “Total Strategy” doctrine as well as the war economy of apartheid South 
Africa created a society within which authoritarianism thrived. However, the apartheid 
government still wanted to create the impression of a free press. The main concern that the 
apartheid government had with the media was in respect of the publication of matters relating 
to the security of the country. This concern could be seen as the reason why the apartheid 
government rarely took the media into its confidence. It became clear that the apartheid 
government did not trust the media. Proof of this can be found in the fact that the 
international media broke the story on Operation Savannah and yet the South African media, 
let alone the South African public, could at best suspect that a major South African troop 
deployment had taken place. The fact that Operation Reindeer was also labelled a “massacre” 
by the international media forced the apartheid government to reconsider its relationship with 
the media of South Africa.1 They only reported that which was shown to the international 
media, and the “no comment” reply by the SADF.  
 
 The apartheid government wanted the media to form part of, or at least lend support to its 
“Total Strategy” doctrine and safeguard certain information relating to security matters of the 
country. It wanted to control the media with regards to the type of information it was 
reporting on. The apartheid government wanted strict control over reporting on security 
matters whilst at the same time championing the notion that apartheid South Africa had a free 
press. Defence reporting was especially restricted as the apartheid government safeguarded 
information regarding the SADF. What follows in this chapter, is an analysis of the manner in 
which the apartheid government reacted towards the media in the aftermath of the PR 
debacles of Operation Savannah and Operation Reindeer. The apartheid government set up 
commissions not only to investigate its relationship with the media, but also to legitimise its 
censorship of defence reporting. This tight grip on information regarding security matters and 
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defence reporting can be seen as a common feature of a “Garrison State”. It is also a process 
that was validated by the “Total Strategy” doctrine. This chapter will show how the findings 
of these commissions assisted the apartheid government in ensuring that the media would 
fulfil its wishes. Another important aspect was that the commissions should not portray the 
apartheid government in an authoritarian light.  
 
The apartheid government set up two commissions to investigate issues surrounding its 
relationship with the media as well as issues relating to defence reporting. Both were also 
tasked to investigate the local media environment. It should be noted that the two separate 
commissions have both been commonly referred to as the “Steyn Commission”. Both 
Commissions were headed by Chief Justice M.T. Steyn, however as previously stated these 
were separate commissions. The first commission was the Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into Reporting of Security Matters Regarding the South African Defence Force and 
the South African Police. This chapter will not focus on the section relating to the South 
African Police Force. This Commission was tasked in 1979 and its report was published in 
1980. The Second commission was titled The Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media 
and was published in 1983. The Chapter will discuss the appointment, primary task and 
recommendations of each Commission. It is important to note that both commissions made 
recommendations directly related to the relationship between the media and the SADF. 
 
MT Steyn, the chairman of both Steyn Commissions, was a highly ranked government 
official chosen to lead both Commissions. Steyn was born into a highly politicised and 
notable family within South African history. Steyn’s father, Colin Fraser Steyn (1887–1959) 
was a lawyer and a politician of South Africa, Member of the House of Assembly, Senator, 
and Cabinet Minister in the government of Jan Smuts.2 He practiced as a lawyer in Pretoria 
and then in Bloemfontein, where he was elected as deputy leader of the National Party.3 He 
served in the Department of Justice from 1915 to 1928, under Tielman Roos.4 He was 
appointed as the Minister of Justice from 1939 till 1945, and then served as Minister of 
Employment from 1946 till 1948, in the government of Jan Smuts.5 Steyn’s grandfather was 
President MT Steyn of the Orange Free State. Steyn himself was the Administer General of 
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South West Africa from 1977-1979.6 Steyn’s career as a public servant was also filled with 
controversy at times. Criticised by Edwin Cameron, then a fellow lawyer, for not being 
impartial, and being too pro government, there were calls on Steyn to resign.7 On April 25 
1978 Steyn announced that nine persons who were “promoting the commission of violence 
and intimidation” had been detained under the emergency regulations.8 All nine were 
members of the 13-member executive committee of SWAPO’s internal wing.9 In a booklet 
entitled Torture-a Cancer in our society, compiled by Father Heinz Hunke, a Roman Catholic 
priest and Mr Justin Ellis, an Anglican worker at the Christian centre in Windhoek, and 
published on 18 January 1978, it was alleged that “institutionalised torture” was proliferating 
in the territory despite a statement made by Steyn that it was not.10 Steyn also decided not to 
appoint a commission of inquiry into torture allegations.11 Steyn’s lengthy career as a public 
servant made him a suitable candidate to head the commissions. The government presumably 
reckoned that it could rely on his loyalty to the Nationalist Party’s political agenda. 
 
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Reporting of Security 
Matters Regarding The South African Defence Force And The South 
African Police 
 
For purposes of this chapter, The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Reporting of 
Security Matters Regarding the South African Defence Force and the South African Police 
will be referred to as the Steyn Commission (1980).  
 
The Commission was set up by the State President, Marais Viljoen, and the report was also 
handed over to him.12 The official primary task of the Steyn Commission (1980) was to 
investigate and report on issues relating to reporting on security matters with special 
references to the SADF and the SAP. It investigated the nature and composition of the South 
African state and community in order to contextualise the analysis of the security situation of 
                                                          
6 Keesing’s Record of World Events, XXIV, June 1978, Namibia, p.29039. 
7 Weekly Mail 7 August 1987 
8 Keesing’s Record of World Events, XXIV, June 1978, Namibia, p.29039. 
9 Ibid., 
10 Ibid., 
11 Ibid., 
12 Ibid., 
99 
 
the country. Its mandate also included the stipulation that it should investigate current conflict 
situations in which apartheid South Africa was involved. The nature and role of the South 
African news media at the time was also subject to investigation. The Commission also had 
to analyse the effectiveness of legislation regarding the media and defence reporting. A very 
important aspect of the task of the Commission was that it had to make recommendations 
regarding all these matters. The fact that the Commission was asked to make 
recommendations shows that it had some authority, however there existed no legal imperative 
to write these recommendations into law. An argument can be made that the Steyn 
Commission (1980) had an unofficial mandate which was to conserve the status quo with 
regards to the relationship between the media and the apartheid government and to ensure 
that the notion of protecting defence information which the government deemed to be 
confidential was upheld. 
 
With regards to media control agreements, the Steyn Commission admitted that measured 
against western standards, the media situation in South Africa did not merit the description 
“free”. Tension built up between the government and the press especially towards the second 
half of 1977 on the issues of security and suggested the possible introduction of further 
measures to control the press.13 This dispute dominated the political scene in 1978 and in 
1979 a heated debate followed on the proposal to institute legislation in order to create a 
“more disciplined press”.14  Apartheid South Africa already possessed a formidable arsenal of 
legislation controlling reporting relating to national security.15 The Commission's main 
concern in its evaluation of the media lay with the concept of the gatekeeper, or the journalist 
who occupies this incredibly important position between what reality actually is and the 
presentation of reality.16 From the Commission's own findings on media effects it seems that 
non-media mediators and opinion leaders have a more powerful influence on the minds of the 
public than the media itself.17 The Steyn Commission (1980) did not in any way assist the 
media with their strained relationship with the SADF/apartheid government. It supported the 
wants and needs of the privacy concerns that the SADF/apartheid government had regarding 
reporting on security matters. The idea of a loyal media was a common theme throughout the 
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Report on the Commission, enforcing ideas put forth by the apartheid government’s “Total 
Strategy”.   
  
M.T. Steyn, D.A.S. Herbst, N.N. Venter, K.P.C.O von Lieres und Wilkau, L.C. Masterson and 
K.H. Fisher were appointed in terms of Proclamation No 302 of 14 December 1979 as a 
commission to investigate and report upon news media reporting of defence matters and other 
related matters.18 The Commission was directed to submit its report before 15 March 1980.19 
In terms of the same Proclamation, the provisions of the Commissions Act, No 8 of 1947, 
were made applicable to the Commission and, in terms of Proclamation 14 of January 1980, 
regulations were issued that, inter alia, empowered the Commission to appoint one or more 
committees, each consisting of at least two of its members, to hear evidence and 
representations concerning any particular aspect of its terms of reference.20 In accordance 
with a decision taken on 12 December 1979, at the first meeting of the Commission, all 
interested parties, were notified, by means of the media and letters directed by the Secretary 
of the Commission to various bodies and persons.21 The first public sitting of the 
Commission was held in Pretoria on 14 January 1980.22  
 
During the period between 14 January 1980 to 7 March 1980, evidence and submissions were 
heard.23 The 45 bodies and persons of interest that presented evidence and submissions were 
heard in Pretoria except during the periods from 29 January to 1 February 1980 and from 3 
March to 7 March 1980 when the Commission sat in Cape Town.24 In addition a number of 
memoranda were received from other interested parties. In terms of Section 4 of the 
Commissions Act of 1947, the hearing of evidence, representations and submissions took 
place in public, with the exception of those aspects which the Chairman determined were to 
take place behind closed doors due to the sensitive and thus confidential nature thereof.25 All 
oral statements were recorded on tape and typed in such a way that the public and 
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confidential parts were easily separated from each other.26 The Commission recommended 
that the confidential evidence and submissions not be made public.  
 
The press reported on certain events regarding the Steyn Commission (1980), however, a 
number of activities undertaken by the Commission were conducted in camera, and thus the 
public and the media did not have access to these activities. The Commission could not keep 
out all of the damning evidence and witness testimonials against the military censorship from 
public view. For example, even Die Burger, which was widely known as a pro-government 
publication during the 1970s and 80s, published articles criticising the military and 
governmental institutions of apartheid South Africa. On Friday 1 February 1980, Die Burger 
led with a story with the heading “Military leads media in illusion regarding war”.27 In the 
article, Johan Coetzee, a defence correspondent for the Huisgenoot and an officer in the 
Citizen Force, who was a witness at the Steyn Commission (1980) and delivered testimony, 
was quoted as saying “SA is involved in a war. As a soldier I am aware of this. As a defence 
correspondent it does not feel like it”.28 This speaks to the credibility gap that existed 
between the military and the public. The military did not trust the media to report on issues 
relating to defence matters, and thus proceeded to shut out the local media. On Tuesday 15 
April 1980 Die Burger reported on the Steyn Commission once more with an article with the 
heading “Control requested over foreign propaganda”.29 The article reported that legislation 
which grants the apartheid government comprehensive control over all propaganda and 
intelligence monitoring, was recommended by the Steyn Commission (1980).30 Contained 
within the same edition, was another report regarding the Steyn Commission (1980).The 
article was headed “Military would ban all” and stated that the official SADF delegation at 
the Steyn Commission (1980) asked for an overall ban on all publications related to the 
SADF itself and that no information regarding the SADF should be published.31 However, on 
the following day, Wednesday 16 April 1980, Die Burger reverted back to its support of the 
apartheid government in an article under the byline Dawie saying that the Steyn Commission 
(1980) made a significant contribution to the potential of a fertile relationship between the 
media and the government of the day. This article went completely against the grain of what 
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Die Burger had been reporting previously regarding the Steyn Commission (1980) and the 
relationship between the government and the media. One can only speculate as to why Die 
Burger made such a drastic change regarding its view of the Steyn Commission. It is possible 
that Die Burger did not want to alienate its conservative readership or its allies in 
government. Dawie (which is an anonymous editorial published in Die Burger and still in 
existence today) could have also been used as a foil to create controversy in the court of 
public opinion.   
 
The Commission defined its general scope as any interests within apartheid South Africa, 
with regards to freedom of speech and disclosure of information on the one hand, and 
national security and keeping secret or confidential facts on the other. For the Commission, 
this was in essence a value judgement that could be properly made only against the 
background of the political nature of apartheid South Africa, and in the context of the 
prevailing circumstances in which the country found itself.32 The same holds true of the terms 
of reference as regards the effectiveness of legal provisions and the possible amendment 
thereof.33 For this reason, the Commission considered it necessary to hear a wide range of 
evidence and to gather information regarding the nature and extent of the conflict situation. 
The Commission saw the “threat” confronting apartheid South Africa as something which it 
probably would have had to be prepared to counter during the coming decades.34 The 
political nature and composition of the peoples of apartheid South Africa were also examined 
and considered in relation to the prevailing circumstances, the requirements with regard to 
delimitation, and other relevant issues.35 Consequently, the nature and scope of the whole 
conflict situation within which the delimitation of interests (boundaries within which the 
Commission worked) occurred, and the other terms of references carried out by the 
Commission, were reported on.36 
 
When analysing the general scope set out by the Commission itself, strong emphasis was 
placed on the political situation in South Africa at the time. Also, the phrase “conflict 
situation” is used throughout the report as a means of justifying the recommendations made 
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by the Commission. When referring to the “conflict situation” the Commission was referring 
to the perceived “Total Onslaught” being carried out on South Africa. Thus for the 
Commission to adequately investigate issues surrounding defence reporting, it also had to 
analyse the political context within which these events were taking place. It has to be 
emphasised that the Commission never truly sought to criticise the apartheid government, and 
thus its analysis of the “conflict situation” the country was facing was merely a means to 
endorse the apartheid government’s threat perceptions. For if the Commission found that the 
actions of the apartheid government were valid, it could then be argued that those actions 
were valid within a specific political context the country found itself in. This argument could 
then be the loophole that the Commission needed to justify oppressive regulations set out by 
the apartheid government limiting press freedom. Thus the “conflict situation” as referred to 
by the Commission, provides an excuse for supporting the actions of the apartheid 
government. The balance between freedom of speech and access to information regarding 
security matters and keeping confidential facts from the public was seen as a “value 
judgement” by the Commission and could not be accurately explained without evaluating the 
political circumstances of apartheid South Africa perceived threats to the country. Thus the 
Commission always had the “conflict situation” and threats to the country as background for 
its analysis. This leads to the conclusion that either the Commission was tainted and biased 
from the start, or it simply framed its report within the hegemonic apartheid discourse of the 
time.  
 
The Report itself was divided into six sections. Namely: (1) The present South African 
political and social dispensation and state of affairs, including the factors giving rise to the 
prevailing conflict situation; (2) The nature and scope of that conflict situation, and the 
probable unfolding and development thereof during the eighties; (3) The nature of the news 
media and their role in effective and successful support of the South African “developmental 
dynamism” and in countering the danger facing the country and its peoples; (4) The 
delimitation of interests as set out in the terms of reference and the reconciliation of the 
interests thus delimited; (5) The investigation of, and recommendations concerning, the 
effectiveness of the relevant statutory provisions and the necessity and equitability of 
amending and/or supplementing existing legislation should the present provisions appear 
ineffective, as well as the suggested amendments and/or supplementary legislation, if deemed 
essential and equitable. And lastly a Summary and Recommendations section.  
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The Steyn Commission made a myriad of recommendations regarding the relationship 
between the SADF and the media. The following is a summary of these recommendations. It 
recommended that: first, the SADF should give attention to the improvement of internal 
liaison and to methods of improving the liaison work with the media, by way of a higher level 
of professionalism as well as efficient and timely liaison centres away from Pretoria.37 
Second, meaningful briefings and dialogue between the media and the SADF be expanded.38 
Third, that the media give urgent attention to the improved professionalisation of journalism 
and that in any event only senior journalists be assigned to handle SADF affairs.39 Fourth, 
that a system of registration of foreign journalists who work in the RSA be instituted.40 Fifth, 
that a clearly formulated communication policy and plan for the RSA be developed as an 
additional aspect of the national strategy. 41 The Official Secrets Act of 1956 should be 
revised so as to restrict its ambit (it was repealed and replaced with the Protection of 
Information Act of 1982).42 The committee added that it had to be borne in mind, that the 
processes of Government became more sophisticated and increasingly affected the affairs of 
all citizens because the dangers to the state changed in character and became more complex.43  
 
The Commission made specific recommendations regarding the Defence Act 1957. In section 
104(5) it is stated that in order to blunt the spear-point of possible enemy propaganda based 
upon unpunished misdeeds which become unpunishable due to miscreants leaving the 
security forces or who for other reasons are no longer subject to their jurisdiction, it was 
recommended that in respect of the SADF Section 104(5) be amended.44 This was a reference 
to security leaks that were taking place. Members of the security forces were supplying 
apartheid South Africa’s enemies with vital information pertaining to national security. Such 
an example was that of Commodore Dieter Gerhardt who would be exposed as a spy. 
Through his father’s influence he joined the navy.45 In recognition of his leadership potential, 
Gerhardt went overseas on several occasions for training course in the British navy.46 This 
                                                          
37 Ibid., 
38 Ibid., 
39 Ibid., 
40 Ibid., 
41 Ibid., 
42 Ibid., 
43 Ibid., 
44 Ibid., 
45 South African History Archives, interview with General Herman Stadler, 31 August 2009 
46 Ibid., 
105 
 
was during a time when the British navy still acted like a mentor for the South African 
navy.47  While overseas again he decided he wanted to make extra money.48 He first 
approached the American consulate, but they rejected him.49 He then went to the Soviet 
embassy.50 After a while he copied documents from the British navy and took it to them and 
told them that he wanted to work for them.51 They then started training him specifically in 
photography and photographic related skills.52 He worked for a period of 30 years, from 1963 
to 1983, for the Soviet Union.53 He severely compromised the defence force, in particular the 
navy.54 Gerhardt was able to exploit the confidence placed in him as commanding officer of 
Simonstown naval base. He, and his second wife Ruth Gerhardt, were sentenced to life 
imprisonment and ten years' imprisonment respectively, being found guilty of high treason on 
charges of spying for the Soviet Union.55  
 
The media was quick to report on the Gerhardt saga (even though it only became public 
knowledge after the first Steyn Commission). On 27 January 1983, one day after the press 
conference made by the South African government regarding Gerhardt’s arrest, various 
newspapers reported the story. The Rand Daily Mail had a front page article with the headline 
“Navy man in Red spy case”.56 The article was written by John Battersby, the political 
correspondent of the Rand Daily Mail.57 The article stated that Commodore Dieter Gerhardt, 
who was commanding the Simonstown naval dockyard, had been detained and that this sent 
shockwaves through the SADF.58 The article also mentioned that he was being held under 
section 29 of the Internal Security Act.59 The article also reported on the press conference on 
26 January 1983 held by PW Botha, Minister of Law and Order Le Grange and Minister of 
Defence Malan that announced the arrest of Gerhardt.60 According to the article Botha 
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mentioned at the press conference that sensitive information had already been leaked to the 
Soviet Union.61 Also on the front page of the Rand Daily Mail was an article written by Chris 
Olckers with the heading “Top Naval Officer, wife may face death sentence”.62 This was due 
to the fact that if it was found that information passed on by Gerhardt and his wife to the 
Soviet Union had resulted in the death of a SADF member, they could be given the death 
penalty. The EP Herald also reported on the Gerhardt saga with an article on the front page 
of the 27 January 1983 edition with the headline “Navy spy bombshell”.63 However, Die 
Burger’s report was far more thorough than that of the EP Herald. Die Burger led with 
multiple front page articles regarding the Gerhardt saga written by different correspondents. 
The main headline was “Spy Revelations” with sub-heading “Big Money hidden in Swiss 
bank account”.64 The main article was written by Tim Du Plessis, regarding Gerhardt’s arrest 
and the press conference held by PW Botha.65 The article mentions that Botha stated at the 
press conference that Soviet interests were placed ahead of South African interests.66 Gideon 
Joubert, defence correspondent for Die Burger, also wrote a front page article detailing how 
Gerhardt had access to highly sensitive information and how Gerhardt compromised the 
entire defence force of South Africa.67 He also interviewed some of Gerhardt’s colleagues, all 
of whom expressed their shock.68 The government’s handling of the matter shows that the 
SADF was loathe to divulge state secrets to the media before it made a public statement.  
 
The Gerhardt incident harmed the intelligence services of the apartheid government, and the 
manner in which the Gerhardt saga was sensationalised by the local media only added to the 
PR damage to the South African intelligence community already caused. The Gerhardt saga 
is pertinent to the Steyn Commission as it was not the media that divulged sensitive 
information about the SADF, but rather it was the SADF’s own members whose actions 
betrayed its secrets. Ironically, the SADF had as much – if not more - reason to distrust its 
own members than the media. 
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The Commission also recommended various amendments to Section 118 (I) which relates to 
the improper disclosure of information. The Commission recommended that the basis of 
authorisation accorded the Minister in sub-section 1 to release information and allow 
publication should be broadened to allow him to give a priori permission for the publication 
of certain categories of news included in the prohibition.69 Thus the Commission in essence 
recommended that the Minister of Defence be given greater censorship powers. The 
Commission also recommended that the ambit of Section 118 (1) (a) “that any information 
relating to the defence of the Union is secret” and (b) “Where the accused is proved to be, or 
have been a member of the SADF” has to be restricted and clarified especially to enable the 
press to perform its watchdog role but without endangering the security of the Defence Force 
during operations.70 (c) Provision had to be made to identify the responsible officer who may 
release information during any joint operations with the SAP in connection with the 
combating of terrorism.71 (d) The whole of section 118 is widely and vaguely formulated and 
the suggested redrafting attempts to engender more clarity and precision whilst 
simultaneously preserving and protecting that basic information requiring protection.72  
 
Thus in summary the Steyn Commission suggested the following recommendations:  
That the SADF and the SAP should give attention to improving their liaison with the media 
through the greater professionalism of their PROs and through more timeous liaison in the 
main centres outside Pretoria.73  The media, for its part, must give urgent attention to better 
professionalising of journalism as a calling and in any case only senior journalists should be 
appointed to handle SADF and SAP matters.74 The system of accrediting correspondents 
should be refined so that the correspondents did not regard defence and police reporting as 
just another beat, but as a field in which there could be proper reporting and insight in 
depth.75 To this end, the military and police liaison offices should provide more meaningful 
briefings.76 As a general principle, the Commission recommended that Government secrecy 
should be meaningful and restricted to the minimum necessary to safeguard the security of 
                                                          
69 Ibid., 
70 Ibid., 
71 Ibid., 
72 Ibid., 
73Ibid., 
74 Ibid., 
75 Ibid., 
76 Ibid., 
108 
 
the state and the community.77  
 
According to Addison the prescription for an integrated communications policy in which the 
news media were to play a role had definite totalitarian overtones.78 Addison is mistaken 
here, in that as shown in Chapter 3, apartheid South Africa should rather be described as an 
authoritarian state, and not a totalitarian one. The Commission insisted that the press was not 
to be deprived of its watchdog role, and that its right to report matters of public concern 
should be limited only where matters adversely affecting the security of the state were at 
play.79 Over sensitivity by officialdom towards criticism sometimes led to unnecessary 
suppression of information and tended to create circumstances in which rumours thrived and 
panic occurred through uncertainty.80 What was needed between the authorities and the media 
was a partnership of mutual respect.81 Instead, the military insisted on keeping the media at 
arm’s length as if the relationship was a “marriage of convenience”. By exposing 
administrative malpractice, corruption, neglect and dishonesty, the press was not being 
disloyal but on the contrary was facilitating effectiveness and promoting a sound relationship 
between the community and the security forces.82 The Steyn Commission reckoned that it 
could achieve this without having to publish sensitive facts about operational methods, 
equipment or actions of the security forces, which had to remain secret.83 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, self-censorship and legislation were not the only ways in which 
journalists and the Department of Defence interacted with each other. The Newspaper Press 
Union (NPU) reached an agreement with the Minister of Defence in 1967 with a later 
amendment in 1979.84 The aim of this agreement was to create a work and liaison mechanism 
between the Directorate for Public Relations of the SADF and the Press Union.85 In 
accordance with the agreement, a liaison committee was established with the purpose of 
discussing matters of policy and principle as often as necessary.86 The main aim of the 
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agreement was stated as follows: “The release to the press of as much information as may be 
released within the framework of security and with the least possible delay” (agreement 
clause 2).87 The SADF as well as the members of the press union, informed the Steyn 
Commission that voluntary regulation of reporting on the basis of the agreement was 
preferable to the implementation of existing legislation.88 This appears to suggest that the 
SADF and the media could see mutual benefits in a trusting relationship (like a “marriage”) 
between the two parties.  
 
According to the Steyn Commission, more than enough evidence existed to prove that the 
agreement between the Minister of Defence and the NPU functioned smoothly at the liaison 
committee level, but not within the NPU itself as well as among its members. Therefore, 
according to the Steyn Commission, the need of the SADF for stricter legislation was a valid 
claim. The SADF also wanted further powers and the means of dealing with those 
publications which did not belong to the NPU. The Commission was of the opinion, however, 
that the SADF had, in fact, at its disposal numerous legal tools, but that these were not 
utilised sufficiently and consequently had not been put to the test. The SADF gave evidence 
to the Commission that it would prefer to operate in accordance with the agreement, which 
according to the commission showed an attitude which indicates a readiness to communicate. 
It should be noted that the legal status of the agreement was questioned and therefore whether 
it was truly binding on both parties. What was certain, however, was that the Agreement 
could in no way replace legislation. At the most it was “a tool for facilitating sound and 
healthy communication”.89 The Commission suggested that the Agreement should be retained 
and refined, it should be utilised within the framework of strict legislation, and be given legal 
status.90 Accredited correspondents was a system that was implemented to give limited access 
to journalists with regards to the SADF and security matters. This system was essential in 
ensuring that sensitive information did not get published. The system ensured a continuity of 
accredited correspondents so that the relationships not be damaged by inexperienced or 
incompetent journalists.  
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The press took a keen interest and reported extensively on the Steyn Commission (1980). The 
following newspaper reports were sampled in order to illustrate how the 
recommendations/report of the Steyn Commission (1980) was reported on. The first is an 
article by the Rand Daily Mail published on16 April 1980 with the headline “A Report with 
two faces” which stated that the report of the Steyn Commission was a bizarre mixture of 
good and bad.91 The positives were that the watchdog status of the media was acknowledged 
and that only secrets that threaten the security of the country should be kept secret.92 Also, the 
government should work with the media, not against it.93 However, the media and the 
government cannot become partners, because that was not the intended role of the media.94 
Control over foreign journalists was a transparent way to control the flow of news.95 The 
scepticism, however, came into play with regards to the attitude which the government had 
displayed towards the media for a very long time.96 The article hinted that it was more likely 
the negative recommendations would be implemented.97 Another article was published in the 
Pretoria News on 15 April 1980 with the headline “Defence Reporting and the National 
Interest” which reported that the report of the Steyn Commission brought perspective and 
balance to a terrain which is generally known for being a problem area.98 On the one hand the 
importance of secrecy was emphasised whilst the role of the media as watchdog was still 
acknowledged.99 The government should appreciate the broad context within which the report 
was based and should not only notice the restrictive elements of the report.100 The call to 
change the Defence Act of 1957 in order to give the media more freedom in its watchdog role 
was also welcomed.101 And lastly, it speculated that the suggestion that foreign intelligence 
and propaganda activities be monitored would cause problems in the future.102 Thus it is 
evident that the reporting on the Steyn Commission (1980), much like the opinions regarding 
it, was quite varied.  
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MID Media-Analysis of the Steyn Commission (1980) 
 
Before any further analysis is done, it should be noted that the MID report dated 14 May 
1980 made special mention of the Steyn Commission and how it was being reported on in the 
media. The MID media-analysis reports, which was discussed in Chapter 3, mention the 
Steyn Commission (1980) and thus it is incorporated into this chapter which has specifically 
dealt with the Steyn Commission. What follows is an analysis of MID reports (mentioned in 
Chapter 3) which focused on the Steyn Commission (1980).  
 
The MID report separated the reporting on the Steyn Commission into two categories namely 
the Afrikaans and the English media. According to the information captured by the reports, 
the Afrikaans media received the report of the Steyn Commission in a positive manner. The 
Afrikaans media also agreed with all of the recommendations made by the Steyn 
Commission. The English media was far more cautious in its approach. They weighed the 
positive and negative aspects of the report on the Steyn Commission very carefully. The 
majority, however, saw it in a negative light and thus took the opportunity to criticise the 
government. Those sectors of the media which saw the Steyn Commission in a negative light 
explicitly stated that they did not have any real trust in the report or that they would change 
their opinion of the report once it is implemented by the government. The Rand Daily Mail 
also said that it became suspicious of government’s good intentions given the strained 
relationship that the newspaper already had with the government.103 The Steyn Commission 
was the largest opinion-forming topic in this specific report. This is due to the fact that the 
report of the Steyn Commission enjoyed plenty of attention in the media. The media 
attempted to see both the positive and negative aspects of the Steyn Commission. Thus the 
reports attempted to give a generally balanced distribution between positive, negative and 
neutral reporting regarding the Steyn Commission.  
 
The reporting on the Steyn Commission was also given a score regarding the attitude towards 
the Commission by the media. This score was calculated according to how frequently the 
Steyn Commission was being reported on within a specific time. In general, The Steyn 
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Commission was given a score as follows: Total Frequency: 143, positive: 30, neutral: 113, 
negative: 0.104 The Steyn Commission’s recommendations were also given a score, more 
specifically that the recommendations would be made into law fairly soon: Frequency: 47, 
Neutral: 47.105 The Steyn Commission’s findings was also given the following score: 
Frequency: 37, Neutral: 37.106 The MID analysis seems to suggest a far more positive 
analysis of the report by mainstream media than my own sampling of such material. It suited 
the MID to create the impression that the press was well disposed towards it. Presumably 
because the MID reports were meant for PW Botha and thus the leader had to be shielded 
from the truth. 
 
The Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media is not as 
important as the first Steyn Commission (1980). However it is still relevant as it relates to the 
reaction of the apartheid government towards media reporting. It did not specifically 
investigate issues pertaining to the relationship between the media and the military, as it was 
a more general investigation of the media. The Commission, similarly to the first Steyn 
Commission (1980), also made recommendations regarding the media. These 
recommendations came with the report on the Commission published in 1983.107  
 
On 27 June 1980, the Department of Interior Minister, Mr. AL Schlebusch, announced that 
Justice MT Steyn, chairman of the first Steyn Commission (1980), would chair The 
Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media.108 The appointment of the Commission was 
formally announced in Government Gazette 7106 dated 27 June 1980.109 The report of the 
Commission was based on information gathered by way of evidence, arguments, submission 
and exhibits. The Commission also took into account facts that were general knowledge or 
were reported in the press although not formally presented to it by way of evidence or 
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otherwise.110 The Commission serves as proof of the obsession which the apartheid 
government had regarding media reporting. Investigating the media’s reporting on defence 
matters was not sufficient for the apartheid government, thus a more general investigation of 
the media was also needed. And this investigation came in the form of The Commission of 
Inquiry into the Mass Media.   
 
The Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media could be heavily criticised for promoting a 
simplistic view of journalism.111 The Commission's version of patriotism, which was often 
invoked, saw the media as a servant of the state.112 For the Commission, the public’s “right to 
know” was subordinate to the “national interest”.113 Similar sentiments were shared by the 
first Steyn Commission (1980). The Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media was an 
admirer of the “Total Strategy” theory prevalent in apartheid South African political and 
military discourse during the 1970s and 1980s. The Commission was also a fervent supporter 
of the idea that the media should act in cooperation with the authorities. At the outset, the 
Commission stated that its concern was not just the ordinary or general practise of news 
reporting.114 For the Commission, the “problems” within the media went far deeper than just 
journalistic practices.115 The problem area identified was an attitude which shaped 
journalistic practices.116 This “attitude problem” of the media was seen as a “libertarian” ideal 
held by the media that freedom of the press implies absolute freedom. The Commission 
found that any “libertarian” view of freedom of the press should be rejected.117 The Steyn 
Commission went on to say that absolute freedom in the press exists nowhere and that 
freedom itself implies responsibility within the situation in which the media finds itself, 
including the circumstances of its country.118 However contrary to this, the Commission 
stated that it was not its intention to curb the principles of a free press in South Africa, 
because, according to the Commission, “without this free, vigorous and responsible press the 
South African community would be much poorer.119 In fact, (apartheid) South Africa without 
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press freedom is hard to imagine”.120 This made little sense as the Commission obviously 
contradicted itself. It recommended that the freedom of the press should be limited, yet at the 
same time it also stated that it had no intention of doing so. Although according to the 
Commission the apartheid government accepted principles of a free press, they placed more 
emphasis on the vital necessity of press loyalty and responsibility.121 This, again, is a 
completely contradictory ideal as the press could not be free and independent if it had to be 
loyal to the wishes of the apartheid government. The Commission stated that a loyal and 
responsible press does not simply imply a manipulated press, and that the major yardstick for 
loyalty lies in service to the community.122 However what the Commission failed to see was 
that if the freedom of the press was limited, its ability to serve the community would also be 
limited.   
 
The Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media came to the defence of the Steyn 
Commission (1980) after it was heavily criticised. The First Steyn Commission’s description 
of South Africa as a “developing and expanding democracy” was severely criticised on the 
grounds that South Africa was in fact a racially oppressive “pigmentocracy” (Commission’s 
own phrase) which denied the vast majority of the population the right to have a say in the 
decision-making at governmental level.123 The Commission found that this criticism was 
illegitimate and was simply anti-South African. Thus the second Commission agreed with the 
first in terms of its branding of apartheid South Africa as a “developing and expanding 
democracy”. This was clearly typical apartheid rhetoric and was in no way based in reality 
and more importantly, it was Steyn defending his earlier work within the previous media 
commission. Most worryingly was the Commission’s understanding and interpretation of the 
South African constitutional system. The constitutional system during apartheid was anything 
but fair and progressive, however it did allow for some freedoms for the white population.  
 
The Commission was established soon after the first Steyn Commission (1980) as the first 
Steyn Commission (1980) did not cover all aspects relating to media reporting. For the 
apartheid government a more general investigation of the media was also needed. The 
Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media was tasked with investigating into and reporting 
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on whether the conduct of the local South African mass media met the needs of the South 
African community at the time and, if not, how it could be improved upon. The Steyn 
Commission found that when it reported the local South African media did not meet the 
needs and requirements of the South African community and that it needed to be improved. It 
can be argued that the apartheid government appointed the Steyn Commission merely to 
diminish the fears of opposition groups. There was a multitude of legal means in place that 
the apartheid government used in the late 1970s and early 1980s to contain opposition 
opinions within the media and thus the public sphere. It is then possible to argue that the 
Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media was a tool used by the apartheid 
government to justify its control of the local media.   
 
The Commission itself noted that the apartheid government in its mandate to the Commission 
provided the following yardstick, “Whether the conduct of, and the handling of matters by, 
the mass media meet the needs and interests of the South African Community and the 
demands of the times, and if not, how they can be improved”.124 According to the 
Commission, the very emphasis on the needs and interests underlined the question whether 
broad community interests were sufficiently represented in and served by the media, or 
not.125 This section in the report can be seen as a justification that was used by the 
Commission to ensure that the public saw it as an autonomous entity that worked 
independently from the government and that it was a necessary Commission with a valid 
mandate.  
 
The Commission drew attention to the fact that the scope and ambit of the report was 
substantially larger and longer than originally intended. This was due to various reasons. 
Firstly, opposition to the idea that there was any onslaught whatsoever on apartheid South 
Africa existed. The Commission made special reference to the fact that the nature of both the 
demands of the times, needs and interests of the community and the question whether the 
media meet these demands and needs can be radically different in abnormal times from these 
pertaining to normal times.126 The Commission regarded “normal times” as when there was 
no opposition to apartheid and no security threat. It is debatable whether it was possible for 
“normal times” to exist in an abnormal (i.e. apartheid) society. Thus the Commission was 
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trying to absolve itself from an unsatisfactory finding by saying the needs and interests are 
being met within the context of “abnormal times” as the Commission saw it. The report stated 
that, secondly, “protagonists of black radical thought” refused and declined to submit and 
engage with the Commission despite invitation do to so.127 However the report itself provides 
no evidence that this was indeed the case. Presumably the black extra-parliamentary 
opposition did not recognise the legitimacy of the apartheid state nor the authority of its 
commissions. 
 
 
The Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media made various recommendations relating to 
the media. Even though the Commission did not specifically investigate the relationship 
between the media and the military, it did make mention of what it saw as problem areas 
within the relationship between the media and the Department of Defence. The Commission 
found that, “The standpoint of the authorities is, justifiably, that they have to interfere if the 
newspaper (or media) cannot discipline itself. It is obvious that the freedom of the press 
becomes ever more endangered in this way, even if a high value is placed upon it.”128 The 
intertwined elements of legislation and self-discipline enforced by the media clashed with the 
ideas of a free press. In this instance, the Commission served as a mouthpiece for the 
apartheid government. It implied that newspapers had a wide margin of freedom and that they 
were only limited by legal constraints which citizens were also subjected to. The Commission 
also recommended the registration of journalists.129 The purpose of registration was to sift out 
unfriendly reporters.130 Similar sentiments were shared by the first Steyn Commission (1980) 
that held that the media should have a specific role to play within the “Total Strategy” theory 
employed by apartheid South Africa. Both Commissions were in favour of a “loyal” media 
which took its direction from the apartheid government and was not allowed to independently 
report on security matters. Self-discipline by the press was also mentioned by the 
Commission. It was framed as a possible solution for the freedom versus legislation 
dichotomy. If the media practised self-censorship (or self-discipline as the Commission 
referred to it), the media would be doing the apartheid government’s work for it. The Report 
on the Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media’s findings and recommendations were 
widely criticised. The Steyn Commission argued that the manner in which to solve the 
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problems facing the media was through the "professionalization" of the media. Thus blaming 
the media’s apparent lack of professionalism for problems created by the apartheid 
government. 
 
The apartheid government saw it necessary for the media to make a clear distinction between 
reporting “that (which) really endangers the security of the country and general matters of 
public interest”.131 The apartheid government had realised that legislation could not possibly 
prevent everything that they deemed to be truly harmful from being published. Thus if the 
press enforced self-discipline or self-censorship the apartheid government could further 
entrench the lie that South Africa had a free press according to Western standards of the time. 
The Commission saw the problem of legislation dealing with the media and especially 
newspapers was basically the problem of which norms should be applied to hold the media to 
“their responsibilities”.132 The problem with legislation dealing with the media has always 
been definitional in nature. How can the state define what is “harmful” content without 
seemingly overstepping its reach? Thus newspapers enforcing self-censorship or self-
discipline by the standards of the apartheid government would have solved a large portion of 
this problem of dealing with the media reporting sensitive information for the apartheid 
government if the relationship was based on trust – like a “marriage”.    
 
It became clear that the Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media was inclined towards 
protecting the apartheid government’s policies regarding the media. This created a conflict 
situation between the media and the Commission. The conflict between the Commission and 
even relatively moderate sections of the commercial media was in essence a struggle over the 
right to reflect perceived reality.133 According to Merrett, Steyn was fundamentally 
antagonistic towards modern trends in journalism, so his conflict with the conservative as 
well as moderate press was technocratic as well as ideological.134 This was not the only 
criticism levelled at Steyn and the Commission. The appointment of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Mass Media was not widely welcomed by the media either. So much so that 
the Commission itself made mention of this. The Commission referred to a content analysis 
report which was done regarding reporting of the Commission which indicated a highly 
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negative attitude towards the Commission and its composition (no details were given 
regarding this content analysis report, or where it stems from).135 Another factor that the 
Commission recognised, was that the liberal media (or what the Commission deemed to be 
the liberal media) especially thought that the Commission would be a vehicle to shackle the 
media, specifically the opposition press which tended to be critical of the apartheid 
government and the military.136 The majority of the press had lukewarm feelings towards the 
Commission due to their suspicions of government intervention. These suspicions were 
justified as the Commission came across as being very pro-government. Also many, if not all 
of its recommendations echoed the sentiments made by the apartheid government regarding 
the media and freedom of the press.   
 
It is also important to single out the MID report of 15 August 1980 as it mentions the Second 
Steyn Commission. It was then simply referred to as the Media Commission as this was 
before Steyn was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission. The report offered the 
following analysis regarding the Commission: that the Commission investigating mass media 
reporting was being criticised and attacked by the media from all quarters.137 The most 
prominent criticism came from academics, who saw the entire undertaking as unnecessary.138 
There were also academics who completely rejected the commission because they felt that 
the commission would base its findings on information that was not scientifically obtained 
and was subjective.139 These sentiments were also conveyed in an article which was 
published in the newspaper Hoofstad on 1 July 1980 entitled: “Media Commission: Experts 
have their doubts.”140 The following problem areas were identified in the report: The scope of 
the report was too broad, there already existed enough legislation to keep the media in check 
and the appointment of the Commission came whilst the Press Union and the Government 
was still involved in talks regarding the first Steyn Commission (1980) report.141 Thus the 
apartheid government noted the criticism being levelled towards the second Steyn 
Commission as it was picked up within the MID media-analysis reports.   
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The fact that The Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media was set up soon after the first 
Steyn Commission (1980), shows that the situation in which the apartheid government found 
itself in forced it to take a serious stand regarding the media. Two prominent media 
commissions commissioned in close proximity of each other was not a regular occurrence 
within apartheid South Africa. Between the two commissions, the main concerns of the 
apartheid government regarding the media were specifically addressed. After the PR disasters 
of Operation Savannah and Reindeer, the role of the mass media within society as well as the 
manner in which the media reports on security matters had to be investigated. If this did not 
occur, the apartheid government ran the risk of having a repeat of the PR disasters of 
Operation Savannah and Reindeer. The second Steyn Commission became a supplement to 
the first Steyn Commission as it provided context with regards to how the mass media 
operated. The Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media saw the role of the media in terms 
of reassuring the white population worried about the growing pressure of social and political 
change facing apartheid South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s.142 It did this by way of 
propagating the view of the apartheid government regarding South African conditions.143 
 
  
Conclusion 
 
It is important to note that the historical context within which the two Steyn Commissions 
took place is vital to the analysis of the Commissions themselves. The subject matter which 
the Commissions covered always reverted back to the political situation within which 
apartheid South Africa found itself. At times, the Commissions attempted to directly address 
questions relevant to the then current political situation in apartheid South Africa. The 
manner in which the Commissions described South African society reinforced the 
propaganda of the apartheid government. The aim of the Commissions was to describe and 
comment on the nature and composition of the South African state and community. However 
they only succeed in propagating beliefs regarding the composition of the South African state 
and community similar to those of the apartheid government. Apartheid South Africa saw 
itself as a legitimate state, thus it always portrayed itself as the victim of conflict situations 
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caused by its enemies. Thus for both Steyn Commissions, the nature and role of the South 
African media was to form part of apartheid South Africa’s “Total Strategy” against the 
“Total Onslaught” posed by the enemies of South Africa. If the media of South Africa were to 
form part of the “Total Strategy” doctrine, legislation governing the media would have to be 
relevant and effective. Thus it was of crucial importance for the apartheid government that 
the Steyn Commissions investigated the effectiveness of the relevant legislation governing 
the media. 
 
Both Steyn Commissions occurred after Operations Savannah and Reindeer which left the 
SADF and the apartheid government with proverbial egg on its face. It can then be deduced 
that the Steyn Commissions were deployed to tighten loopholes that allowed the local media 
to pick up on stories reported by the international media. There is of course no direct causal 
relationship between Operations Savannah and Reindeer and the Steyn Commissions. 
However, as previously shown, there is circumstantial evidence (in absence of the in camera 
submissions) to show that the Steyn Commissions investigated the local media so as to 
concur with the apartheid government’s “Total Strategy” discourse. The only real leverage 
which the apartheid government had was to ban or register foreign media especially after the 
PR debacles of Operations Savannah and Reindeer.  The authoritarian tendencies of the 
apartheid government were defended and described as measures to ensure national safety.  
Thus censorship of security information was always defended by the Steyn Commissions no 
matter the consequences. The censorship of security information, as previously shown, 
created a dependence for the media on the military. This dependence was favourable for the 
military as it entrenched the “convenient marriage” between the military and the media. This 
also ensured that the media’s relationship with the military was a “marriage out of necessity”.  
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Conclusion 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to draw together the key issues and arguments articulated in 
the thesis. It will also be shown how findings made throughout the different chapters play a 
central role in answering the main question posed. This chapter will draw together each 
component of the arguments developed within the thesis in a logical and meaningful way. It 
will also summarise key points and show how they connect with the main question. This 
chapter will also show how the thesis relates to the overall field of research. It should be 
noted that these findings are not merely a summary of the different chapters of the thesis. It is 
rather a consolidation of the arguments presented in the body of the thesis. But the following 
summation will follow the sequence of the chapters in the thesis.  
 
In chapter 2, the thesis specifically focussed on censorship legislation. The thesis found that 
extremely strict censorship legislation existed within apartheid South Africa. An arsenal of 
legislation existed not only regarding censorship in general, but specifically relating to 
reporting on defence matters. The legislation made it incredibly difficult for defence 
correspondents to report on defence matters as they did not want to be prosecuted for 
breaking the law. The thesis showed how various forms of legislation was used by the 
apartheid government to ensure that information related to security matters did not reach the 
public sphere. The thesis showed the importance of the censorship legislation for the 
apartheid government because the apartheid government needed the legislation to control the 
media. Throughout the thesis, censorship legislation was emphasised as to show how it 
impacted the relationship between the media and the SADF. From this it can be deduced that 
censorship legislation promoted the secrecy needs of the SADF at the expense of the media’s 
right to publish information for purposes of informing the public. The barrage of censorship 
legislation ensured that the media could generally not independently report on defence 
matters. The Defence Act of 1957 (and amendments made up until 1980) was the most 
important piece of legislation as it limited the freedom of the media to publish reports about 
defence matters. As chapter 2 showed, the 1957 Defence Act stipulates conditions details 
regarding reporting on defence matters.  
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Harold Lasswell (1941) coined the phrase the “Garrison State” and defined it as a society in 
which its most powerful and influential members are those either closely associated with the 
military, or are members of it. The thesis found that apartheid South Africa was a “Garrison 
State”. It was shown in chapter 3 that apartheid South Africa was a highly militarised society 
with authoritarian tendencies. The Department of Defence White Paper of 1977 which 
outlined apartheid South Africa’s “Total Strategy” as an answer to the perceived “Total 
Onslaught” that was being waged against the country was a very important document. It 
showed how apartheid South Africa used the French military theorist Andre Beaufre’s “Total 
Strategy” theory to frame its policies. These policies justified the steps taken to ensure that 
the country became a “Garrison State”. Chapter 3 details the theory of “Total Strategy” and 
the “Garrison State” and how this impacted on the relationship between the SADF and the 
media. Referring to apartheid South Africa as a “Garrison State” is not only a useful 
categorisation, it also assists in contextualising the environment in which the media had to 
operate. As the thesis showed throughout, this was a very difficult and authoritarian 
environment which was not conducive to in depth reporting on defence matters. Chapter 3 
also details the Military Intelligence Department’s secret monitoring of the media’s reporting 
on the SADF and PW Botha. The question that the thesis asked was why was a military 
department monitoring the media? The thesis found that apartheid South Africa embodied the 
characteristics of the “Garrison State” and so enabled the military establishment to influence 
the apartheid government to a greater degree than what would have been the case in other 
societies which are/were not authoritarian in nature. The thesis cited examples of the USA 
and the UK both of which have civil departments (the NSA and MI5) which undertake 
monitoring roles within their societies. Thus the purpose of the MID monitoring the media 
was the first step to ascertaining whether the media was complying with the draconian 
censorship laws. It also gave the military insight into how the media perceived the SADF, i.e. 
what image it projected. 
 
A fairly large section of the thesis is dedicated to discussing the manner in which defence 
correspondents interacted with the Department of Defence. The thesis found that the defence 
correspondents sampled interacted in various manners with the Department of Defence. The 
thesis provided contrasting examples of Bob Hitchcock of the Rand Daily Mail and Gideon 
Joubert of Die Burger. As shown in chapter 4, Hitchcock had his accreditation as a defence 
correspondent revoked for criticising the defence establishment even though he was never 
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overtly anti-military. Gideon Joubert, who can be described as pro-military, never criticised 
the defence establishment, and never had his accreditation as a defence correspondent 
revoked. Such case studies show how the relationship between the SADF and the media 
functioned at its most basic level. The thesis found that defence correspondents acting on 
behalf of their respective media organisations who criticised the SADF were effectively cut 
off from information regarding defence matters. It is important to note how the defence 
establishment acted as a gatekeeper in terms of reporting on defence matters. Defence 
correspondents were not allowed to report on any issues relating to defence matters unless it 
was pre-approved by the Department of Defence via its Liaison Officers. Thus the thesis 
found that defence correspondents operated in a very difficult and secretive environment.    
 
After the relationship between defence correspondents and the Department of Defence was 
analysed, chapter 4 provided an analysis of the political fallout of both Operation Savannah 
and Operation Reindeer. The thesis first offers an account of the Operations and also the 
media coverage of them. The thesis used these two case studies to show how the consistent 
reply of “no comment” made by the defence establishment to the media only resulted in 
worsening the crisis situation caused by these Operations. Also, the thesis examined these 
Operations to show how the military failed to take the media into its confidence. Chapter 4 
shows that the military was short sighted in not taking the media into its confidence in that it 
could have used the media to reduce the damaged caused by the political fallout of the 
Operations. Therefore, the thesis found that the military did not trust the media, and that it 
repeatedly favoured the “no comment” reply rather than working with the media. The thesis 
also found that Operations Savannah and Reindeer were Public Relations disasters for the 
SADF because they exposed the SADF. Operation Savannah not only exposed the SADF as 
being inadequately prepared to defend the country, but also as being overly secretive and 
dishonest in its dealings with the public. The fact that SADF troops had crossed into Angola 
without the knowledge of the South African public, and the consequent exposure of this by 
the international media, was a massive embarrassment for the military establishment of 
apartheid South Africa. The political fallout in the aftermath of Operation Reindeer was also a 
PR disaster for the SADF in that the SADF was accused of war crimes. The SADF’s failure 
to adequately deal with these allegations in the court of public opinion caused a further PR 
setback for the SADF. The SADF consequently lost the propaganda war with the MPLA and 
SWAPO. Therefore, the thesis found that the overall policy of secrecy by the SADF, its 
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distrust of the media and failure to take the media into its confidence, and the consistent reply 
of “no comment” ensured that Operation Savannah and Operation Reindeer became PR 
disasters.   
 
Chapter 5 analysed both Steyn Commissions. The purpose of the chapter was to analyse both 
Commissions and show what impact they had on the relationship between the 
government/SADF and the media. The chapter first gave an account of the appointment, 
primary task and recommendations of each Commission. The thesis found that it is important 
to note the relevance of these two Commissions as both made recommendations regarding the 
relationship between the media and the SADF. The thesis found that both Commissions 
portrayed the apartheid government in a positive light. Also, the authoritarian tendencies of 
the apartheid government were defended by the Commission and described as measures to 
ensure national safety. It should be noted, however, that both Commissions were never 
overtly protective of the apartheid government and its policies. The support was given via a 
more subtle and nuanced manner as to ensure that the notion that apartheid South Africa had 
a free press was not tainted. The chapter also showed how censoring reporting of security 
information was also supported by the Steyn Commissions. Therefore, the thesis found that 
both of the Steyn Commissions are crucial in understanding the relationship between the 
media and the SADF/apartheid government. The thesis also found that the Steyn 
Commissions had a negative effect on the relationship because it validated the secretive 
environment created by the apartheid state in which the media had to operate. It did so not 
only on the basis of its findings but also because it provided for in camera hearings of matters 
deemed to be sensitive to national security. 
 
The overall conclusion regarding the nature of the relationship between the media and the 
SADF can be found in the manner in which it was framed and contextualised within the 
thesis. The analogy of a “difficult” or “dysfunctional marriage” has limitations as it does not 
fit with the specific characteristics of the relationship. Framing the relationship, and calling it 
“dysfunctional” or “difficult” would not be specific enough as a more detailed description is 
required to characterise the relationship. The thesis found that the relationship between the 
SADF and the media is two dimensional, from the perspective of the SADF the relationship 
could be characterised as a “convenient marriage” and for the media as a “marriage out of 
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necessity”. This was due to the deep-seated mistrust which the SADF had regarding the 
media and how it acted as a gatekeeper of defence information. The SADF, along with its 
allies in government, created an environment in which it was almost impossible to practice 
independent journalism. However, the thesis also found that not all media institutions and the 
defence correspondents reporting for them were victimised by this relationship. Pro-SADF 
media organisations (generally espousing conservative political ideologies) were given inside 
information which their competitors did not have access to. Thus the media organisations and 
defence correspondents who wanted to act independently of the wishes of the SADF were 
side lined and had to rely on media briefings issued by the SADF to all media outlets. 
Therefore, the thesis found that the relationship between the SADF and the media was very 
complex in nature, and that the relationship was unequal and lopsided with the SADF itself 
practising favouritism towards pro-SADF media organisations.    
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